Gibson v. State

Decision Date31 July 2000
Docket NumberNo. 29A02-0001-CR-14.,29A02-0001-CR-14.
Citation733 N.E.2d 945
PartiesBobby L. GIBSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Tommy L. Strunk, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Adam M. Dulik, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Following a bench trial, Bobby L. Gibson was convicted of possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. This appeal ensued. We reverse.

Issues1

Gibson raises the following restated issue for our review: whether the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress the marijuana seized from the warrantless search of his vehicle.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts most favorable to the trial court's judgment reveal that on June 12, 1999, Sergeant John Cox brought his patrol car to a halt directly behind Gibson's van which was stopped at a red traffic light. Thereafter, Sergeant Cox conducted a random computer check2 of Gibson's license plate which indicated that Gibson had an outstanding warrant for his arrest from Brown County, Indiana.3 However, Sergeant Cox did not initiate a traffic stop of Gibson's van.

Instead, Sergeant Cox followed Gibson as he drove into the parking lot of a convenience store. As Gibson exited the van and walked toward the convenience store, Sergeant Cox got out of his patrol car, stopped Gibson, and requested his driver's license. After examining the driver's license, Sergeant Cox handcuffed Gibson. Thereafter, Officer Bradley Meyers, who had responded to Sergeant Cox's call for assistance, asked Gibson if he had any weapons or contraband in his van. Gibson informed Officer Meyers that marijuana was located in the center console of his van. Neither Sergeant Cox nor Officer Meyers informed Gibson of his Miranda rights prior to Officer Meyer questioning Gibson. A plastic bag containing a green leafy substance later determined to be marijuana was retrieved from Gibson's vehicle.

Consequently, the State charged Gibson with possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor.4 Thereafter, Gibson filed with the trial court a motion to suppress the statements made by him after his arrest and the marijuana obtained from the warrantless search of his vehicle. On September 22, 1999, the trial court granted Gibson's motion to suppress the statements made by him to Officer Meyers after he was arrested. However, on September 24, 1999, the trial court denied Gibson's motion to suppress the marijuana obtained from the warrantless search of his van. Following a bench trial, Gibson was found guilty as charged and sentenced to one year at the Indiana Department of Correction, all but two days suspended. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Gibson contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress the marijuana seized from the warrantless search of his van because the search did not fit within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. We agree.

I. Standard of Review for Admission of Evidence

When ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the trial court is afforded broad discretion, and Indiana appellate courts will only reverse the ruling upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Smoote v. State, 708 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.1999). An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Stone v. State, 536 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Ind. Ct.App.1989), trans. denied. When reviewing the trial court's ruling on the validity of the search, we consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling and any uncontradicted evidence to the contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Rook v. State, 679 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Ind.Ct. App.1997) (citing Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078, 118 S.Ct. 858, 139 L.Ed.2d 757 (1998)).

II. Warrantless Search of a Vehicle

We note initially that Article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and, as a general rule, require "a judicially issued search warrant [as] a condition precedent to a lawful search." Culpepper v. State, 662 N.E.2d 670, 675 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Thus, searches conducted "outside the judicial process" are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few well delineated exceptions. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-21, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984). Both Article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect private and possessory interests by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Santana v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1355, 1358 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:

The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure have been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 464-65 (Ind.1998) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, (1961)). The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). For a search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Berry, 704 N.E.2d at 465. The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Farber, 677 N.E.2d 1111, 1116 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied.

A. Probable Cause to Search a Movable Vehicle

One exception to the warrant requirement is probable cause to believe that an operable vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. The United States Supreme Court has stated that when there exists probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a crime, a warrantless search of the vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment because of the existence of exigent circumstances arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)).5 In addition, as long as the search is supported by probable cause, a warrantless search of a vehicle may also include a search of a container or package found in the vehicle. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). Facts necessary to demonstrate the existence of probable cause for a warrantless search are not materially different from those which would authorize the issuance of a warrant if presented to a magistrate. Young v. State, 564 N.E.2d 968, 970 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991),trans. denied. Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists where the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent person to conclude that a search of those premises will uncover evidence of a crime. Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1029 (Ind.1994).

In the present case, Sergeant Cox testified at trial that when he conducted the investigatory stop of Gibson by asking him for his driver's license, he did not have any suspicion that Gibson had contraband in his vehicle. R. 194. However, Officer Meyers testified at trial that after Sergeant Cox had placed Gibson under arrest, he asked Gibson whether or not he had any weapons or drugs in his van. R. 121-22. Officer Meyers testified that Gibson informed him that he had a bag of marijuana in the center console of the van. R. 122. We believe that Gibson's admission to Officer Meyers that he had marijuana in his van provided the police with sufficient probable cause to search Gibson's van for contraband.

However, Officer Meyers testified that Gibson "had already been arrested and handcuffed" when he interrogated Gibson. R. 121. Officer Meyers testified that he did not advise Gibson of his Miranda rights prior to interrogating him. R. 127. In addition, Sergeant Cox testified that he never gave Gibson the Miranda warnings prior to Officer Meyers interrogating Gibson. R. 100. Miranda warnings are based upon the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, and were designed to protect an individual from being compelled to testify against himself. Curry v. State, 643 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Ind. Ct.App.1994), trans. denied.6 When an accused is subjected to custodial interrogation, "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the [defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment] privilege against self-incrimination." Carter v. State, 634 N.E.2d 830, 834 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). The safeguards of the Miranda warnings are an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherently coercive and police-dominated atmosphere of custodial interrogation. Id.

Police officers are not required to give a defendant Miranda warnings unless the defendant is both in custody and subject to interrogation. State v. Linck, 708 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind.Ct.App.1999),trans. denied. Interrogation includes both express questioning and words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Id...

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