Gibbons v. Shalodi
| Citation | 174 N.E.3d 832 |
| Decision Date | 07 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19CA011586,19CA011586 |
| Parties | Nadia GIBBONS, Administrator of the Estate of N.G., Deceased Appellant v. Summer SHALODI, et al., Appellees |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
DENNIS R. LANSDOWNE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
CARI FUSCO EVANS, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
{¶1} Appellant, Nadia Gibbons, administrator of the estate of N.G., appeals from the judgment of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court. For the reasons set forth below this Court affirms in part and reverses in part.
{¶2} In early 2015, Summer Shalodi met Ms. Gibbons and her daughter, N.G., while working as a teacher. Ms. Shalodi and Ms. Gibbons became friends. Ms. Shalodi was fond of N.G. and babysat the child on many occasions, including at her townhouse.
{¶3} In the afternoon of December 12, 2015, Ms. Gibbons brought seventeen-month-old N.G. to Ms. Shalodi's townhouse for an overnight babysitting stay. Late that evening and into the early morning hours of the next day, Ms. Shalodi left N.G. alone in her townhouse while she went to the movies and shopped. Ms. Shalodi returned to the townhouse sometime after 2:00 a.m. on December 13, 2015 and found N.G. unresponsive. Ms. Shalodi attempted, unsuccessfully, to revive N.G. At 6:34 a.m., Ms. Shalodi called 911, but the paramedics were unable to revive N.G. The coroner determined N.G. died from the combined effects of head trauma
and alprazolam1 intoxication.
{¶4} Ms. Shalodi was charged with multiple counts in N.G.’s death. Ms. Shalodi pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter, endangering children, and corrupting another with drugs and was sentenced to prison. Thereafter, Ms. Gibbons, as the administrator of the estate of N.G., filed a civil suit against Ms. Shalodi alleging claims for survivorship and wrongful death and seeking punitive damages.
{¶5} Four and a half months prior to N.G.’s death, Ms. Shalodi leased a townhouse and moved her personal belongings into the townhouse. Prior to leasing the townhouse, Ms. Shalodi had lived with her sister, R.H., and her brother-in-law in their house. Between August 2015 and December 2015, Ms. Shalodi spent time at both her townhouse and her sister's house. At the time of N.G.’s death R.H. had a homeowners insurance policy through Westfield National Insurance Company ("Westfield"). Westfield denied coverage to Ms. Shalodi and intervened in Ms. Gibbons’ lawsuit, seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not owe a duty to defend and indemnify Ms. Shalodi against Ms. Gibbons’ claims.
{¶6} Westfield filed a motion for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim. Ms. Shalodi did not file a brief in opposition to Westfield's motion for summary judgment; only Ms. Gibbons opposed Westfield's motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Westfield on the basis that Ms. Shalodi was not a resident of her sister's household and thus not an insured under the policy and entered a judgment declaring that Westfield did not owe a duty to indemnify Ms. Shalodi against Ms. Gibbons’ claims.
{¶7} Two weeks before trial, Ms. Shalodi's counsel, at her request, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. At a hearing, Ms. Shalodi consented to the withdrawal of counsel and further indicated that she did not want to "participate, in any way, in the jury trial." Counsel's motion to withdraw was granted and the jury trial proceeded with the magistrate presiding and without Ms. Shalodi's presence or defense. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Ms. Gibbons, as the administrator of the estate of N.G., and awarded compensatory damages of $5,000,000 for the survivorship claim and $30,250,000 for the wrongful death claim, and punitive damages in the amount of $35,250,000.
{¶8} The magistrate filed a magistrate's decision noting that Ms. Shalodi had not filed any post-trial motions challenging the jury's verdicts and recommending that a judgment be issued based upon the jury's verdicts which were attached thereto. No objections were filed to the magistrate's decision. The trial court adopted the magistrate's decision as to the compensatory damages awarded for the survivorship and wrongful death claims and rejected and vacated the punitive damages award.
{¶9} Ms. Gibbons timely appealed, asserting two assignments of error.
{¶10} Ms. Gibbons argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Westfield and declaring that Ms. Shalodi was not covered under her sister's homeowners insurance policy. We disagree.
{¶11} This Court reviews a trial court's decision granting summary judgment de novo. See Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. , 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Summary judgment is proper under Civ.R. 56(C) when: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only reach one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Civ.R. 56(C) ; Temple v. Wean United, Inc. , 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
{¶12} Summary judgment consists of a burden-shifting framework. The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact concerning the essential elements of the nonmoving party's case. Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). Specifically, the moving party must support the motion by pointing to some evidence in the record of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264. Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party has a "reciprocal burden" to " ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial[.]’ " Id. at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264, quoting Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶13} Westfield filed a motion for summary judgment as to its declaratory judgment claim regarding its duty to indemnify Ms. Shalodi in relation to Ms. Gibbons’ claims. Westfield asserted three alternate bases as to why it owed no duty to indemnify Ms. Shalodi: 1) she was not an insured under the policy, 2) coverage under the policy was not triggered because Ms. Shalodi's conduct was not an occurrence, and 3) coverage under the policy was excluded pursuant to coverage exclusions for intentional acts or bodily injury arising from physical abuse and/or use of controlled substances. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Westfield solely on the basis that Ms. Shalodi was not a resident of her sister's household and thus not an insured under the policy.
{¶14} The Westfield homeowners insurance policy provides coverage to those insured under the policy. The Westfield policy defines " ‘Insured’ " as including "any family member." Additionally, the policy defines " ‘Family member,’ " in pertinent part, as "a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household." The terms " ‘you’ " and " ‘your’ " are also defined in the policy as the " ‘named insured’ shown in the Declarations." The policy, however, does not define the words "resident" or "household" or the phrase "resident of your household."
{¶15} In order for Ms. Shalodi to be an insured under the Westfield policy she must be both related to the named insured and a resident of the named insured's household. There is no dispute that Westfield issued a policy to R.H., she was the named insured on the Declarations Page, and the policy was in effect at the time of N.G.’s death. Nor is there any dispute that Ms. Shalodi and R.H. are sisters related by blood. The only dispute is whether Ms. Shalodi was a resident of R.H.’s household.
{¶16} Given that the Westfield homeowners insurance policy does not define "household," "resident," or "resident of your household," these words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm , 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108, 652 N.E.2d 684 (1995). See, e.g., Shear v. West Am. Ins. Co. , 11 Ohio St.3d 162, 166, 464 N.E.2d 545 (1984) (); Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. LaMarr , 92 Ohio App.3d 331, 334, 635 N.E.2d 63 (9th Dist.1993) (). In Shear , the Ohio Supreme Court defined the term " ‘household,’ " when used in an insurance policy, as " ‘* * * those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family: * * * a social unit comprised of those living together in the same dwelling place * * *.’ " (Alterations in original.) Id. at 166, 464 N.E.2d 545, quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary. Additionally, the term " ‘resident’ " in the phrase " ‘resident of your household’ " in an insurance policy has been recognized in all of the Ohio appellate districts as meaning "one who lives in the home of the named insured for a period of some duration or regularity, although not necessarily there permanently, but excludes a temporary or transient visitor." Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc. v. Taylor , 39 Ohio App.3d 68, 70, 528 N.E.2d 968 (10th Dist.1987) ; Flynn v. State Farm Mut. Auto., Ins. Co. , 554 Fed.Appx. 430, 434-435 (6th Cir. 2014), fn. 5 (collecting cases). Accord Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Norton , 9th Dist. Medina No. 10CA0105-M, 2011-Ohio-6195, 2011 WL 6016926, ¶ 8.
{¶17} The primary consideration in determining whether a person is a resident of the insured household is the "nontemporary nature * * * or regularity of the living arrangements." Am. States Ins. Co. v. Guillermin , 108 Ohio App.3d 547, 554, 671 N.E.2d 317 (2d...
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