Gibson v. Clark

Decision Date13 February 1902
PartiesGIBSON v. CLARK ET AL.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from circuit court, Dale county; A. A. Evans, Judge.

Action by John P. Gibson against M. E. Clark and others. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

G. L Comer and J. E. Z. Riley, for appellant.

Sollie & Kirkland, for appellees.

McCLELLAN C.J.

The indorsement on the back of a deed of the names of the parties to it, so made as to indicate which is grantor and which grantee, as "A. B. to C. D.," is no part of the deed, nor effectual for any purpose; and the filing for record in the probate office of a deed upon which is so indorsed the names of persons as grantor and grantee, or either, who are not parties to the instrument, is not constructive notice of a conveyance between or from or to the persons or person whose names or name are thus written on its back, but is constructive notice of a conveyance between the parties to the paper as they appear in the deed itself. Perhaps such an erroneous indorsement might be used as a false representation as to the parties to the instrument, and thus become evidential of fraud in a proper case; but this is not such a case. And it was therefore immaterial what indorsement of names was on the deed from Blackwell and wife to Margaret E. Clark, and whether the name of the grantee as originally indorsed thereon had been changed from "J. J Clark" to "Margaret E. Clark." The court did not err in refusing to allow the question propounded by plaintiff to Mrs. Clark on this subject.

It was admitted on the trial by plaintiff that at the time of the conveyance by D. B. Blackwell and wife, Mary, to the defendant Margaret E. Clark, said Blackwell had title to the land. The proposed evidence to the effect that this deed to Mrs. Clark was not recorded in Deed Book E, at the pages stated in the certificate of the probate judge written on the back of it, but that instead a deed from A. B. Blackwell and his wife, Mary, to J. J. Clark was there recorded, did not tend to show title in J. J. Clark, plaintiff's grantor nor to impeach the title which confessedly passed by the deed of D. B. Blackwell and wife to Margaret E. Clark. At most, it went to show the absence of constructive notice of the deed to Mrs. Clark; and, as no question of bona fide purchase without notice is made in the case, the evidence was immaterial in that connection.

Nor was the record of that deed admissible to prove the description of the land as laid in the complaint, because it was not the deed which was made a part of that description, and it was not...

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