Gibson v. Collins, 4095.

• Decision Date: 05 January 1925
• Docket Number: No. 4095.,4095.
• Citation: 4 F.2d 874,55 App. DC 262
• Parties: GIBSON v. COLLINS et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

55 App. DC 262, 4 F.2d 874 (1925)

GIBSON v. COLLINS et al.

No. 4095.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Submitted December 1, 1924.

Decided January 5, 1925.

J. A. O'Shea, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

G. E. Sullivan, of Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice, and BLAND, Judge of the United States Court of Customs Appeals.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, setting aside a deed to certain real estate situated in the city of Washington. The bill was filed in the court below by Sarah Gibson, personally and by her next friend, Patrick J. Collins, against Anna C. Gibson. A shorttime after the decree was entered, Sarah Gibson died, and her heirs at law have been substituted as parties appellee in this proceeding.

It appears that Mrs. Sarah Gibson, hereafter for convenience referred to as the mother, and the defendant Anna C. Gibson and her husband, the son of Sarah Gibson, lived together for the period of 25 years, or during the whole married life of the son and defendant. In November, 1921. John T. Gibson died. On the day of the funeral, when the relatives returned to the house, Patrick Kennedy, brother-in-law of Mrs. Sarah Gibson, had a conversation with defendant, in which he requested her to remain with the mother and take care of her, on the assurance that the property here in question would be conveyed to her. Defendant agreed to stay and continue the relations as they had existed during all the years preceding. Whereupon Kennedy, without any suggestion from defendant, procured a reputable lawyer, who came to the house, and after a conversation with the mother, during which the defendant was not present, was instructed by the mother to prepare a deed conveying the property to defendant. After the attorney left, the mother spoke to defendant of the visit of the attorney and said to her: "I am going to give this house to you."

On the following day, Kennedy brought the attorney with the deed to the house, and in the presence of Mrs. Kennedy, sister of the mother, the deed was discussed. Upon protest from Mrs. Kennedy that the mother was deeding away her property absolutely, it was agreed that a clause should be inserted in the deed reserving a life estate in the mother. This was done, and the deed was executed and witnessed by the attorney and a Mrs. Mary E. Wannall, who was rooming in the house. Defendant was not present, but was called down to the room and the attorney handed her the deed, when the mother said: "Annie, I am turning the house over to you."

For several years the defendant had been working as a clerk in a grocery store, from which she was at this time receiving a salary of $40 per week. Following the death of her husband and the conveyance of the property, the defendant employed a maid to take care of the house and to look after the care of the mother during the time when she was absent attending to her work. She opened an account at the grocery store across the street, instructing the groceryman to furnish the mother or the maid whatever they required. She paid the bills. She also paid all bills for the maintenance and support of the household. The mother collected the rents from the roomers in the house and for the use of the garage, which had been erected at the expense of the defendant prior to her husband's death.

This arrangement continued until October, 1922, when, during the absence of defendant from the house, Patrick Kennedy and his wife came and induced the mother to go with them to their home. When defendant returned, she ascertained from the neighbors where the mother had gone. She telephoned, and was informed that the mother would not return home that night. Upon further inquiry she was put off with the assurance that the mother would return soon. The first notice she had that anything was wrong, or that any fault was found with the care she was according the mother, was when the present suit was filed on November 10th by Patrick J. Collins, a brother of the mother, as her next friend, and by the mother, Sarah Gibson.

In the bill the conveyance is assailed on the ground that there was no valuable consideration; that the mother was 72 years of age at the time of the execution of the deed; that she was in a senile mental condition and unable to understand or comprehend ordinary business transactions; that her condition at the time of the signing of the deed had been aggravated by the death of her only son, the husband of defendant; that defendant took advantage of the situation by having the deed prepared and executed by a notary public, who conducted only a hurried reading of the deed; that the mother thought she was executing a will providing that the property should go to defendant at her death, upon the understanding that defendant would care for her during her lifetime; that defendant failed to provide for the mother, failed to furnish sufficient food and nourishment, and neglected her; and that plaintiff Patrick J. Collins, learning of the alleged impositions practiced upon his sister, brought this suit. It was also averred that the mother lacked mental capacity to make said deed, or appreciation or understanding of its force and effect.

In the answer defendant denied that any imposition was practiced upon the mother, or that she secured the execution of the deed, but alleged that Patrick Kennedy, brother-in-law of the mother, sent a reputable lawyer to see the mother and confer with her, and that as a result of this consultation the deed in question was prepared, executed by the mother, and delivered to defendant. She denies that she exercised any influence over the mother to procure the deed, or took any part whatever in obtaining the deed.

The trial justice, in an elaborate opinion, found as a fact that the execution of the deed was not procured by any act of defendant, but upon the advice of Patrick Kennedy; that the conversation between Kennedy and defendant, after returning to the house from the funeral, was solely at the instance of Kennedy, and that he proposed the conveyance of the property to defendant; that Kennedy procured the attorney and sent him to consult with the mother; that the execution of the deed was conducted in the absence of defendant; and that defendant took no part in the matter other than to receive the deed after it had been executed.

As to the treatment accorded the mother during the period of almost a year following the death of the son the court said: "I do not think that Mrs. Anna Gibson neglected this lady. There was no marked change in their course of living. I mean by that that Mrs. Anna Gibson had for years before found it necessary to go to work, and she continued in her employment. She made selection of at least the maid who testified on the stand, apparently employed a colored woman who would answer the purposes of the situation, not merely in running the house, but in looking after this old lady during Mrs. Anna Gibson's absence from the house at her place of employment."

The court, however, after a somewhat severe cross-examination of defendant, covering several printed pages of the record, concluded the examination as follows: "Q. And then Mr. Dunne handed you this deed? A. Mr. Dunne handed me the deed; yes. Q. Did Mrs. Sarah Gibson say anything at that time at all? A. She talked about the deed; she said, `Annie, I am turning the house over to you.' Q. Was that after Mr. Dunne had given you the deed? A. Yes. Q. Mrs. Sarah Gibson spoke up and said that, did she? A. Yes; she did. Q. Then, if I understand your testimony, Mrs. Gibson, it is this: As far as you are concerned, this conveyance to you by Mrs. Sarah Gibson of this house was a gift? A. Absolutely. Q. No condition and no qualification; no obligations of any kind on your part; but it was an out and out gift by her to you at that time? A. Yes."

On this statement the court in its opinion says: "I had supposed there would be some evidence here that Mrs. Anna Gibson had undertaken something for this; but she says, has made it clear to-day, that was not her understanding and not her intention. She was offered a gift of this property, and she accepted it. I do not know why people should not accept gifts, ordinarily, if people wish to make them. All of us, I suspect, enjoy such favors of fortune as that; but the donor of the gift must know what he or she is about before the gift can be effected."

The court emphasizes the fact that there was not any reason for making such a gift. In this, we think, the court was in error. The consideration for the execution of this conveyance should be gathered from the record as a whole, rather than from the statement extracted at the end of a searching cross-examination. Unquestionably defendant had in mind a money consideration when she referred to the conveyance as a...