Gibson v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 09 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 82-443.,82-443.
• Parties: Gloria GIBSON, Appellant, v. Walter JOHNSON, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 574

492 A.2d 574

Gloria GIBSON, Appellant, v. Walter JOHNSON, Appellee.

No. 82-443.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued September 12, 1984.

Decided January 9, 1985.

As Amended June 5, 1985.

Roy L. Pearson, Jr., Washington, D.C., Neighborhood Legal Services Program, for appellant.

Stephen O. Hessler, Washington, D.C., for appellee. Lisa J. Dessel, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for appellee.

Before BELSON and TERRY, Associate Judges, and PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired.

PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired:

This appeal is from a judgment entered in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Superior Court in favor of the landlord, Walter Johnson (appellee), for possession of the leased premises and for unpaid rent. The tenant, Fannie Daniels (appellant),¹ challenged the decision on numerous grounds contending that the court (1) erred in striking her counterclaims, (2) erroneously concluded that the premises were exempt from rent ceiling limitations of the District of Columbia Rental Housing Act of 1977, and (3) failed to find that she had not been served with the required notice to quit the premises.^1A We conclude that the assertions of error are without merit, and accordingly, affirm.

On October 11, 1977, Fannie Daniels entered into a rental lease agreement with Carl W. Johnson for the occupancy, on a month-to-month basis, of an apartment at premises 612 14th Place, N.E. By its terms, the lease was assignable and the monthly rental was $109. The lease also contained a covenant whereby Ms. Daniels expressly waived her right to 30 days' notice to quit the premises in the event she breached any provision of the lease.² The lease provided further that all covenants were binding upon the assigns of the landlord.

On September 15, 1980, Carl Johnson and his wife, Bobbie Jean Johnson, conveyed by deed recorded October 12, 1980, all of their right, title and interest in and to the subject property to their son, Walter Johnson, appellee herein. On or about September 26, 1980, appellee made claim with the rent administrator for exemptions from the rent ceiling. Shortly thereafter, appellee served upon appellant notices that her rent was being increased, first to $176 and then to $180 monthly.

The dispute which culminated in this litigation arose over Ms. Daniels' failure to pay a portion of the rent due for October 1980 and the entire rent due for November 1980. On November 16, 1980, Carl Johnson filed a complaint for possession of the apartment and for nonpayment of rent. Ms. Daniels answered the complaint alleging that the rent charged exceeded the maximum allowable rent under the Rental Housing Act of 1977 (D.C.Code § 45-1681 et seq. (1980 Supp.)), and that the lease was void because the landlord had violated District of Columbia housing regulations.³ Ms. Daniels then counterclaimed for rents paid prior to the initiation of the suit, alleging overpayment of rent, breach of implied warranty of habitability and other violations of the housing regulations.

Trial was commenced in May 1981 and during its pendency Carl Johnson moved to amend his complaint to substitute Walter Johnson as plaintiff and to amend also the ad damnum clause to include the amount of the October rent which remained unpaid. The court granted the motion.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court made findings of fact, upon the basis of which it ruled as a matter of law that the subject premises were exempt from the rent ceiling limitations of the Rental Housing Act, that Walter Johnson was, as owner of the premises, the proper party-plaintiff in the action, and that Ms. Daniels had defaulted in her obligation to pay rent. The court, accordingly, entered judgment in favor of Walter Johnson for possession of the premises and for unpaid rent.⁴ This appeal followed.⁵

I. The Subject Premises are Exempt From the Rent Ceiling Limitations, of the Rental Housing Act.

Appellant argues that the increase in her monthly rent from $109 in September of 1980 to $176 in October and $180 in November was in contravention of the Rental Housing Act. Appellant asserts that the property was not exempt from the rent ceiling limitations contained in § 45-1687⁶ and that therefore the filing of a claim of exemption statement with the D.C. Rental Accommodations Office by Walter Johnson on September 29, 1980, was ineffectual. We do not agree.⁷

Section 45-1686(a) exempts from rent control:

(4) any rental unit in any housing accommodation of four (4) or fewer units, including any aggregate of four (4) units whether within the same structure or not: Provided, that:

(A) such housing accommodation is owned by not more than four (4) natural persons;

(B) none of such owners has an interest either directly or indirectly, in any other rental unit in the District of Columbia; and

(C) the owner(s) of such housing accommodation shall file with the Rent Administrator a claim of exemption statement which shall consist of an oath or affirmation by such owner(s) of the valid claim to the exemption. The claim of exemption statement shall also contain the signatures of each person having an interest (direct or indirect) in the housing accommodation. Any change in the ownership of the exempted housing accommodation or change in the owner's interest in any other housing accommodation which would invalidate the exemption claim must be reported in writing to the Rent Administrator within thirty (30) days of such change. . . .⁸

Appellant maintains that Carl Johnson had either a direct or indirect interest in the rental property, but did not sign, as required, the exemption statement. The "interest" that appellant would have us recognize as controlling is Carl Johnson's obligation on a promissory note secured by a first deed of trust on the property and his continued management of the rental units.⁹ These are not, however, indicia of the interest which § 45-1686(a)(4)(C) contemplates. Rather, that code section calls for full disclosure of those persons having any ownership interest in the property.¹⁰ As manager of the property, Carl Johnson was no more than an agent of the owner Walter Johnson. Moreover, Carl Johnson's continued liability on the promissory note secured by a first deed of trust on the property was not tantamount to ownership. It evidenced merely an underlying monetary obligation which was personal in nature. See Yasuna v. Miller, 399 A.2d 68, 72 (D.C.1979).

Citing the legislative history of § 45-1686, appellant also argues that Carl Johnson is the "owner" of the subject premises, given a liberal definition of the term, and should not be able to evade rent control provisions by conveying the property to one who qualifies for the exemption.¹¹ An examination of the record reveals that Carl Johnson may have had as one motive in conveying the property to his son the evasion of rent control.¹² And as appellant suggests, this result may not have been desired.¹³ Yet, the statute is not ambiguous. It clearly exempts from rent control rental housing of four units or less which is owned by not more than four persons provided the owner(s) has no interest, either directly or indirectly, in any other rental property in the District of Columbia and provided a claim of exemption statement is properly filed with the Rental Accommodations Office. In our view, these criteria have been satisfied. Walter Johnson was the owner of record of the rental units involved at the time he filed the claim of exemption statement and at the time the rent increases were implemented.¹⁴ The record quite clearly indicates that he had no other interests in District of Columbia rental property. Consequently, it would be contrary to the clear meaning of the statute to deny him the advantage of the exemption. In re Estate of Shutack, 469 A.2d 427, 429 (D.C.1983); Davis v. United States, 397 A.2d 951, 956 (D.C.1979). This court, of course, will not look beyond the plain meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous and does not produce an absurd result. Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C.1983).

Having determined that Walter Johnson was the owner of the premises within the meaning of § 45-1686, it is necessary to address the contention that he, as a potential heir of his father Carl Johnson, had an indirect interest in other District of Columbia rental property and that consequently the subject premises did not qualify for the rent ceiling exemption. We find no merit to appellant's argument. It is axiomatic that a living person has no heirs. In re Bartlett's Will, 76 N.Y.S.2d 247, 254, aff'd, 274 A.D. 136, 80 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1948). As appellee suggests, among the many facts that appellant's argument presupposes is that Carl Johnson will predecease his son Walter. We decline to indulge in any such speculation.

Finally, appellant asserts that in violation of D.C.Code § 28-3101 (1981), Carl Johnson fraudulently conveyed the premises to his son Walter in an effort to evade the rent ceiling limitation and therefore retains an interest in the property, invalidating its exempt status. Appellee raises the issue of whether fraudulent conveyance was properly pleaded by appellant. Alternatively, appellee argues that the record does not support appellant's claim that the property was fraudulently conveyed by Carl Johnson to his son Walter.

Superior Court Landlord and Tenant Rule 5(c) requires that a defendant who desires to interpose a plea of title in defense to a suit for possession file such plea in writing under oath. Appellee maintains that appellant's claim that the premises were fraudulently conveyed by Carl Johnson is tantamount to a plea of title and that since none was filed, appellant cannot now avail herself of this defense. We are persuaded, however, that appellant was not required to file a plea of title under Rule 5(c) since she was not claiming title in herself or in another under whom she claimed. Mindell v. Glenn, 65 A.2d 340, 341-42 (D.C.1949). In...