Gibbs v. Helgemoe
| Citation | 367 A.2d 1041,116 N.H. 825 |
| Decision Date | 30 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 7467,7467 |
| Parties | Frank D. GIBBS v. Raymond A. HELGEMOE, Warden. |
| Court | Supreme Court of New Hampshire |
Michael E. Chubrich, of the New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union, Concord, for plaintiff.
David H. Souter, Atty. Gen., and Richard B. McNamara, Concord, Atty., for defendant.
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus (RSA ch. 534) or for the exercise of this court's power of general superintendence (RSA 490:4 (Supp.1975)) pertaining to plaintiff's detention at the State prison as a criminally insane person. Plaintiff who was charged with armed robbery (RSA 585:18 (1955)) first pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, on November 26, 1973, plaintiff changed his plea to not guilty by reason of insanity which was accepted by King, J. In accordance with a prior agreement, the State recommended that plaintiff be committed to the State hospital for life. However, the trial court heard testimony from a psychiatrist that the plaintiff's condition was diagnosed as a 'chronic schizophrenic reaction' and that the State prison would be a more appropriate place for his confinement. The court committed plaintiff to the State prison 'for life until or unless earlier discharged, released, or transferred by due course of law.' RSA 651:9.
Plaintiff maintains that his constitutional rights of due process and of equal protection have been violated because his committal is for life while the involuntary commitment under civil procedures of a mentally ill person 'shall (not) be valid for longer than two years.' For the original civil commitment order to be renewed there must be another judicial hearing proving that this person's mental condition is still such that he is potentially dangerous to himself and to others. RSA 135-B:38 (Supp.1975); see Dolcino v. Clifford, 114 N.H. 420, 321 A.2d 577 (1974). In contrast, the order committing the plaintiff for life sets out no procedure for his earlier discharge, release or transfer. A writ of habeas corpus can be resorted to but this places on the plaintiff the difficult burden of proving that his mental condition is such that he is no longer a danger to the public. RSA 534:1; Heath v. Vitek, 115 N.H. 200, 337 A.2d 345 (1975); Waite v. Jacobs, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 475 F.2d 392, 399 (1973); Comment, Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 116 U.Pa.L.Rev. 924, 938 (1968).
The legislature by Laws 1973, 556:1, now RSA ch. 135-B (Supp.1975) enacted a detailed code of civil procedures relating to the admission and treatment of the mentally ill. It is important to bear in mind that the plaintiff was committed to the State prison not because of his mental condition at the time he is alleged to have committed an armed robbery but on his mental condition at the time of his sentence. He was committed because the trial court found that at that time his mental condition was such that 'it (would) be dangerous that such person should go at large.' RSA 651:9; Bolton v. Harris, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 395 F.2d 642, 646 (1968).
'Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously insane of course may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all.' Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111, 86 S.Ct. 760, 763, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966). Involvement in the criminal process is an inadequate reason 'to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others.' Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 1851, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972); Commonwealth v. Druken, 356 Mass. 503, 507, 254 N.Ed.2d 779, 781 (1969); Holderbaum v. Watkins, 42 Ohio St.2d 372, 375, 328 N.E.2d 814, 816 (1975) (Brown, J. concurring); Comment, Commitment and Release Standards and Procedure: Uniform Treatment for the Mentally ill, 41 U.Chi.L.Rev. 825, 831-32 (1974).
About two years after its enactment of RSA ch. 135-B (Supp.1975) setting up civil procedures for the admission and treatment of the mentally ill, the legislature directed its attention to both the commitment and the release of the criminally insane. Laws 1975, ch. 388, now part of RSA ch. 651 (Supp.1975). It provided that when the forensic unit building and equipment at the State hospital are completed and in operation all criminally insane shall be committed to the State Hospital (RSA 651:9-a (Supp.1975)). At that time, RSA 651:9 (Supp.1975) which presently permits committals to the State prison will be repealed. However, the legislature provided in the same Act that effective July 1, 1975: . RSA 651:11-a (Supp.1975). Section 11-b provides that, effective July 1, 1975, 'Persons committed or transferred to the state hospital pursuant to this chapter shall be granted to rights set forth in RSA 135-B:42-46 ((Supp.1975) (rights of civilly committed mentally ill)).'
These amendments must be interpreted in light of the previously mentioned due process and equal protection requirements applicable to the involuntary commitment and release of mentally ill persons in general. Sibson v. State, 110 N.H. 8, 11, 259 A.2d 397, 400 (1969). It is apparent that the legislature was responding to the developing awareness of the neglected and helpless state of civilly and criminally committed mental patients. RSA 651:11-a (Supp.1975) imposes a two year limitation on the commitment of all criminally insane now in the State hospital or to be committed in the future. The statute reveals no legislative intent to withhold these benefits to the nine criminally insane including this plaintiff who had been committed to the State prison instead of to the State hospital.
We hold that plaintiff's confinement order is subject to the provisions of RSA 651:11-a (Supp.1975) requiring a judicial hearing for its renewal to be held within two years from the effective date of the statute, July 1, 1975, that is, on or before July 1, 1977. Otherwise the original order of commitment of November 26, 1975 shall then become null and void.
Essential elements in a commitment hearing are the nature of the burden of...
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