Gibbs v. General Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 11 February 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. B--1801,B--1801 |
| Citation | 450 S.W.2d 827 |
| Parties | Opal Dent GIBBS et al., Petitioner, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Collins, John E. Collins, Fanning & Harper, Peter S. Chamberlin, Dallas, for petitioner.
Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Martin & Unis, Royal H. Brin, Jr., Dallas, for respondent.
This suit was by John W. Alexander against Opal Dent Gibbs and husband, James E. Gibbs, and General Motors Corporation for damages for personal injuries sustained in a collision between an automobile driven by Alexander and a pickup truck, manufactured by General Motors and driven by Mrs. Gibbs. The Gibbs filed a third party action against General Motors. The trial court severed the claims against General Motors, granted General Motors' motion for summary judgment and, as to it, rendered judgment that Alexander and the Gibbs take nothing. The court of civil appeals affirmed. 445 S.W.2d 589. Only the Gibbs filed an application for writ of error. As to them, we reverse the judgments of both courts and remand the cause to the trial court.
The effort to impose liability on General Motors was based on the theory of strict liability in tort. It was alleged that the left front ball-joint unit on the pickup was defective, and that it had disintegrated or come apart, causing the left front wheel to collapse and the pickup to swerve into the Alexander automobile.
The court of civil appeals put the question before it in this language (445 S.W.2d at 590):
'Appellants correctly assert that the primary and controlling issue involved in this case is whether the summary judgment proof Raises a fact issue 1 concerning defectiveness of the upper left ball-joint unit on the Gibbs pickup at the time of the accident and at the time the truck left the General Motors factory.'
Pointing out that an essential element of appellants' case was proof that 'the ball-joint unit in question was defective at the time it left appellee's factory,' the court of civil appeals concluded (445 S.W.2d at 593):
'The record considered in its most favorable light to appellant Does not raise a fact issue which would support a finding in their favor on this essential element of their case.'
The two quotations illustrate a basic fallacy frequently found in the approach of some of our courts to the matter of rendering or affirming a summary judgment in favor of a defendant. In such cases, the question on appeal, as well as in the trial court, is Not whether the summary judgment proof Raises fact issues with reference to the essential elements of a plaintiff's claim or cause of action, but is whether the summary judgment proof Establishes as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. The last sentence of paragraph (c) of Rule 166--A, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, governs. It provides:
'The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, Show that, except as to the amount of damages, There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'
The provisions of Rule 166--A are applicable alike to defendants and plaintiffs who move for summary judgment; the judgment sought should be granted, and if granted should be affirmed, Only if the summary judgment record establishes a right thereto as a matter of law.
Affirmance of the trial court's summary judgment in this case was rested primarily by the court of civil appeals upon an affidavit of Marvin Miller, an investigator who qualified as an expert on automobile failures and who examined the ball-joint unit of the pickup after the accident. In his affidavit Miller gave it as his opinion 'that the wheel had actually come loose before the accident occurred and that this was the result of a ball joint...
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Ho v. University of Texas at Arlington
...more of the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970). To make such a showing concerning an affirmative defense, the defendant must prove there are no genuine issues of ma......
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...conclusively prove all essential elements of that defense. Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972); see Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970). Collateral estoppel is a defense constituting an avoidance and, therefore, is also an affirmative defense. Sysco Foo......
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...law, that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to one or more elements of the movant's cause or claim. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970). In resolving the issue of whether the movant has carried this burden, all evidence favorable to the non-movant must ......