Gibbs v. United States

• Decision Date: 31 March 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:11–cv–75–J–34TEM.
• Citation: 865 F.Supp.2d 1127
• Parties: M. Eugene GIBBS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

865 F.Supp.2d 1127

M. Eugene GIBBS, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:11–cv–75–J–34TEM.

United States District Court,

M.D. Florida,

Jacksonville Division.

March 31, 2012.

M. Eugene Gibbs, Florence, SC, pro se.

Collette Bridget Cunningham, U.S. Attorney's Office, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 27; Motion to Dismiss), Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (Doc. 65), and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. (Doc. 81) (collectively “Motions to Amend”). The Motion to Dismiss was referred to the Honorable Thomas E. Morris, United States Magistrate Judge, for a Report and Recommendation regarding an appropriate resolution of the motion, (Doc. 80; 10/11/11 Order), and the Motions to Amend were referred to Judge Morris for disposition as a nondispositive matter. SeeRule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)); Rule 6.01, Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (“Local Rules”) On January 17, 2012, the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation (Doc. 89; Report), recommending that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted, and Plaintiff's two Motions to Amend be denied. Report at 23. Plaintiff M. Eugene Gibbs (“Gibbs”),¹ proceeding pro se, filed an objection to the Report (Doc. 92; Objection), and Defendants filed a response to that Objection. (Doc. 93: Response to Objection).²

I. Standard of Review

The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). If no specific objections to findings of facts are filed, the district court is not required to conduct a de novo review of those findings. Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n. 9 (11th Cir.1993);see also28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, the district court must review legal conclusions de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See Cooper–Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Rice, No. 2:07–mc–8–FtM–29SPC, 2007 WL 1428615, at *1 (M.D.Fla. May 14, 2007).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex. rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir.2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, 1951. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998), “ ‘this leniency does not give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’ ” Alford v. Consol. Gov't of Columbus, Ga., 438 Fed.Appx. 837, 839 (11th Cir.2011)³ (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir.1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 706 (11th Cir.2010)).

“ ‘In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court may consider an extrinsic document if it is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.’ ” Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Secs., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.2010)). Additionally, a court may take judicial notice of and consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss or response, which are public records that are “central” to a plaintiff's claims, without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.This is so, as long as such documents are “public records that [are] ‘not subject to reasonable dispute’ because they [are] ‘capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy [can] not reasonably be questioned.’ ” Horne v. Potter, 392 Fed.Appx. 800, 802 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)). Moreover, “a court may take notice of another court's order ... for the limited purpose of recognizing the ‘judicial act’ that the order represents or the subject matter of the litigation.” United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir.1994).⁴

II. DiscussionA. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

1. Count I: FECA Disability Benefits

Count I of Gibbs's Second Amended Complaint is entitled “5 U.S.C. §§ 8123(d) & 5596.” ⁵ In this count, Gibbs focuses on issues related to his claim for disability benefits, and seeks an “injunction” and $400,000 in interest. Complaint ¶¶ 10–19; see also id. ¶¶ 2, 7. In his general allegations, Gibbs, a former federal employee, alleges that his “disability claim is administered at the Department of Labor [DOL] field office located in Jacksonville, Florida,” and that “Defendants are sued ... to recover disability benefits Plaintiff loss [sic] as a direct result of improper actions taken against Plaintiff: including but not limited to retaliation against Plaintiff for demanding his legal rights under 5 U.S.C. §§ 8123(d) and 5596.” Id. at ¶¶ 2, 7. Though somewhat garbled, Gibbs's Count I allegations refer to the DOL's mistaken suspension of his disability benefits in 1996 due to Gibbs's failure to attend a medical examination “with a doctor [sic] did not exist.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 13. Gibbs alleges that the DOL “awarded payment for the period of March 31, 1996 to April 30, 2002 = $174,815.17” to correct the error. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14. Gibbs then alleges that the DOL demanded “repayment of $34,000 ... in retaliation for Plaintiff not dropping his claim for interest—about $400,000”, apparently on the disability claim awarded for the 1996 through 2002 period. Id. ¶ 15. The balance of Gibbs's Count I allegations takes issue with the DOL telephonic hearing process, and the DOL's monthly deduction of disability payments, beginning in March 2010. Id. ¶¶ 16–18. Gibbs seeks an “injunction” to “prevent ... the illegal taking of Plaintiff's disability benefits,” and $400,000, presumably referring to his “claim for interest-about $400,000.” Id. ¶¶ 15, 19.

Defendants seek to dismiss Count I of the Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that Gibbs is challenging the DOL's determination and processing, pursuant to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq., of his disability benefit claim. Defendants contend that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the DOL's decision. Motion at 10–11, 13–17. In support of this contention, Defendants have submitted an extensive collection of documents related to Gibbs's FECA disability claim, dating back to 1987.

Rule 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of a case when the court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. “[B]ecause a federal court is powerless to act beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must zealously ensure that jurisdiction exists over a case.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.2001). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be founded on either a “facial” or “factual” challenge to the court's jurisdiction:

Facial attacks challenge subject matter jurisdiction based on the allegations in the complaint, and the district court takes the allegations as true in deciding whether to grant the motion. Factual attacks challenge subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings. In resolving a factual attack, the district court may...