Gibson v. Hoppman

• Decision Date: 07 November 1928
• Citation: 143 A. 635,108 Conn. 401
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: GIBSON v. HOPPMAN ET AL.

143 A. 635

108 Conn. 401

GIBSON v. HOPPMAN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

November 7, 1928

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Christopher L. Avery Judge.

Action by May L. Gibson against Harry Hoppman and others. From a judgment on a directed verdict for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Error, judgment set aside, and new trial ordered.

HINMAN and Banks, JJ., dissenting.

Charles S. Hamilton, of New Haven, for appellant.

Charles J. Martin, Bernhard Hoffman, and Walton E. Cronan all of New Haven, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and MARVIN, JJ.

MALTBIE, J.

The plaintiff was injured by a fall while descending a stairway leading from an apartment, occupied by her parents, located on the third floor of a building owned by the defendants, to the hall on the second floor. The building contained three separate apartments, one on each floor, each rented by the defendants to a separate family. The negligence alleged was a failure of the defendants to provide a handrail for the stairway in question and to provide for the lighting of the halls and stairways in the building at night. The defendants filed a general denial.

The stairway in question was winding, some of the treads being very narrow at one end and widening out at the other. There was no handrail. At the top of the stairs was a doorway leading into the apartment of plaintiff's parents, and it appeared in evidence that some light came to the stairway through this, but that the plaintiff closed the door after she passed through it. There was also evidence that at the time the injury occurred, after 5 o'clock on the afternoon of November 4th, the part of the stairway at the turn, where the plaintiff fell, was quite dark. The trial court held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

The elements in the plaintiff's conduct which the defendants claim to have been negligent were the closing of the door between the apartment and the hall after she had passed through it, excluding such light as came from the kitchen, failure to use her hands to guide her in going down the stairs, and her use of the rear stairway, although another stairway was available at the front of the building. It appears, however, at least by permissible inference, that any light coming from the kitchen would not have penetrated to the part of the stairs where the plaintiff fell. She testified that she kept her right arm against the wall to guide her as she passed down the stairs, and when she reached the turn, and two or three steps before she fell, used her hand for the same purpose. There was no evidence that the front stairs were better lighted or safer than the rear, but it did appear that the rear stairway was customarily used by the plaintiff upon her frequent visits, and by the members of her family residing in the apartment. Even if the rear stairs were more dangerous than the front, the plaintiff was not necessarily bound to choose the other means of exit, or chargeable with contributory negligence in passing down the rear stairs, provided she did so with reasonable care. Blake v. Waterbury, 105 Conn. 482, 484, 136 A. 95; Lucy v. Norwich, 93 Conn. 545, 549, 106 A. 762; Pesin v. Jugovich, 85 N.J.Law, 256, 259, 88 A. 1101. The evidence was such that, at least, reasonable men might differ upon the question as to whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence; therefore its determination should have been left to the jury. Lampe v. Simpson, 106 Conn. 356, 138 A. 141; Bunnell v. Waterbury, 103 Conn. 520, 526, 131 A. 501.

The defendants' building was clearly a " tenement house," within the definition given in section 2563 of the General statutes, and therefore subject to the provisions of chapter 133 of the General statutes, including that, in section 2567, which provides that " the owner of every tenement house shall provide for the lighting of all public halls at night." Section 2563 defines such a public hall as " a hall, corridor or passageway not within an apartment." The hallway on each of the floors of the defendants' building was, therefore, a " public hall," within this definition, and the above-quoted provision regarding lighting was applicable thereto. The evidence was undisputed that the only provisions for lighting these halls was a fixture in each connected with the wiring of the adjoining apartment, controlled by the tenant thereof, and used, if at all, at his option and expense. This was not a compliance with the statute, which plainly contemplates that the occupants of such tenement houses and others having lawful occasion to traverse the public halls therein shall be safeguarded by light maintained therein by the landlord, instead of leaving such lighting dependent upon the will of the tenants of the respective floors. Agatstein v. Stark (N. Y. Sup.) 156 N.Y.S. 393, 394; 36 Corpus Juris, 215. The trial court correctly so ruled, but held that there was a lack of evidence that the time when the plaintiff fell was " at night," and this was one of the two grounds upon which a defendants' verdict was directed.

The word " night" is susceptible of various interpretations. In this state, as elsewhere, a burglary has been held to have been committed in the " night," when there was not daylight enough to enable one to discern the features of a man. State v. Morris, 47 Conn. 179, 180. But that definition, arbitrarily adopted and of itself open to criticism, hardly affords an apt criterion for such a case as this. We cannot fix a definite time after sunset when night shall be deemed to begin, as has been done by legislative act in a number of states. 5 Words and Phrases, First Series, p. 4808; 3 Words and Phrases, Second Series, p. 614. One of the accepted definitions of " night" includes within it the period from the termination of daylight in the evening to the earliest dawn the next morning. State v. Bancroft, 10 N.H. 105; State v. McKnight, 111 N.C. 690, 692, 16 S.E. 319. The purpose of the statutory requirement we are considering was obviously to safeguard the occupants of tenement houses and others having lawful occasion to traverse the halls and stairways within them and to assure them a safe passage, and, as it ordinarily gets dark more quickly within buildings than it does in the open, to attribute to the word " night" as used in this statute the meaning last suggested would fall far short of accomplishing the purpose of the provision, leaving, as it would, a period of darkness in the evening and another after dawn, when the statute would not apply.

" Night" has, however, another accepted meaning, and that is the period from sunset to sunrise the next morning. Century Dictionary; Webster's New International Dictionary. As indicative of the practical necessities of the situation, it is to be noted that, in so far as we have examined the statutes of other states which have similar provisions, we find that the requirements as to light in public halls in tenement houses become effective at sunset. Gen. Laws Mass. 1921, p. 1495; Laws N.Y. 1923, c. 796; Laws Cal. 1923, p. 782; and see Viller's Model Housing Law, § 91. Bearing in mind the purpose of the statute, it seems to us that the legislative intent is best effectuated by construing the word " night" as meaning the period which begins at sunset.

The sun set on the day of the accident at 4:30 o'clock and all the testimony as to the time of the injury placed it after 5. If the jury found in accordance with this testimony, it would follow that the injury occurred at a time when under the statute the halls in the building ought to have been lighted. There was evidence that, when the electric light in the second story hall was lighted, it illuminated to some extent, at least by reflected rays, the part of the stairs involved in the plaintiff's fall. If the jury should find that under the statute a light was required at that time and place, the failure of the defendants' to provide it, if the proximate cause of the plaintiff's fall, would be actionable negligence. Monroe v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 76 Conn. 201, 206, 56 A. 498; Schindler v. Welz, 145 A.D. 532, 130 N.Y.S. 344; Pesin v. Jugovich, 85 N.J.Law, 256, 88 A. 1101; 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, p. 653; 36 Corpus Juris, 214. The jury might, upon the evidence, have found that such lack of light did proximately cause the plaintiff's fall and injury. It follows that the court was in error in directing a verdict for the defendants.

As a new trial must be ordered, certain other claims of the plaintiff must be regarded. Her parents occupied the only apartment upon the third floor of the building, and there was no occasion for any other tenant to use the stairway leading to it, except as he might visit them. At the same time, it is clear from the evidence that the stairway formed no part of the tenement rented to the plaintiff's parents, but was retained by the defendant landlords within their exclusive control. They were under a duty to use reasonable care to keep it reasonably safe for the use of the tenants and those having lawful occasion to visit them, including the plaintiff. Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 386, 128 A. 705, 39 A.L.R. 287 The plaintiff claims that in this duty is included an obligation, quite apart from the statute we have been discussing, to light the stairway, if that was reasonably necessary to the safety of those using it. It is generally stated that negligence cannot ordinarily be predicated upon the failure of a landlord to light the halls and stairways retained in his control, although not very many jurisdictions seem to have adopted the rule. 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, p. 635; 2 Underhill, Landlord and Tenant, § 492; 16 R. C. L. p. 1041.

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