Giarratano v. Huntington Ingalls Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-88 |
| Parties | KELLY GIARRATANO v. HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
SECTION “D” (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before me is Plaintiff Kelly Giarratano's Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash. ECF No. 134. Defendant Huntington Ingalls Incorporated timely filed an Opposition Memorandum. ECF No. 137. Plaintiff sought expedited hearing, which was granted. ECF No. 135, 136. The Court held a hearing on the motion on Monday, October 31, 2022, and thereafter took the matter under advisement.
Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the reasons stated herein.
Plaintiff Kelly Giarratano filed suit against Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (“HII”) and numerous other defendants in state court alleging that she contracted asbestos-related lung cancer and other health effects from exposure to asbestos brought home from work by her grandfather between 1962-1979. ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 3 10-11. HII removed based on federal officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (ECF No. 1) after which Plaintiff filed a First Amended and Supplemental Complaint. ECF No. 53. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint seeks a variety of damages, including:
HII issued discovery asking for the identity of all medical providers addressing any asbestos-related conditions (Interrogatory No. 17) as well as HIPAA compliant medical authorizations directed to every medical provider who has provided any care for the last 30+ years (since January 1, 1990) (Request for Production No. 3). ECF No. 137-1 at 8, 10. Plaintiff objected to these requests. ECF No. 137-3 at 7, 41.
Plaintiff now seeks to quash the subpoenas to four medical providers (LSU Healthcare Network Kenner Multispecialty Clinic, Dr. Andrew Tilton, Dr. Madeline Crilly, and Dr. James Campbell). ECF No. 134-1 at 2. Plaintiff argues that the subpoenas are procedurally defective because HII provided only 6 days' advance notice rather than the 7-day advance notice required by La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3715.1. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff also argues that the subpoenas are overly broad, seek irrelevant and privileged information, and are not proportional to the needs of the case because the subpoenas seek information about unrelated medical conditions. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also asks for a protective order limiting the use and disclosure to this litigation. Id. at 5.
In its Opposition, HII explains that it sent copies of its medical provider subpoenas to all parties on October 5, 2022 and began serving same on the medical providers on October 11, 2022. ECF No. 137 at 3; see also ECF Nos. 134-9, 137-4. HII contends that, because Plaintiff is suffering from lung cancer, smoking history, cessation and related conditions, primary care physician records are relevant. ECF No. 137, at 3. It argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy Rule 45's burden to quash the subpoenas, federal (not state) law provides the procedural requirements, Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the subpoenas based on overbreadth, proportionality and relevance, and Plaintiff's medical records are neither irrelevant nor privileged as she waived any privilege by placing her health at issue in this case. Id. at 4-10.
In Reply, Plaintiff argues that Rule 34 does not permit the court or another party to compel a party to sign a medical records release authorization. ECF No. 142, at 2. Plaintiff also argues that state privilege law applies under Fed.R.Evid. 501 because her claims are based on state law, and thus, state law supplies the rules of decision. Id. at 3-4. Further, she argues that she has standing to object to the subpoena because she has a personal right or privilege in the medical records documents sought from the third parties. Id. at 5. Finally, Plaintiff reiterates her prior arguments that medical records unrelated to the diagnosis at issue are irrelevant and privileged and that HII's request is overbroad and burdensome insofar as it is not limited to records after her cancer diagnosis on August 12, 2021. Id. at 2, 6-7.
Under Rule 26, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26(b)(2)(C) directs the Court to limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed, if it determines: (1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (2) the party seeking discovery had ample opportunity to obtain the information; or (3) the proposed discovery is outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).
The relevancy evaluation necessarily begins with an examination of Plaintiff's claims.[2]The threshold for relevance at the discovery stage is lower than the threshold for relevance of admissibility of evidence at the trial stage.[3] This broader scope is necessary given the nature of litigation, where determinations of relevance for discovery purposes are made well in advance of trial. Facts that are not considered in determining the ultimate issues may be eliminated in due course of the proceeding.[4]
At the discovery stage, relevance includes “[a]ny matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”[5] Discovery should be allowed unless the party opposing discovery establishes that the information sought “can have no possible bearing on the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery.”[6] If relevance is in doubt, the court should be permissive in allowing discovery.[7]
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(a)(1), a party may serve a subpoena that commands a nonparty to whom it is directed to, among other things, produce designated documents in that person's possession, custody or control. Third-party subpoenas are discovery devices which, although governed in the first instance by Rule 45, are also subject to the parameters established by Rule 26.[8] Rule 45 provides additional protections when subpoenas are issued to non-parties. Specifically, the party issuing a subpoena to a non-party “must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(1).
The obligation to comply with a subpoena may be suspended by timely filing written objections or a motion to quash. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(2)(B); 45(d)(3). On timely motion, the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that: (1) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (2) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (3) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (4) subjects a person to undue burden. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(3). “Both Rules 45 and 26 authorize the court to modify a subpoena duces tecum when its scope exceeds the boundaries of permissible discovery or otherwise violates the parameters of Rule 45,”[9]and modification is preferable to quashing the subpoena outright.[10]
The person filing the motion to quash has the burden of proof to demonstrate that compliance would impose undue burden or expense.[11] To determine whether the subpoena presents an undue burden, the Fifth Circuit considers the following factors: (1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.[12] “Whether a burdensome subpoena is reasonable must be determined according to the facts of the case, such as the party's need for the documents and the nature and importance of the litigation.”[13] “Further, if the person to whom the document request is made is a non-party, the court may also consider the expense and inconvenience to the non-party.”[14]
A party, however, may not seek to quash a subpoena directed to a third party when the party is not in possession of the materials subpoenaed and does not allege any personal right or privilege with respect to the materials subpoenaed because the party lacks standing.[15] Further, a party cannot challenge a Rule 45 subpoena directed to a third party on the basis that the subpoena is overly broad or seeks irrelevant information because only the responding third party can object and seek to quash a Rule 45 subpoena on those grounds.[16] A party who lacks standing under Rule 45 does,...
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