Gibson v. Fischer

• Decision Date: 16 December 1885
• Citation: Gibson v. Fischer, 68 Iowa 29, 25 N.W. 914 (Iowa 1885)
• Parties: GIBSON AND ANOTHER v. FISCHER AND ANOTHER.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

68 Iowa 29

25 N.W. 914

GIBSON AND ANOTHER

v.FISCHER AND ANOTHER.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed December 16, 1885.

Appeal from Des Moines district court.

The plaintiffs are owners of a mill-dam and mill on Skunk river, and the defendants are the owners of a similar dam and mill on the same stream about six miles below the plaintiffs' mill. The latter brought this action to recover damages caused by backwater caused by the defendants' dam, and also for the abatement of the dam. There was a trial to the court, and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for $1,800, and a portion of the defendants' dam was ordered to be removed; and they appeal.Hall & Huston, for appellants, Fischer & Orton.

Casey & Casey and Newman & Blake, for appellees, Gibson & Kloppenstein.

SEEVERS, J.

1. Evidence was introduced, to which the defendants objected, tending to show the profits, or how much the plaintiffs' mill would have earned, if the dam had not caused the water to flow back on the water-wheel, and thereby impeded the operation of the machinery. It is insisted that such evidence was inadmissible, for the reason that the damages sought to be proved were too remote and uncertain, and it is said that “in actions for damages for not fulfilling in time contracts for particular work the plaintiff cannot recover damages estimated on the value of profits if the work had been completed in time.” In support of this proposition a large number of authorities are cited. We shall not stop to inquire whether, conceding the rule as stated to be correct, it applies to an established business which has been interrupted by the breach of the contract; but, for the purposes of the opinion, will concede the rule is fully as strong as counsel have stated it. It will, however, be found, we think, that there is not entire harmony in the decisions in this respect. Taft v. Tiede, 55 Iowa, 370;S. C. 7 N. W. Rep. 617. It is believed that no general and uniform rule has or can be established, and that the facts in each particular case must be considered before a determination can be reached, for the reason, if no other, that for breaches of a contract there can be no recovery of damages except such as arise naturally, and such as the parties may reasonably be supposed to have contemplated at the time the contract was entered into. Hadley v. Baxendale, 26 Eng. Law & Eq. 398; Mihills Manuf'g Co. v. Day, 50 Iowa, 250. This, however, is an action for a tort or wrong, and in such case the defendant should respond in damages to the full extent of the wrong. In such case compensation should be the rule; but, while this is so, remote damages should not be allowed, but only such as are sustained or caused by the wrongful act. In Sedg. Dam. note 1, p. 80, it is said that “it may be assumed to be the general rule that in actions of tort, where the amount of profits of which the injured party is deprived as a legitimate result of the trespass can be shown with reasonable certainty, such profits constitute, to that extent, a safe measure of damages.” And in Wolcott v. Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 263, it is said that the earlier cases, “both in English and American courts, concur in excluding as well in actions in tort as in actions on contracts, from the damages recoverable, profits which might have been realized if the injury had not been done or the contract had been performed. This judgment of the power of courts to award compensation adequate to the injury suffered has been removed in actions of tort. The wrong-doer must answer in damages for those results, injuries to other parties, which are presumed to have been within his contemplation when the wrong was done.” To the same effect are Hamer v. Knowles, 30 L. J. Exch. 102; Sewall's Falls Bridge Co. v. Fisk, 3 Fost. 171;Chandler v. Allison, 10 Mich. 460; Wood, Nuis. 892; Dubois v. Glaub, 52 Pa. St. 238; Fultz v. Wycoff, 25 Ind. 231;Park v. Chicago & S. W. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 636;Simmons v. Brown. 5 R. I. 299;White v. Moseley, 8 Pick. 356. In the last case it is said: “The interruption to the use of the mill and the diminution of the plaintiffs' profits on that account, were alleged in the declaration, and proved at the trial, and we think this was right. The plaintiffs are entitled to recover all the damages they suffered by reason of the trespass.”

Counsel for the appellant insist that the value of the use of the mill is the measure of damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled. This undoubtedly is true; but how is the value of such use to be ascertained? It is said the lessened rental value and plaintiffs' loss of time, that is, their skill and labor, when shown, constitutes the value of the use or what they have lost as profits. But it seems to us that this is not necessarily the extent of the loss. If the earnings or profits amounted to more than this, then the plaintiffs' loss would be such excess. Besides this, the rental value must depend on and be measured by the extent of the profits. If there was absolute certainty in human evidence, the one should amount to precisely the same as the other. When the profits are ascertained, the value of the use, or rental value, is certainly known. When the defendants did the wrong complained of, they were bound to know what the probable result would be. They knew, or were bound to know, that the capacity of the mill would be lessened, and that, consequently, the earnings and profits would be decreased. The evidence in question was therefore admissible for the purpose of enabling the court to determine the amount of damages. Its sufficiency in this respect will be hereafter considered.

The facts in Decorah Woolen-mill Co. v. Greer, 49 Iowa, 498, were materially different. In that case the damages allowed were based on the capacity of the mill, and it was thought the evidence was too uncertain to enable the court to determine with a sufficient degree of accuracy what the profits were or would have been. Profits were not allowed in Howe Mach. Co. v. Bryson, 44 Iowa, 159, and Winne v. Kelley, 34 Iowa, 339. We deem it sufficient to say that the actions in these cases were based on breaches of contract, and therefore distinguishable.

2. It is urged that the finding of the court as to the damages, and also in relation to the backwater, and whether the dam should be abated to the extent the court ordered, is not sustained by the evidence. In considering these questions it is practically contended that this court must examine the evidence, and reach a conclusion without reference to what the district court did. The thought of counsel seems to be that if this court, after reviewing the evidence, should reach the conclusion that if we, as an original proposition, “would have decided the case otherwise,” then we should do so now, notwithstanding the decision of the district court. It is said that the evidence in this case was all taken down by the short-hand reporter, and is now presented to us in the precise form the several witnesses stated it to the district court, and therefore we can and should determine the weight and value of the evidence to establish any given proposition. Counsel, however, concede that this is not a trial court in actions at law, and that in this court there “must be recognized a presumption in favor of the correctness of the rulings of the court below.” This is undoubtedly true, and then the question is pertinent, when or at what point shall such presumption cease to have effect upon the judicial mind, when a doubt is created,...