Gibson v. Firestone, 84-3422

• Decision Date: 28 August 1984
• Docket Number: No. 84-3422,84-3422
• Citation: 741 F.2d 1268
• Parties: Robert E. GIBSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Ed Havill, et al., Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. George FIRESTONE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1268

741 F.2d 1268

Robert E. GIBSON, Plaintiff-Appellant and Ed Havill, et al., Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. George FIRESTONE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-3422.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 28, 1984.

James G. Mahorner, Herbert Kraft, Tallahassee, Fla., Dow N. Kirkpatrick, II, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

Mitchell D. Franks, Eric J. Taylor, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before HILL and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and WISDOM ^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:

This appeal touches upon a wide variety of complex and important issues, one of which proves to be dispositive of the dispute: did the district court abuse its discretion in refusing to enjoin the Florida Secretary of State from complying with the Florida Supreme Court's mandate to remove from the upcoming general ballot a proposed constitutional amendment that the Florida Supreme Court found violative of the state constitution. We are unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellants' injunctive relief. Hence, we affirm.

An elucidation of the facts illustrates the difficult position in which appellants find themselves and the reasons why the federal courts are not empowered to remedy their plight. Appellants expended substantial sums in organizing support for a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution. ¹ After acquiring the necessary signatures of 600,000 state electors, appellants submitted their citizens initiative petition to the Florida Department of State for verification. The Secretary of State, finding that the petition satisfied the format requirements of state law, issued a Certificate of Ballot Position to the proposed amendment, certifying it for placement on the November 1984 general election ballot.

Shortly after the Secretary of State certified the amendment, an action was filed in the Florida District Court of Appeals seeking its removal. ² The suit named Secretary Firestone as the defendant in interest and requested the Florida appellate court to issue a writ directing Secretary Firestone to remove the proposed amendment, primarily on the grounds that the proposal violated the state constitution's single-subject requirement for constitutional amendments. See Fine v. Firestone, 443 So.2d 253, 256-57 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983).

Appellants then sought to intervene in the proceedings before the Florida District Court of Appeal. Arguing that Secretary Firestone had publicly voiced opposition to the proposed amendment and had filed a response disclaiming any intention of supporting the merits of the proposal, appellants asserted their right to intervene as the real parties in interest. Although Secretary Firestone did not oppose appellants' motions to intervene, the state appellate court denied them party status but granted them leave to appear as amici curiae.

The Florida District Court of Appeal ultimately ruled that extraordinary relief was not available to direct the Secretary to remove the proposed amendment. Fine v. Firestone, 443 So.2d at 255-56. However, the appellate court elected to certify the case to the Florida Supreme Court because questions of great public importance were presented. ³

The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and ordered the proposed amendment removed from the general ballot. Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 993 (Fla.1984). The court held that mandamus was an appropriate means for testing the constitutionality of the proposal, id. at 987, and that the amendment violated the state constitution's prohibition against multiple-subject constitutional amendments, id. at 987-93. Significantly, the court addressed only the state constitutional issue ⁴ and rested its decision entirely on its reading of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 987. ⁵

Appellants then filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida claiming that the state proceedings in which they were refused leave to intervene deprived them of their right to vote, violated their rights to due process and equal protection and impaired their contract rights under art. I, Sec. 10 of the U.S. Constitution. The complaint alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331(a) and 1343(3), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and art. I, Sec. 10 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and in its prayer for relief, requested the district court to grant an "injunction against the Secretary['s] decertifying Proposition 1 or directing its recertification." The district court granted appellants' request for an advanced final hearing on their motion for injunctive relief and, after conducting such a hearing, held that appellants had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Appellants now appeal.

Our task is two-fold. First, we must consider whether the allegations stated in the complaint are sufficient to invoke the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. Second, we must decide whether appellants have stated a claim on which relief can be granted such that the district court abused its discretion by denying injunctive relief on that ground. To summarize our conclusions, we hold that the complaint properly invoked the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts; however, appellants have not stated a claim on which relief could be granted. Thus, the denial of injunctive relief does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

I. JURISDICTION

Appellee questions whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the claim stated by appellants' complaint. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is determined by the face of the well-pleaded complaint. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127-28, 94 S.Ct. 1002, 1003-04, 39 L.Ed.2d 209 (1974); Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97-98, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). Further, all well-pleaded allegations must be taken as true for purposes of determining the existence of federal jurisdiction. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 521 n. 7, 93 S.Ct. 854, 860 n. 7, 35 L.Ed.2d 36 (1973) (citing authorities).

Here, appellants have alleged a deprivation of their first amendment right to vote as well as their fourteenth amendment rights to due process and equal protection. See Record on Appeal at 6 and 80. These allegations, whether sufficient to state a claim for relief, are adequate to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. at 521-22, 93 S.Ct. at 860-61. Thus, we find that appellants have stated a claim that is cognizable under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(3), the jurisdictional counterpart of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ⁶

II. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The relief requested of the district court was an order "granting an injunction against the Secretary['s] decertifying Proposition 1 or directing its recertification." Record on Appeal at 11. ⁷ The clear effect of such relief, as appellants concede, would be to require the Secretary of State to disregard the decision of the Florida Supreme Court invalidating the proposed amendment; the Secretary cannot heed both orders. The question before this court, then, is whether the district court's refusal to grant injunctive relief constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp, 697 F.2d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir.1983); (grant or denial of injunctive relief rests within sound discretion of district court); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir.1977).

Appellants primarily rely on Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir.1978), and the authorities supporting the First Circuit's decision in that case. In Griffin candidates and voters in a local Rhode Island primary relied on a state statute authorizing the use of absentee and shut-in ballots in all local "elections." The Secretary of State and other election officials, reading the statute to include party primary elections, advertised the availability of such ballots for use in the local primary and issued those ballots to qualified applicants. After the absentee and shut-in ballots were tabulated and added to the other votes cast, the election board certified candidate Griffin as the winner. Candidate McCormick, who had received a majority of the votes cast at the polls but 15 fewer total votes than Griffin, challenged the use of absentee and shut-in ballots. Ultimately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld McCormick's challenge, "finding no constitutional or statutory basis for allowing absentee and shut-in voters to cast their votes in a primary election," id. at 1068, and ordered that all such ballots be invalidated, resulting in the certification of McCormick as the primary winner. Griffin, the decertified winner, moved to reargue the case before the state Supreme Court and an attorney moved to intervene as amicus curiae on behalf of those whose ballots had been invalidated. However, the court denied both motions.

Griffin then filed suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. He was joined by absentee and shut-in voters who had cast ballots in the local primary. The plaintiffs requested the district court to issue a temporary restraining order postponing the general election, a preliminary injunction invalidating the primary and an order scheduling a new primary and election. Id. at 1067-68. The court granted plaintiffs' requested relief, concluding that the federally-protected right to vote extended to primaries and that the arbitrary denial of that right affected the outcome of the local election. Id.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Significantly, the First Circuit rested its decision on the effect of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision on the voters' rights to participate in the primary. As the court characterized the constitutional claim involved,

Appellee...