Gibson v. Cmty. Dev. Partners
| Decision Date | 18 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-454-SI |
| Parties | KATIE A. GIBSON, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Katie A. Gibson, Plaintiff, pro se.
Kenneth J. Abere, Jr., and Brandon L. Thornburg, COSGRAVE VERGEER KESTLER LLP, 900 SW Fifth Avenue, 24th Floor Portland, OR, 97204. Of Attorneys for Defendants.
Plaintiff Katie A. Gibson, representing herself, alleges that she has endured unsuitable living conditions and threats amounting to harassment and discrimination during her tenancy at the Milepost 5 Studios apartment complex in Portland, Oregon. Plaintiff brings federal claims under the Fair Housing Act as amended by the Fair Housing Act Amendments Act of 1988 (FHA);[1] the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA);[2] and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act).[3] In these federal claims, Plaintiff alleges discrimination and failure to make reasonable accommodations. She also asserts state law claims under the Oregon Fair Housing Act (OFHA);[4] Oregon Residential Landlord-Tenant Act;[5] Oregon Constitution, art. I, §§ 8, 10; Oregon Equality Act;[6] and common law doctrines of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff sues Community Development Partners (CDP), the owners and operators of the apartment complex; Guardian Management, LLC, the property management company contracted by CDP; and officers, agents, and employees of these companies, including Erik Paine, Kyle Paine, Kelly Paine, Kayla F. Jamieson, and Tei-Onna Haggard (collectively, Defendants).
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's federal claims and her OFHA claim for failure to state a claim. If this motion is granted, Defendants ask the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. Defendants also request that the Court strike certain sections from the Second Amended Complaint. For the reasons below, the Court grants the motion to strike in part, grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims under federal law and OFHA, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, courts must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). To be entitled to a presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Off. Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). But courts need not credit a plaintiff's legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).
Self-represented, or pro se, plaintiffs receive special dispensation. A court must liberally construe the filings of a pro se plaintiff and afford the plaintiff the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). Further, “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 923 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). A liberal construction of a pro se complaint, however, does not mean that the court will supply essential elements of a claim that are missing from the complaint. See Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014). Nor does it immunize a pro se litigant from complying with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,'” but does demand more than “‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Upon dismissal, a court generally should grant pro se litigants leave to amend their complaints. “Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect, . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” Garity v. APWU Nat'l Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Unlike state courts, which are courts of general jurisdiction, federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction in certain cases as authorized by the United States Constitution and Congress. See id.; United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Federal courts have jurisdiction over two primary categories of cases: (1) “federal question” cases; and (2) “diversity of citizenship” cases. A “federal question” case involves the Constitution or a federal law or treaty. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A “diversity of citizenship” case involves citizens of different states where the amount of damages is more than $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). When a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case, it must dismiss the complaint, whether upon the motion of a party or sua sponte. See Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
A federal court may invoke supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims brought in the same case if the state law claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). When a court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a federal claim, the court generally retains discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Even so, a court may dismiss remaining state law claims, as the “decision whether to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009).
Plaintiff is a transgender woman who has lived at Milepost 5 Studios since May 1, 2021. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6, ECF 21. She has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, for which she receives clinical treatment. Id. ¶ 5. Her dysphoria causes her significant stress and anxiety that impacts her daily life. Id. ¶¶ 42, 44. Plaintiff alleges that she has been assaulted, menaced, and harassed by other tenants on account of her gender identity. These incidents include a knifecarrying tenant threatening to kill her “numerous times.” Id. ¶ 19. In another incident, a group of tenants allegedly surrounded her and taunted her to “come out of the car and show them ‘what kind of woman she really is,'” leading her to spend a fearful night in her friend's car. Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that conditions in her apartment complex have been uninhabitable. She alleges multiple incidents of rampant drug use and sale, prostitution, methamphetamine production squatters inhabiting the premises, a stolen car and bicycle “chop shop” operation, tenants' belongings and trash creating obstructions in common areas, filthy and dangerous conditions in shared bathrooms, discarded syringes left in common spaces, package theft, bed bugs, and open firearm displays, among others. Id. ¶¶ 18 21. Plaintiff filed exhibits to support the allegations in her complaint, providing further examples of the conditions in her residence. See ECF 10, 11.[7] Plaintiff alleges she has delivered to Defendants “countless verbal, written, and text message complaints” of these conditions and the harassment she has experienced, which Defendants have ignored. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 22, 54. She also alleges that Defendants have failed to follow their own policies, including screening prospective tenants and enforcing the property's no smoking policy. Id. ¶¶ 21, 29. As a result of Defendants' failures to act, Plaintiff...
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