Giant Food Stores v. MARKETPLACE COMMUNICATIONS
Decision Date | 24 July 1989 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 88-1732. |
Citation | 717 F. Supp. 1071 |
Parties | GIANT FOOD STORES, INC., Plaintiff, v. MARKETPLACE COMMUNICATIONS CORP., Shelfvision, Inc., MCC of Oregon, Inc., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Wayne F. Shade, Carlisle, Pa., for plaintiff.
Myrna G. Baskin, Stanley J. Adelman, Michael L. Daugherty, Rudnick and Wolfe, Chicago, Ill., Thomas D. Caldwell, Jr., Richard B. Swartz, Harrisburg, Pa., for defendants.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, plaintiff, Giant Food Stores, Inc. (Giant), has moved for summary judgment against defendants, Marketplace Communications Corp. (Marketplace), Shelfvision, Inc. (Shelfvision), and MCC of Oregon, Inc. (MCC), in this diversity action controlled by Pennsylvania law, and removed here by the defendant, MCC.1 Giant has sued for breach of contract, contending that defendants have failed to pay certain minimum guarantees owed to it under the terms of an agreement under which defendants were entitled to place advertising on the shelves of plaintiff's supermarkets. MCC opposes the motion. We will examine it under the well established standard, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), bearing in mind the parties respective burdens on the motion. See Sorba v. Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 730, 98 L.Ed.2d 679 (1988).
From the pleadings, affidavits and admissions on file, the following is the undisputed background to this litigation. On June 16, 1986, plaintiff and Marketplace entered into a "Standard License Agreement," permitting Marketplace to position small advertising displays on the shelves of plaintiff's supermarkets. This agreement was negotiated on behalf of Marketplace by Robert J. Ferrante, within the course and scope of his duties. (Ferrante affidavit, ¶ 3). In part, the agreement provided that Giant would receive a license fee based upon its "proportional share of thirty (30%) of the monthly net income" from the sale of the advertising space as further defined in the agreement. (second amended complaint, Exhibit A, ¶ 4.1). It also contained a clause permitting assignment by either party but requiring the written consent of the other party, "which consent was not to be unreasonably withheld." (Id., ¶ 9) (brackets added). Finally, the agreement was integrated. Paragraph 13.2 provided as follows:
Modification. This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties, and unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, no modification or waiver of any of the provisions, or any future representation, promise, or addition shall be binding upon the parties unless made in writing and signed by both parties.
On November 13, 1987, Shelfvision, without first receiving the written consent of Giant, assigned the agreement to Actmedia, Inc. (Actmedia), a stranger to this litigation. Thereafter, defendants made payments under the agreement until May 9, 1988. Plaintiff has received no payments from Actmedia.2 In this action it seeks as damages the difference between payments received from defendants and the amount of certain minimum guarantees made by Ferrante at the time the agreement was executed but admittedly not included in that document.
As proof of these guarantees, plaintiff has submitted a letter, dated June 2, 1986, from Ferrante to Allan Noddle of Giant who negotiated the deal on behalf of plaintiff. The letter stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
(second amended complaint, Exhibit B).
Noddle responded by letter, dated June 10, 1986, which read, in relevant part:
(second amended complaint, Exhibit E) (emphasis in original).
The June 10th letter also enclosed two copies of the Standard License Agreement which had been executed on behalf of Giant by Noddle. As noted, the agreement was dated June 16, 1986.
Plaintiff contends the parties subsequently entered into a verbal agreement concerning the new store not covered by the previous guarantees. This agreement, modifying the previous guarantees, was memorialized in a memorandum, dated July 16, 1986, authored by Noddle, and copied to Ferrante, among others. That memorandum read, in pertinent part, as follows:
(second amended complaint, Exhibit F) (emphasis added in part).
The affidavit of Robert Ferrante confirms all of the foregoing, and in the absence of contradictory evidence from the defendant, we accept that affidavit as proof of the existence of the oral agreements concerning the minimum guarantees.3 Specifically, Ferrante affirms that "one of the inducements offered by Marketplace ... for Plaintiff to enter into the written agreement was a written guarantee for minimum compensation ... under the terms of that agreement." (Ferrante affidavit, ¶ 5) (brackets added). This minimum compensation, set forth in his June 2nd letter to Noddle, (Id. ¶ 7), and confirmed in Noddle's letter to him of June 10th, constituted part of the agreement between the parties. (Id. ¶ 12). The minimum guarantees were not included in the formal written agreement because the guarantees (Id. ¶ 13).
Ferrante also affirmed the increase in the guarantees occasioned by the opening of the new store. As he put it:
(Id. ¶¶ 15, 16).
Defendant's main defense is that the written agreement is integrated, thereby precluding any attempt to prove additional terms concerning guarantees of minimum compensation or other collateral agreements.4 The general rule in Pennsylvania is that:
Alleged prior or contemporaneous oral representations or agreements concerning subjects that are specifically dealt with in the written contract are merged in or superseded by that contract. Bardwell v. Willis Co., 375 Pa. 503, 507, 100 A.2d 102, 104 (1953). The effect of an integration clause is to make the parol evidence rule particularly applicable. National Cash Register Co. v. Modern Transfer Co., Inc., 224 Pa.Super. 138, 144, 302 A.2d 486, 489 (1973).
McGuire v. Schneider, Inc., 368 Pa.Super. 344, 349, 534 A.2d 115, 117 (1987), aff'd per curiam, 519 Pa. 439, 548 A.2d 1223 (1988) (table).
But there is an exception to the parol evidence rule when the party seeking to enforce the agreement as written has made admissions that the agreement does not, in fact, constitute the entire agreement between the parties even when it contains an integration clause. See Coal Operators Casualty Co. v. Charles T. Easterby and Co., Inc., 440 Pa. 218, 269 A.2d 671 (1970).
In Coal Operators, the appellant insurance company and the appellee insurance agency executed an agreement on January 6, 1961, authorizing the appellee, Charles T. Easterby and Co., to sell insurance policies on behalf of Coal Operators in certain areas of Pennsylvania. The agreement reserved the company's right to appoint other agents in the same...
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