Gibson v. Perdue, 6 Div. 229.

Decision Date30 June 1932
Docket Number6 Div. 229.
Citation144 So. 121,25 Ala.App. 240
PartiesGIBSON v. PERDUE.
CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

Rehearing Denied Nov. 1, 1932.

Appeal from Court of Common Claims, Jefferson County; E. N. Hamill Judge.

Action by Graham Perdue against A. K. Gibson. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

A. F Lindbergh and H. A. Entrekin, both of Birmingham, for appellant.

Robert E. Smith, of Birmingham, for appellee.

RICE J.

This appeal is by the defendant in the court below, from a judgment rendered against him in favor of appellee, in a suit brought in the Jefferson county court of common claims, a court created by act of the Legislature of Alabama approved July 20, 1931 (Gen. Acts Ala. 1931, pp. 621-628).

By appropriate pleadings the question, and the sole question presented for our consideration, is the constitutional validity, vel non, of the act creating said court, or, which amounts to the same thing, the said court.

The attack by appellant upon the constitutionality of the court is focused upon the proposition that, whereas the act creating it was passed under the guise of a general law, it was in fact, as disclosed by its title, and substance, but a local law, applying to only Jefferson county, and hence void because of the obvious failure to comply with section 106 of the Constitution of 1901.

The pertinent portion of the title, etc., of said act is as follows: "An Act to establish an Inferior Court of Record in all counties in this State having a population of 300,000 or more," etc.

Because of the fact that only Jefferson county comes within the classification mentioned, and because of the fact that the only other county in the state even "approaching" Jefferson in point of population-Mobile-is some 180,000 behind the figure named in the title, etc., of the act, and because of the fact that it is thought to require the efforts of an unnaturally fertile imagination to conceive the county of Mobile's (and more imagination with reference to any other county) coming within the purview of said act any time within the next century or so appellant's capable counsel argue very forcefully that the act is nothing more nor less than a local law, applying to only Jefferson county.

But we are precluded, as are said counsel. Code 1923, §§ 7322, 7318.

The same question here raised, and on facts in all essential respects similar, was raised in the case of L. L. Wages v....

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