Gibraltar Corrugated Paper Co. v. North Bergen Tp., Hudson County

• Decision Date: 05 December 1955
• Docket Number: No. A--11,A--11
• Citation: 20 N.J. 213,119 A.2d 135
• Parties: GIBRALTAR CORRUGATED PAPER CO., Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The TOWNSHIP OF NORTH BERGEN in the COUNTY OF HUDSON and Division of Tax Appeals, Department of the Treasury, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 213

20 N.J. 213

119 A.2d 135

GIBRALTAR CORRUGATED PAPER CO., Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The TOWNSHIP OF NORTH BERGEN in the COUNTY OF HUDSON and Division of Tax Appeals, Department of the

Treasury, Defendants-Respondents.

No. A--11.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Sept. 27, 1955.

Decided Dec. 5, 1955.

Joseph C. Glavin, Jersey City, argued the cause for plaintiffs-appellants (Joseph C. Glavin, Jersey City, attorney for plaintiffs- appellants Gibraltar Corrugated Paper Co., Inc., and Prudential Ins. Co. of America; Joseph V. Cullum, Union City, attorney for plaintiffs-appellants Max Eckhardt & Son, Inc., Harold M. Pitman Co., Triple M. Transp. Co. and Calumet Block Co.; Otis & Kilkenney, West New York, attorneys for plaintiff-appellant Grand City Container Corp.; Jay M. Levenson, Union City, attorney for plaintiffs-appellants Ecco High Frequency Electric Corp., North Hudson Grocery Co. and Constance A. Weber; Burke, Sheridan & Hourigan, Union City, attorneys for plaintiffs-appellants Felix A. Tagliabue, W. L. Cameron Co., Inc., Shippen Holding Co., Nine Sixty One Bergenline Ave. Co., and others).

Nicholas S. Schloeder, Union City, argued for defendants-respondents.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BURLING, J.

This appeal stems from an order of the Division of Tax Appeals granting the motion of defendant Township of North Bergen (hereinafter referred to as North Bergen) to dismiss so much of the petitions of appeal of the various taxpayer plaintiffs as were based upon a prayer for relief to reduce their assessments at true value 'to the same level and standard of value used in levying assessments on other types of property' in the taxing district. We certified the controversy on our motion prior to consideration by the Appellate Division. R.R. 1:10--1.

North Bergen being a part of Hudson County, the township assessor filed the annual assessment list and duplicate with the Hudson County Board of Taxation. It is uncontradicted that the assessments on the plaintiffs' properties for 1950 represented 'a substantial increase' over the prior 1949 assessments on the same properties. Prior to April 1, 1950 the county board met for the purpose of 'examining, revising and correcting' the North Bergen tax lists, R.S. 54:4--46, N.J.S.A., and certified the duplicates to the collector of that district without altering in any way the increased assessments on plaintiffs' properties.

Subsequently and prior to August 15, 1950, the individual plaintiffs took separate appeals to the county board, R.S. 54:3--21, as am. L.1945, c. 125, N.J.S.A., alleging that the assessments upon their properties had been computed 'according to a standard of value different from and higher than the standard used by the Township of North Bergen in assessing other types of property' within the taxing district resulting in 'an unconstitutional discrimination' against the property owners. The relief requested signals the importance of the question:

'Your petitioner * * * prays that said assessment at true value be reduced to the same level and standard of value used in levying assessments on other types of property in said taxing district.'

The county board, after consolidating the appeals for hearing, decided that the plaintiffs had not sustained the burden of showing an unconstitutional discrimination. This burden was conceived to be proof of an 'intentional systematic undervaluation' and 'an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity.' The record before us indicates that the board was clearly of the opinion that the relief sought might be afforded in a proper case.

Thereafter, and before December 15, 1950, the plaintiffs separately appealed to the Division of Tax Appeals alleging discrimination and requesting the same relief advanced before the county board.

The Division never heard these appeals, and similar proceedings were initiated by the plaintiffs in 1951, 1952, 1953, and 1954. In each year the decision of the Hudson County Board has been the same and in each year plaintiffs appealed to the Division of Tax Appeals praying for the same relief as that requested in 1950.

In November 1954, no hearing having been conducted by the Division, North Bergen moved to dismiss so much of the petitions of appeal as were based upon the prayer for relief seeking a reduction below true value on two grounds, first, because the petitions did not allege a basis for the relief, and secondly, because the Division was without authority, at least under R.S. 54:2--39, as am. L.1954, c. 115, N.J.S.A., to afford the requested remedy. The motion was granted, the Division being of the opinion that it had no jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. That the Division was somewhat uncertain about its action in this regard is indicated by the fact that in November 1952 a similar motion was advanced by North Bergen and denied.

The question involved is narrowed to this inquiry: May the Division of Tax Appeals remedy a discriminatory assessment at true value by reduction thereof to the common ratio employed in levying assessments throughout the same taxing district?

The basic statutory law was enacted under the Constitution of 1844 of this State, specifically Art. IV, Sec. VII, par. 12 (as added, election September 7, 1875, proclamation September 28, 1875) which provided: 'Property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws * * * according to its true value.' R.S. 54:4--23, as am. L.1942, c. 281 and L.1943, c. 120, N.J.S.A., directs the assessor to determine the 'full and fair value' of all the real property in his district 'at such price as, in his judgment, it would sell for at a fair and bona fide sale by private contract.' This is a true value standard which is generally determined by the value the property has in exchange for money, City of Newark v. West Milford Township, 9 N.J. 295, 88 A.2d 211 (1952); cf. Hackensack Water Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 2 N.J. 157, 65 A.2d 828 (1949). We have recognized the statutory duty upon the party charged with assessment to apply the true value standard. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 10 N.J. 418, 433, 91 A.2d 739 (1952).

The new Constitution worked no change in the statutory standard for it speaks only in terms of equality, leaving the denominator at which this is to be attained to legislative determination. 1947 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. I, par. 1 provides, Inter alia:

'Property shall be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform rules. All real property * * * shall be assessed according to the same standard of value; * * *.'

The Legislature has not disturbed the provisions which call for true value assessment, but the dominant principle now is equality of treatment and burden, the standard employed is but the level on which the objective is to be realized. Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 16 N.J. 329, 340, 108 A.2d 598 (1954). The failure to reach a uniform state of equality at true value is probably due to the frailties of human nature.

In Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex County Board of Taxation, supra, we held that taxpayers who were visited with discriminatory assessment burdens might seek relief in the courts of this State in accordance with the principles laid down in Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 66 S.Ct. 445, 90 L.Ed. 358 (1946), thus overruling the doctrine of Royal Mfg. Co. v. Board of Equalization of Taxes, 76 N.J.L. 402, 70 A. 978 (Sup.Ct.1908), affirmed 78 N.J.L. 337, 74 A. 525 (E. & A.1909), which placed an insuperable task upon an aggrieved taxpayer to himself seek an unward revision of all other assessments in his district to true value. In obeisance to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and the mandate of equality in property assessment of the new State Constitution we assured relief against discriminating treatment although it occurred below the true value level. The dominant consideration was recognized to be equality of burden which by virtue of its constitutional foundation must override the statutory standard where the latter has not been manifested in fact to achieve equality.

The present issue, which was not squarely decided in the Baldwin case, supra, is whether the administrative agencies must also apply the rule of dominant equality in affording relief in their quasi-judicial capacities.

The Fact of discrimination against a complainant taxpayer may be determined by the state agencies. R.S. 54:3--21, as am. L.1945, c. 125, N.J.S.A.; R.S. 54:2--35, as am. L.1946, c. 161, N.J.S.A.; R.S. 54:2--39, as am. L.1944, c. 240, L.1946, c. 161, L.1954, c. 115, N.J.S.A.; see Jersey City v. Division of Tax Appeals, 5 N.J.Super. 375, 384, 69 A.2d 331 (App.Div. 1949) affirmed 5 N.J. 433, 75 A.2d 865 (1950). It is difficult to conceive of a more prevalent grievance arising from abuse of the assessment process. It is equally clear that the fact of discrimination cannot be erased for lack of a remedy whether it occurs above or below the true value standard.

North Bergen emphasizes the determination of the Appellate Division in Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 28 N.J.Super. 110, 100 A.2d 341 (App.Div.1953). That case dealt with the procedural aspects of the Baldwin litigation which we later decided on the merits, Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 16 N.J. 329, 108 A.2d 598 (1954). The tax board and city had sought a dismissal of the plaintiffs' action on the ground that administrative remedies had not been exhausted, to which reply was made that the agencies were without authority to grant relief unless the assessments complained of were above true value. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, held (28 N.J.Super. 110, 100 A.2d 345) that the plaintiffs were not required to initially address the agencies because the latter were without authority to afford erlief,...