Gibbons v. Rhode Island Co.

• Decision Date: 10 July 1914
• Docket Number: No. 4717.,4717.
• Parties: GIBBONS v. RHODE ISLAND CO.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

91 A. 9

37 R.I. 89

GIBBONS

v. RHODE ISLAND CO.

No. 4717.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 10, 1914.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Chester W. Barrows, Judge.

Action by Flora Gibbons against the Rhode Island Company. Verdict for plaintiff, defendant's motion for new trial denied, and new trial ordered, unless plaintiff within seven days should remit the verdict in excess of $20,000, and plaintiff and defendant except. Exceptions overruled, and case remitted for new trial unless plaintiff, on or before July 20, 1914, file a remittitur of the verdict in excess of $20,000, with direction in case plaintiff filed such remittitur to enter judgment for that amount.

John W. Hogan and Philip S. Knauer, both of Providence, for plaintiff. Joseph C. Sweeney and Eugene J. Phillips, both of Providence, for defendant.

SWEETLAND, J. This is an action of trespass on the case to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff through the negligence of the defendant. The case was tried before a justice of the superior court sitting with a Jury. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $27,500. The defendant duly filed its motion for a new trial on the ground that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive. Said justice in his decision on said motion held that the amount of said verdict was excessive, and ordered that a new trial should be granted unless, within seven days, the plaintiff should remit all of said verdict in excess of $20,000. The plaintiff did not file her remittitur in accordance with said decision. The case is before us upon the plaintiff's exception to the decision of said justice on the motion for a new trial and upon the defendant's exceptions to certain rulings of said justice, upon the admission of evidence, made during the trial, and to the decision of said justice upon its motion for a new trial.

The defendant excepted to the ruling of said justice permitting the plaintiff, in cross-examination of a medical witness, who had qualified as an expert, to call the attention of said witness to certain testimony given by him in another case between different parties, which former testimony the plaintiff claimed was contradictory of the witness' testimony given in the case at bar. In direct examination this witness testified in regard to the condition of the plaintiff:

"I think she—I am very positively of the opinion that she has one thing and that is this so-called traumatic neurosis which has been testified to, that includes elements of hysteria."

Later, in cross-examination, the witness testified as follows:

"Q. 44. What do I understand you is the cause of this condition that you find, Doctor? A. I understand that the accident was the exciting cause; that the condition has been prolonged largely by litigation. Q. 45. And the condition is what? A. What is known as traumatic—some call it traumatic neurosis, some call it litigation neurosis at this stage, because after three years the effects of the original accident have presumably passed away and that of the litigation is the important one, long-continued study of herself, and so on. It is a mental condition largely."

And later, in cross-examination, the witness testified as follows:

"Q. 52. How long have you been diagnosing neurosis and neurasthenia following an accident, trauma? A. Oh, I suppose for—ever since the diagnosis originated. Ever since it originated. They used to call these cases spinal concussion long ago. When I was in the medical school they called them all spinal concussion. Then about the time I graduated the opinion was changing about them, that they were—that the spinal cord was not affected in these cases and it was a functional condition, and they began to call them traumatic neurosis and traumatic hysteria. That was along perhaps 1886, or something like that, and I have studied these cases ever since that time, as well as before. Q. 53. Traumatic neurasthenia and traumatic neurosis are in the same class? A. Well, in a way. Traumatic neurosis includes traumatic neurasthenia. Neurosis is a general term that includes hypochondria, hysteria, and neurasthenia. Q. 54. Does traumatic neurosis mean a larger field of injury and symptoms than traumatic neurasthenia?

A. Not necessarily. It may be smaller. Q. 55. Now, ever since you began in 1880, as I understand, to examine these cases you have made that diagnosis; that people have traumatic neurosis or neurasthenia from accident, trauma, injury, I want to know the length of time you have been doing it? A. Well, I should like to include also what I have done besides the length of time. I have examined and given opinions on these cases since certainly that time, say 1886. When I have made the diagnosis I have made it as I did here in this case, so-called traumatic neurosis. I carefully used the word 'so-called,' in view of the fact that it is not all due to the accident."

The plaintiff was then permitted to ask the witness, against the defendant's objection, if in a deposition given by the witness in another case he had not made certain general statements with regard to the diagnosis of neurasthenia resulting from accident, to which the witness replied that he had. The answers of the witness, contained in said deposition, in which these statements appeared were the following:

"Well, to tell the honest truth, the diagnosis of neurasthenia resulting from accident is one that I practically never make. I practically never made it. I don't regard accidents as a cause of neurasthenia;" and answer: "I mean I don't think that accidents cause neurasthenia as such. Neurasthenia may be set up by worry, anxiety, overwork, and I have sometimes made the diagnosis litigation neurasthenia in cases in which I thought that the worry and anxiety of litigation was putting the person into a more or less neurasthenic condition, but I don't think that an accident in itself is a legitimate cause of neurasthenia."

The grounds of the defendant's objection to this cross-examination is that it was testimony given in another case between different parties; that the answers contained in the deposition are not inconsistent with the testimony of the witness given upon the stand in this case, and that the examination must have created the impression upon the minds of a jury of laymen that there was such an inconsistency, although none existed. We do not find merit in the exception. It is proper cross-examination of an expert witness, who in his testimony has given...