Gibbs v. Young

• Decision Date: 09 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. 18049,18049
• Citation: 130 S.E.2d 484,242 S.C. 217
• Parties: Calvin T. GIBBS, Respondent, v. Harvey Walter YOUNG and Bowman Transportation, Inc., Appellants.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 484

130 S.E.2d 484

242 S.C. 217

Calvin T. GIBBS, Respondent, v. Harvey Walter YOUNG and Bowman Transportation, Inc., Appellants.

No. 18049.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 9, 1963.

Baskin & Cothran, Bishopville, for appellants.

Belser & Belser, Columbia, Leppard & Leppard, Chesterfield, for respondent.

BUSSEY, Justice.

The plaintiff, respondent here, is a resident of California and commenced this action in the Court of Common Pleas for Chesterfield County to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile-truck collision near Athens, in the State of Georgia, in July 1960. The defenant Young, a resident of Anderson County, South Carolina, was the driver of the truck involved, which was owned by the defendant Bowman Transportation, Inc., an Alabama corporation licensed to operate through Chesterfield County. The defendant Young was admittedly the agent of the defendant Bowman at the time.

The defendant Bowman demurred to the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action as to it, and the defendant Young moved to change the venue to Anderson County, South Carolina, in the event that the demurrer should be sustained.

The lower court overruled the demurrer of the defendant Bowman, and, of course, denied the motion of the defendant Young.

Section 10-214 of the 1962 Code of Laws provides that:

'An action against a corporation created by or under the laws of any other state, government or country may be brought in the circuit court * * * (2) by a plaintiff not a resident of this State when the cause of action shall have arisen or the subject matter of the action shall be situate within this State.'

It is clear that if in the instant action the plaintiff had sued the defendant Bowman alone, the court would not have had jurisdiction of the alleged cause of action under the construction given to the foregoing Code section in numerous decisions of this court. Central R. & Banking Co. v. Georgia Construction & Investment Co., etc., 32 S.C. 319, 11 S.E. 192; Blue Ridge Power Co. v. Southern R. Co., 122 S.C. 222, 115 S.E. 306; Hodges v. Lake Summit Co., 155 S.C. 436, 152 S.E. 658; Salway v. Maryland Casualty Co., 176 S.C. 215, 179 S.E. 787; Knight v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 184 S.C. 362, 192 S.E. 558.

There is no question presented as to the jurisdiction of the court over the persons of the two defendants, and the only real question presented by the appeal is whether the joinder of a defendant (with respect to whom the court has jurisdiction of both the person and the subject matter) with a defendant (as to whom the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter) confers upon the court jurisdiction of the subject matter as to the latter defendant when it otherwise had no jurisdiction.

The circuit court concluded that Section 10-214 did not apply to the factual situation involved in this case and, in effect, construed said section to be applicable only when a foreign corporation was sued independently of a resident co-defendant.

No case directly in point, from this or any other jurisdiction, was relied upon by the circuit court; none was cited in the briefs of counsel; and none has come to the attention of this court. Generally speaking, our circuit courts, of course, have jurisdiction of transitory actions such as this, but the legislature has clearly limited the jurisdiction of our courts with respect to transitory actions against foreign corporations.

In the case of American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Thomas, 206 S.C. 355, 34 S.E.2d 592, ...