Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co.

Decision Date15 December 1982
Docket NumberNos. 81-2035,81-2084,s. 81-2035
Citation695 F.2d 1093
Parties30 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 859, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,247, 12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 220 Richard L. GIBSON, Appellee, v. MOHAWK RUBBER COMPANY, Appellant. Richard L. GIBSON, Appellant, v. MOHAWK RUBBER COMPANY, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Harley M. Kastner, Millisor, Belkin & Nobil, Akron, Ohio, James M. Moody, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant-cross appellee.

William Russell Gibson, Pettus, Johnson & Gibson, Fayetteville, Ark., Millisor, Belkin & Nobil, Akron, Ohio, for appellee-cross appellant.

Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, and STEPHENSON, * and HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Mohawk Rubber Company appeals from the district court's 1 judgment, 521 F.Supp. 1285, awarding Richard Gibson $194,376.74 in damages because the company discharged him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621 et seq. Gibson cross-appeals from the district court's denial of his request for certain equitable relief. We reverse and remand for a new trial to determine the damages to which Gibson is appropriately entitled.

I.

FACTS.

Mohawk Rubber Company, headquartered in Hudson, Ohio, is primarily a producer of tire and rubber products. Prior to 1979, Mohawk operated tire producing facilities in Akron, Ohio; West Helena, Arkansas; and Salem, Virginia. Today, only its Salem plant remains in operation.

Richard Gibson began working for Mohawk in 1959 as a production manager at the company's West Helena facility. In 1960, Gibson accepted a position with a competing rubber products company, but he returned to Mohawk in 1963 as a division manager at the West Helena plant. In 1967, Gibson was promoted to production manager, and transferred to Mohawk's new facility in Salem, Virginia. At the Salem plant, Gibson helped supervise the installation of equipment, and the hiring and training of over 300 new employees. Within a year after its opening, the Salem plant became one of the most successful tire-producing facilities in the country.

Mohawk transferred Gibson back to its West Helena plant in 1970, and promoted him to general manager of that facility. The West Helena plant had been beset with labor and production problems, and Mohawk had employed seven general managers at the facility in the previous ten years.

During Gibson's tenure as general manager at the West Helena plant, production increased regularly. In both 1976 and 1977, the West Helena plant produced more tires than in any other years in its sixty-five year history. The record is unclear as to how much profit Mohawk realized from the production at the West Helena plant while Gibson was its general manager, but is undisputed that Gibson received substantial pay raises in 1970, 1971, 1972, 1975 and 1977. He also received bonuses in every year that he was a general manager.

On March 23, 1978, when Gibson was fifty-four years old, Mohawk fired him. He was paid full wages through August, 1978, and kept him on a leave of absence until he reached age fifty-five in February, 1979. Because Mohawk kept Gibson on this leave of absence, he retained his health insurance coverage and became eligible for early retirement at age fifty-five. Gibson declined to accept early retirement.

Mohawk contends that it fired Gibson because he had a poor working relationship with his superior David King and because he had made excessive concessions to the West Helena employees. In contrast, several union members employed at the West Helena plant who spoke with King immediately after Gibson was discharged testified that King told them, in essence, that Mohawk had a policy of discharging employees approaching age fifty-five, and that Gibson was fired for this reason.

On July 9, 1979, Mohawk permanently closed its West Helena plant because the facility was operating at a deficit. Mohawk let Gibson's replacement, Tom Ferrell, go at the end of that month without offering Ferrell another position within any of its other operations.

Gibson filed this action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621 et seq, in August, 1978. In a jury trial in June, 1981, the jury found that Mohawk unlawfully discharged Gibson because of his age. It awarded him $97,188.27 in actual damages from the date of his discharge to the date of trial. The jury also found that Mohawk terminated Gibson in willful violation of the ADEA, and awarded Gibson an additional $97,188.27 in liquidated damages.

In the subsequent nonjury hearing on Gibson's request for equitable relief, the district court ordered Mohawk to contribute the funds it would have owed to Gibson's pension plan between the date of his discharge and February, 1979, when he reached age fifty-five and became eligible for early retirement and his pension fully vested. The district court, however, refused to order Mohawk to reinstate Gibson or to award him additional pension benefits calculated as if he had remained employed until he was sixty-five.

Mohawk now appeals from the damages awarded by the jury. 2 Gibson cross-appeals from the district court's denial of his request for additional equitable relief.

II.

DISCUSSION.

A. Damages Issues.

Mohawk first contends that the district court erred in permitting Gibson to recover damages from the date of his discharge to the date of trial. The jury awarded Gibson $97,188.37 in actual damages for losses sustained over that period, plus the same amount in liquidated damages.

The purpose of the ADEA is to make persons whole for injuries suffered as a result of unlawful employment discrimination. E.g. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 372-374 (8th Cir.1974). The Act provides legal and equitable remedies to eliminate the unlawful practices and to restore aggrieved persons to the position where they would have been if the illegal discrimination had not occurred. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626.

Consistent with the ADEA's purpose of recreating the circumstances that would have existed but for the illegal discrimination, aggrieved persons are not entitled to recover damages for the period beyond which they would have been terminated for a nondiscriminatory reason. See e.g., Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 627 F.2d 858, 863-866 (8th Cir.1980); Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 594 F.2d 638, 641-642 (8th Cir.1979). See also Welch v. University of Texas, 659 F.2d 531, 535 (5th Cir.1981) (Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e et seq.).

Mohawk closed its West Helena plant on July 9, 1979, because of declining demand for its tires and high production costs at that facility. Gibson nonetheless argues that he is entitled to recover damages for his losses after July, 1979, up to the date of trial because had Mohawk not previously unlawfully discharged him, it would have transferred him to another position within the company after the West Helena closing.

Mohawk, on the other hand, argues that there is not substantial evidence in the record from which the jury reasonably could find that the company would have retained Gibson after the West Helena plant was closed. Thus, it claims the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Gibson's recovery must be limited to the time between his discharge and the closure of the West Helena plant, when Gibson would have been lawfully terminated. We cannot accept Mohawk's claim.

Gibson introduced evidence that he successfully performed his duties as general manager of the West Helena plant, and in several lesser positions in Mohawk's operations. He received numerous promotions, pay raises and merit bonuses throughout his twenty years with the company. Moreover, witnesses for Mohawk testified that the competition in the tire industry for well-qualified managerial personnel was intense.

At the time Mohawk closed its West Helena plant, it still operated numerous other facilities, including one new tire plant, three retread tire plants and several subsidiaries engaged in unrelated activities. In fact, Mohawk had transferred Gibson from West Helena to Salem, Virginia, in 1970 to help manage the construction of the company's new tire manufacturing facility and the training of the personnel for it. Witnesses for Gibson testified that he did an outstanding job, and that the Salem plant is now one of the most productive in the nation. The general manager's position still exists at the Salem facility, as well as the production manager's job which Gibson held while he was there. Moreover, several division manager positions, which Gibson formerly held on his way up the ranks in Mohawk, also apparently still exist at the Salem plant, as well as in Mohawk's other facilities. Gibson testified that to protect his pension, he would have accepted a position at another Mohawk facility that was lower than the one he held at West Helena.

Gibson also introduced evidence that Mohawk in the past had transferred its salaried personnel between its tire facilities. Indeed, Gibson testified that he was transferred between West Helena and Salem more than twice. Most importantly, there was also testimony that Mohawk transferred at least one salaried employee and offered transfers to several others upon the closing of the West Helena facility.

Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury reasonably could have found that Mohawk would have retained Gibson after it closed its West Helena facility. Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to limit Gibson's recovery as a matter of law to the period prior to the West Helena plant's closure. 3

Mohawk alternatively contends that the district court's damage instruction was erroneous because it improperly directed the jury to award Gibson damages for all losses incurred up to the date of trial even though there was a question for the jury concerning whether Mohawk would have retained Gibson when it closed...

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