Gibson v. Jensen

Citation158 P. 426,48 Utah 244
Decision Date08 February 1916
Docket Number2809
CourtSupreme Court of Utah
PartiesGIBSON v. JENSEN

Rehearing Denied July 7, 1916.

Appeal from District Court, Second District, Hon. N. J. Harris Judge.

Action by Isabelle V. Gibson against Joseph M. Jensen.

Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

REVERSED AND REMANDED, with directions.

James Ingebretsen, for appellant.

Skeen Bros. & Wilkins, for respondent.

FRICK J. STRAUP, C. J., and McCARTY, J., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

The plaintiff brought this action in equity to annul a contract by which she purchased a certain number of shares of the capital stock of a certain corporation and to recover the purchase price she paid for the stock. The plaintiff, in her complaint, in substance, alleged that on January 2, 1907, one H. C. Healy, while acting as the agent for the defendant Jensen, by false and fraudulent representations (which she specifically set forth) which she believed and relied on, was induced to purchase the capital stock aforesaid for the sum of $ 1,300; that she did not discover the fraud practiced upon her by said Healy until "about the 10th day of December, 1913." Plaintiff prayed judgment that her contract to purchase be set aside and that she recover from the defendant said sum of $ 1,300 with legal interest from January 2, 1907. The defendant, in his answer, denied each and every allegation of the complaint, and further alleged that the action was barred by the provisions of Comp. Laws, 1907, Section 2877, subdiv. 4. The action was commenced January 20, 1914. Upon the foregoing issues and the evidence adduced, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of the plaintiff, and entered judgment in her favor for said sum of $ 1,300 with interest as prayed. Defendant appeals.

The principal errors assigned are: That the court erred in finding that said Healy was the agent of the defendant in selling the stock in question; that the court erred in its findings and conclusions of law that the representations made by said Healy were actionable; and, further, that the court erred in not holding that the action was barred by the provisions of the statute before referred to.

From an examination of the evidence, we are impressed that there is much force to counsel's contention that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the court's finding that Healy was the agent of the defendant. Nor is the evidence of fraud strong. But be that as it may, in view that we have become convinced that the case should be determined upon the assignment relating to the statute of limitations, which, if held to apply, of necessity disposes of this action, we express no opinion upon the other two assignments to which we have referred.

The court's findings in relation to the defense of the statute of limitations is as follows:

"That plaintiff did not discover the facts of said transaction until on or about the 10th day of December, 1913, although she used due and reasonable diligence in her endeavor to do so."

There is no conclusion of law, or any other intimation by the court, that the action was not barred. For the purposes of this decision we shall assume, however, that the foregoing finding is sufficient to meet the defense that the action was barred.

The defendant pleaded the subdivision of the section to which we have referred. That section, so far as applicable here, reads:

"An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake three years; the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake."

Now, the evidence is undisputed that the plaintiff was fully advised of the fraud that was practiced upon her by Healy, if any actionable fraud was practiced upon her, as early as July 27, 1909, in a letter from Mr. Healy to her in which he made a full statement respecting his faults in the transaction. By a comparison of the complaint with the statements contained in the letter aforesaid, and of plaintiff's own admissions when testifying, it appears that she was advised of every essential fact which was necessary for her to know in order to bring an action if she felt disposed to bring one. It was not necessary for her to be informed of all the details. 25 Cyc. 1217. If she was made aware of the principal or controlling facts, it was sufficient. By that we mean it was sufficient if she was fully informed of such facts as would put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence upon inquiry. If she was so informed, then she had all the information contemplated by the statute.

In Larsen v. Utah L. & T. Co., 23 Utah 449, 65 P. 208, in referring to this question, this court said:

"Where relief is sought on the ground of fraud, the statute does not begin to run until the discovery of the fraud, or the discovery of such facts as would put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry."

To the same effect is 25 Cyc. 1174, 1186-1190. At page 1177 of the volume referred to, it is said:

"Nor is the rule just stated altered by plaintiff's ignorance of his legal rights, or by the circumstance that he is a person of a low order of intelligence and mental capacity and of small will power, provided that he has the legal capacity to act and to contract."

To the same effect is Marks v. Evans (Cal.) 62 P. 76.

The rule is also clearly stated in 3 Words and Phrases, 2093, where it is said:

"Whatever is notice enough to excite attention, and put the party on his guard, and call for inquiry, is notice of...

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7 cases
  • Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corporation
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • July 3, 1967
    ...383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192. 9 78-12-26(3) Utah Code Annotated. 10 Horn v. Daniel, 10 Cir., 315 F.2d 471; Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426; Larsen v. Utah Loan and Trust Co., 23 Utah 449, 65 P. 11 The letter in pertinent part is as follows: "Mr. Sanders apparently h......
  • International Union United Auto. Workers of America v. Wood
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1953
    ...agency such fraud as would toll the statute of limitations. Owen v. King, 130 Tex. 614, 111 S.W.2d 695, 114 A.L.R. 859, and Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426. Concealment by one other than the one sought to be charged is not within the prohibition of the statute. See Stevenson v. Ro......
  • Haslem v. Ottosen, 18749
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • September 10, 1984
    ...of limitations until "discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the ... mistake." (Emphasis added.) In Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426 (1916), this Court construed the predecessor to § 78-12-26(3) and held that discovery occurs when facts arise which would put a r......
  • Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 860064-CA
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • December 11, 1987
    ...deemed to have discovered all that would have been revealed, and the running of the statute of limitations commences. Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426, 427 (1916); Haslem v. Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27, 30 (Utah 1984). The complaining party does not have to have actual notice of the alleg......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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