Gibson v. Sorrells

• Docket Number: Civil Action 4:23-cv-016-O
• Decision Date: 24 May 2023
• Parties: JAMALLE DONNTAI GIBSON, (TDCJ No. 01964551), Plaintiff, v. PHIL SORRELLS, Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney, et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

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JAMALLE DONNTAI GIBSON, (TDCJ No. 01964551), Plaintiff, v. PHIL SORRELLS, Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney, et al., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-016-O

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division

May 24, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

REED O'CONNOR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Now pending is the motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and incorporated brief filed by Defendant Phil Sorrells (“Sorrells”), Criminal District Attorney, Tarrant County, Texas. Mot., ECF No. 6. Sorrells supported the motion with an appendix. ECF Nos. 7, 7-1 through 7-6. Plaintiff Jamalle Donntai Gibson (“Gibson”) filed a response (ECF 10), and Sorrells filed a reply (ECF No. 12). After considering the relief sought by Gibson, the record, the briefing and the applicable law, the Court finds that the Defendant's motion to dismiss must be GRANTED.

I. NATURE OF CLAIMS

Before a district court adjudicates the merits of a pro se prisoner's claim, it should review and decipher the underlying nature and essence of the claim, regardless of the title affixed to the suit. See Odom v. West, 174 F.3d 198, 1999 WL 153008, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983)). A § 1983 action is the appropriate remedy for recovering damages for illegal state action. Taylor v. Cass Cnty. Dist. Ct., 178 F.3d 1291, 1999 WL 236119 at *1 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480-82 (1994)). The writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate federal remedy for a state prisoner challenging the fact or duration of his confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 792-96 (5th Cir. 1993).

Gibson sued newly-elected Criminal District Attorney Sorrells. Compl., ECF No. 1. Gibson characterizes his case as civil-rights complaint against Sorrells. Id. at 15, ECF No. 1. Review of the complaint, however, shows that Gibson also seeks to vacate the indictments and judgments in four state criminal cases he received in the 297th District Court, Tarrant County, Texas: Case Nos. 1277347D (possession with intent to deliver heroin), 1277348D (possession with intent to deliver cocaine), 1277349D (unlawful possession of a firearm), and 1369654D (aggravated assault with a deadly weapon-a firearm). Id. at 3.

Gibson is aware of the distinction between the types of cases, as he has filed both kinds of suits in this district. See e.g., Gibson v. Hagerman, No. 4:22-cv-0173-P (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2022) (§ 1983 case); Gibson v. Lumpkin, No. 4:21-cv-1203-P (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2021) (§ 2254 case). The documents Gibson filed in this case, however, reflect confusion. In documents filed after the motion to dismiss, Gibson appears to seek both kinds of relief. In an address update, Gibson expressly writes, “I ask the Courts to adhere to this request (to pursue a civil rights suit) . . . I am asking the court to proceed as this is a (Nature of Suit) 440 Civil Action Suit Gibson should be perceived as a (Nature of Suit) 550 due to incarcerated housing it is CIVIL SUIT.” Address Update 4, ECF No. 9. Yet, in his response to Sorrells's motion to dismiss, Gibson challenges the sufficiency of his indictments and the state criminal court's jurisdiction. Response 2-4, ECF No. 10. Thus, the Court will address both of Gibson's attempts at relief.^[1]

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Applicable Law

1. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is generally viewed with disfavor. Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir.1997). The court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)). Rule 12 must be interpreted in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim for relief in federal court and calls for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(A)(2). The court cannot look beyond the face of the pleadings in resolving a rule 12(b)(6) motion. Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty., Sch. Dist., 649 F.3d 335, 341 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[w]e examine only the allegations within the four corners of the complaint”), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1431 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss”) (citation omitted)). Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

As the United States Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and his “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Then, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified that review of a 12(b)(6) motion is guided by two principles: (1) a court must apply the presumption of truthfulness only to factual matters and not to legal conclusions; and (2) only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-680. If the pleadings fail to meet the requirements of Iqbal and Twombly, no viable claim is stated and the pleadings are subject to dismissal.

2. Review of Records Referenced by Gibson

Although all well-pleaded facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Bustos, 599 F.3d at 461, “[w]here the allegations in the complaint are contradicted by facts established by documents attached as exhibits to the complaint, the court may properly disregard the allegations.” Martinez v. Reno, No. 3:97-cv-813-P, 1997 WL 786250, at * 2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 1997) (citing Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). In his complaint, Gibson expressly challenges four separate convictions. Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. Gibson relies on those convictions. Also, “[i]n deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may permissibly refer to matters of public record.” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994). Also, documents attached to a rule 12(b)(6) that “are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [his] claim[s]” are properly before a court. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Sorrells's appendix includes documents that are public records of which this Court may take judicial notice and are properly before the Court at the 12(b)(6) stage. See Crawford v. Pitts, No. 4:20-CV-1119-O, 2022 WL 479959, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 22-10245, 2022 WL 4079269 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2022). Also, “[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [his] claim.” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Therefore, the public conviction records are considered by the Court.

B. Claims Seeking Relief as a Civil-Rights Action

1. Sovereign citizen/redemptionist-inspired claims are frivolous.

Gibson's complaint, in part, appears to advance frivolous sovereign-citizen arguments in support of vacating his four criminal convictions. Compl. 2-9, 11-13, ECF No. 1. In addition to referring to his alleged rights under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), Gibson attempts to draw a distinction between “The Person of JAMALLE DONNTAI GIBSON” and “Jamalle Donntai Gibson”-the “Owner of the Property of the PERSONS OF JAMALLE DONNTAI GIBSON.” Compl. 7, ECF No. 1. Gibson has also attached a UCC Financing Statement, in which Gibson has allegedly set up the “JAMALLE DONNTAI GIBSON TRUST©.” Id. at 1113. Furthermore, Gibson claims to be “executing the right of redemption.” Id. at 3. In short, Gibson's complaint relies on arguments common to “sovereign citizen” or “redemptionist” movements-arguments that federal courts consistently reject.

“The sovereign citizen movement is a loose grouping of litigants, commentators, and tax protesters who often take the position that they are not subject to state or federal statutes and proceedings.” Porter v. Tex., 729 Fed.Appx. 358, 358 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 746 n.5 (5th Cir. 2016)). The Third Circuit has explained:

“Redemptionist” theory ... propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the “strawman.” The “strawman” purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in 19[3]3, and, instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country's national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman.

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