Gibson v. Florence Country Club, 22145

• Decision Date: 05 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 22145,22145
• Citation: 282 S.C. 384,318 S.E.2d 365
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Mary Gail GIBSON, Claimant, Respondent, v. FLORENCE COUNTRY CLUB, Liable Employer, and Florence Country Club, Separating Employer, Appellant. . Heard

Page 365

318 S.E.2d 365

282 S.C. 384

Mary Gail GIBSON, Claimant, Respondent, v. FLORENCE COUNTRY CLUB, Liable Employer, and Florence Country Club, Separating Employer, Appellant.

No. 22145.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard June 5, 1984.

Decided July 25, 1984.

A.E. Morehead, III, of Swearingen & Morehead, Florence, for appellant.

Michael Ballenger, of Harwell, Ballenger & DeBerry, Florence, for respondent.

NESS, Justice:

This is an appeal from the circuit court's reversal of the South Carolina Employment Security Commission's denial of unemployment benefits to respondent, Mary Gail Gibson. Appellant, Florence Country Club, contends the trial court erred in concluding Gibson was entitled to unemployment benefits, claiming the Commission's findings were supported by substantial evidence within the meaning of S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(g)(5) (1983 Cum.Supp.). We agree and reverse.

Mary Gail Gibson was employed by Florence Country Club for approximately five years, the last three primarily as a full-time computer operator. While working on a full-time basis she received a base salary ranging from $150 to $165 per week, in addition to a share of a "gratuity fund" which amounted to $40 per week. Approximately two weeks prior to her final day of employment, the Club's management instituted a new salary structure which effectively substituted overtime hourly payment for the weekly gratuity fund salary supplement each employee received. Specifically, Gibson was to receive a base salary of $175 per week, an increase of $10 per week, as well as one and a half times her salary for any overtime she worked in a given week. Despite her contention that she "loved her job," Gibson resigned within one day after receiving notice of this change, claiming she had been subjected to an unwarranted salary decrease.

The Employment Security Commission, while recognizing the record contained conflicting testimony, determined Gibson had not voluntarily left her job for good cause attributable to her employment within the meaning of S.C.Code Ann. § 41-35-120(1) (1983 Cum.Supp.), finding there had been no "material change in her working conditions that justified her leaving" and denied unemployment compensation. Gibson then appealed this ruling to the circuit court, which reversed the Commission's decision, concluding Gibson had not been properly informed of the effects of the new salary system.

Basically, the only issue in this case concerns whether Gibson was informed of the specifics of the new system, which apparently would have had a negligible effect on her "take-home" salary. Gibson maintains she was never informed of the effect of the new salary structure on her particular situation, and was unaware she would receive the same, if not a higher amount of wages under this new procedure. The Club argues that even if Gibson was not individually informed of the details of the new salary procedure, it is easily inferrable that she became aware of the effect of this system through her interaction with management and fellow employees during the period she worked subsequent to the submission of her letter of resignation, which occurred only one day after she was informed of the salary changes.

At oral argument, both parties claimed our standard of review in this matter was governed by S.C.Code Ann. § 41-35-750 (1976), rather than S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(g) (1983 Cum.Supp.) of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-310, et seq. We disagree.

Clearly, the Employment Security Commission is an agency within the meaning of S.C.Code Ann. §...