Gibson v. Cook
| Decision Date | 20 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–2179.,13–2179. |
| Citation | 764 F.3d 810 |
| Parties | Travis Wayne GIBSON, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Rick COOK; Jeff Mitchell; Josh Benton; City of Dexter; Carl Hefner; Roxanne Cook; Catherine Rice; Tommy Horton, Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James P. Leonard, argued, Saint Louis, MO, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Michael E. Bub, Eileen Ruppe Krispin, AAG, argued, (Keith Henson, Mary Delworth Morris, AAG, on the brief), Saint Louis, MO, for Defendants–Appellees.
Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Dexter, Missouri, police officers arrested Travis Gibson in January and April 2008 for violating a July 2007 Full Order of Protection, which the Circuit Court of Stoddard County had granted in response to a petition by Gibson's estranged wife, Ann. Gibson pleaded guilty to violating the Full Order after each arrest, receiving suspended sentences and probation. In May 2008, Gibson was arrested for blatant disregard of a special condition of probation that he not contact Ann. He admitted multiple violations. Probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to three years in prison. In December 2009, a Stoddard County judge granted Gibson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and ordered him released. Gibson remained in custody one additional day because the State of Louisiana had issued a detainer based on pending charges in that jurisdiction. Following his release, Gibson filed this action, asserting various state and federal claims against, inter alia, the arresting officers, the City of Dexter, his public defender, his probation officer, and two Stoddard County sheriffs for delaying his release. Defendants removed. Extensive discovery ensued.
Gibson appeals the district court's 1 grant of summary judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against those defendants. He does not appeal the dismissal of pending state law claims without prejudice. Viewing disputed facts in the light most favorable to Gibson, and reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, we affirm. Fisher v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 814 n. 3 (8th Cir.2010) (standard of review). Magistrate Judge Blanton's forty-page opinion thoroughly reviewed the facts and legal issues surrounding each phase of this protracted dispute. Gibson v. Cook, No. 1:10–CV–00107–LMB, 2013 WL 1817786 (E.D.Mo. Apr. 29, 2013). We will limit this opinion to facts essential to each § 1983 claim Gibson appealed; additional background may be found in Judge Blanton's opinion.
A. The January 12, 2008 Arrest. On January 10, 2008, one of Ann's co-workers called the police “because [Ann's] husband was in the parking lot and there had been previous problems between the two in the past.” When Dexter Police Officer Jeff Mitchell arrived, he learned “that Mrs. Gibson had an active Full Order of Protection against Mr. Gibson.” Gibson was arrested for violating the Full Order. Mitchell's incident report included the Full Order's case number and July 22 expiration date and the dispatcher's copy of that Order.
On the morning of January 12, a caller reported yelling and arguing at Ann's residence. Officer Mitchell and Officer Anthony Roberts were dispatched to investigate whether Gibson was violating the Full Order. When they arrived, Gibson told Officer Mitchell he was there to pick up his son, and Ann explained to Officer Roberts “that child custody was worked out through the court.” The officers concluded the Full Order allowed Gibson to be present for this purpose, and he was not arrested. Officer Roberts waited at Ann's residence until Gibson left.
That afternoon, Officers Mitchell and Roberts were again dispatched to Ann's residence after Ann's daughter called to report that “Travis is back yelling at her mother.” On arriving, Officer Roberts saw Gibson in the kitchen “down on one knee talking to Ann who was standing against the counter.” Ann told Officer Roberts she “told Travis to leave several times but he wouldn't go,” She gave the officers a copy of the Full Order, which stated, in relevant part,
The Court hereby orders ... [t]hat the above named Respondent [Travis Gibson] be restrained from any contact with the Petitioner [Ann Gibson].
* * * * * *
Respondent shall not abuse, threaten to abuse, molest, stalk or disturb the peace of Petitioner wherever Petitioner may be found.
* * * * * *
Respondent shall not communicate with Petitioner in any manner or through any medium.
Respondent shall not enter or stay upon the premises of wherever Petitioner may reside.
Ann and Gibson told Officer Roberts that their custody agreement “was in the court ordered separation paperwork.” Neither Gibson nor Ann provided the officers with a copy of the separation decree, and Gibson did not claim he was present for a custody exchange. Gibson claims he told the officers he was not violating the Full Order because the November 2007 separation decree terminated some provisions of the Full Order, pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 455.060. The officers arrested Gibson for violating the Full Order because they found nothing in that Order allowing Gibson to be present at Ann's residence. As Officer Mitchell explained at his deposition,
Gibson argues that Officers Mitchell violated Gibson's Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause or an arrest warrant. Whether a warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause “is a question of law for a court to decide.” Fisher, 619 F.3d at 816. In evaluating probable cause, “we look at the totality of the circumstances as set forth in the information available to the officers at the time of arrest.” It is significant for summary judgment purposes that Gibson does not dispute the officers' accounts of what they observed and what Ann and her daughter told them prior to the arrest. Gibson claims Ann lied to the officers, but “[o]fficers are generally entitled to rely on the veracity of information supplied by the victim of a crime.” Id. at 816–17 (quotations omitted).
At the time of arrest, Officer Mitchell knew that Gibson had been inside Ann's home. A caller reported he was yelling at Ann, and Ann said Gibson refused to leave. Ann provided Officer Mitchell a copy of the unexpired Full Order, which prohibited Gibson from communicating with Ann or “enter[ing] ... upon the premises of wherever Petitioner may reside.” Officer Mitchell had participated in an arrest of Gibson two days earlier for violating the Full Order. Based on this information, Officer Mitchell had probable cause to arrest Gibson for violating Mo.Rev.Stat. § 455.085.8 ().
Gibson argues that Mitchell lacked probable cause because he did not adequately investigate Gibson's claims that the separation decree terminated relevant portions of the Full Order by reason of Mo.Rev.Stat. § 455.060.4, which in January 2008 provided in relevant part:
All provisions of an order of protection shall terminate upon entry of a decree of ... legal separation except ... provisions which ... enjoin the respondent from abusing, molesting, stalking or disturbing the peace of the petitioner and which enjoin the respondent from entering the premises of the dwelling unit of the petitioner as described in the order of protection when the petitioner continues to reside in that dwelling unit unless the respondent is awarded possession of the dwelling unit.
This contention is without merit. First, it is well-established that “officers are not required to conduct a ‘mini-trial’ before arrest.” Fisher, 619 F.3d at 817, quoting Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832 (8th Cir.2008). This was not a situation where Mitchell “disregard[ed] plainly exculpatory evidence,” or “unreasonably failed to interview witnesses at [the] scene,” circumstances that may create a duty to investigate more thoroughly, “at least in the absence of exigent circumstances” such as the risk of domestic violence present in this case. Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir.1999). Thus, Officer Mitchell was not obligated to seek out a copy of the separation decree and research the parameters of this state statute before defusing a potentially dangerous domestic dispute by arresting the party who was violating a Full Order. Once probable cause was established, Mitchell had no constitutional duty to investigate further. Clayborn v. Struebing, 734 F.3d 807, 809–10 (8th Cir.2013).
Second, this was not a case where “minimal further investigation would have exonerated the suspect.” Kuehl, 173 F.3d at 650 (quotation omitted). The separation decree in fact made no mention of the outstanding Full Order. The statute on which Gibson relies, which to our knowledge has not been judicially construed, provides that a provision in a pre-decree protection order enjoining respondent from entering “the dwelling unit of the petitioner as described in the order” remains in effect. Gibson asserts this part of the Full Order terminated when Ann moved to a new residence. But the Full Order prohibited entering the premises “wherever [Ann] may reside.” Thus, as in Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523–24 (8th Cir.2011), even if Officer Mitchell had investigated further by obtaining and studying the separation decree and § 455.060.4, he still would have had probable cause to arrest Gibson for violating § 455.085.8.
B. The April 9 Arrest. Following his January 12 arrest, Gibson pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor violation of the Full Order. He received a suspended sentence and twelve months probation conditioned on no contact with Ann. On...
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