Gibson v Trant

• Decision Date: 05 October 2001
• Docket Number: 99-00390
• Citation: 58 S.W.3d 103
• Parties: JOHNIE N. GIBSON v. DOUGLAS TRANT, ET AL
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

JOHNIE N. GIBSON v DOUGLAS TRANT, ET AL.

No. M1999-00390-SC-R11-CV

June 13, 2001 Session

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

Filed October 5, 2001

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County, No. 3-399-93

Wheeler A. Rosenbalm, Judge

This case presents the question whether a criminal defendant must obtain post-conviction relief in order to maintain a legal malpractice action against his defense lawyer (what is often referred to as a "criminal malpractice" action). The trial court held that he must. Since the plaintiff in the malpractice case here was denied post-conviction relief, the court dismissed his claim against his former defense lawyers. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We now affirm. Along with the large majority of courts to address this issue, we adopt the rule that a plaintiff in a criminal malpractice action must show he has been exonerated. To meet this requirement, the plaintiff must obtain post-conviction relief. Because the plaintiff did not obtain such relief, the courts below correctly ruled that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Application for Permission to Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed

Frank F. Drowota, III, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which, Riley Anderson, Janice M. Holder, and William M. Barker, JJ., joined. Adolpho A. Birch, Jr. filed a concurring/dissenting opinion.

Gerald C. Russell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Johnie N. Gibson.

Jeffrey A. Woods, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Douglas Trant and Jerry Cunningham.

OPINION

Background

On August 16, 1989, Johnie N. Gibson ("Gibson"), along with numerous co-defendants, was charged with committing drug-related offenses in a multi-count indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Gibson hired Jerry Cunningham ("Cunningham") to represent him, and Cunningham brought in Douglas Trant ("Trant") to assist with the case.

Gibson alleges that Trant and Cunningham asked him to persuade his co-defendants to hire them as well, "telling [Gibson] that none of the Co-Defendants could plead out and testify against him if they were under Trant and Cunningham's representation . . . that if they could get the other Co-Defendants 'under the same umbrella' they would united stand [sic]." A total of seven co-defendants ultimately hired Trant and Cunningham to represent them. Gibson alleges that this joint representation, engendered through unethical persuasive tactics, created a "severe" conflict of interest.

Gibson further alleges that Trant and Cunningham pressured him to plead guilty. Specifically, he claims that Trant told him that a failure to plead guilty would cause the federal prosecutors to file charges against his elderly father. Gibson claims he agreed to plead guilty to avoid this result. Trant also allegedly told him not to tell the federal district court judge during the plea hearing that the government threatened to prosecute his father; if he did mention the threat, the judge would not accept the guilty plea and the government would carry out its threat. Finally, Gibson alleges that Trant told him he would receive a sentence of eight to ten years.

After Gibson entered the guilty plea, the district court sentenced him to twenty years without the possibility of probation or parole, the minimum sentence according to the federal sentencing guidelines. Gibson alleges that once he pled guilty, Trant and Cunningham "started taking the other Co-Defendants down like dominos, by pleading them guilty, because [he] was out of the way."

Gibson filed a civil complaint in state court alleging that Trant and Cunningham's misconduct constituted legal malpractice. He also raised allegations of gross negligence, outrageous conduct, and fraud, based on the same conduct. In 1993, Trant and Cunningham moved to dismiss this complaint, a motion the court denied a year later.

Gibson also attempted to have his plea vacated on the ground that it was involuntary, by filing a motion for habeas corpus relief in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.¹ The district court denied his motion, thereby holding that his plea was voluntary. In 1995, the parties filed an agreed order in the state trial court indicating that Gibson's habeas petition had been denied but that he intended to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Significantly, the agreed order stated that "the relief sought under [the habeas statute] is for the same action complained of in the instant case, and the parties agree that it will be to everyone's advantage to take this case off the trial docket until after the said appeal is over." The order provided that Gibson's legal malpractice case would not be put back on the jury trial docket until his Sixth Circuit appeal was decided, unless either party moved for an earlier court date.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. Gibson did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court. Trant and Cunningham then filed a second motion to dismiss in state court. Pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, they asserted that Gibson's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because he "suffered no damages as a proximate result of the alleged breach of the Defendant's duty of representation . . . ." The defendants aver that since the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of post-conviction (in this case, habeas) relief, the federal courts have already determined that Gibson's guilty plea was valid; Gibson cannot now recover damages based on the claim that his plea was invalid.

The state court granted Trant and Cunningham's motion to dismiss. In its order, the court stated: "This Court has determined that in light of the Federal Courts' holding that Mr. Gibson's plea of guilty was, in fact, voluntary, and there exists no right or recovery in this action in this court, mandating dismissal of this case." In making this determination, the court recognized that its knowledge of what occurred in the federal habeas proceedings was limited, for the documents in that case were placed under seal. The record does not reveal the reason for the seal, but at oral argument before this Court Gibson's counsel suggested that Gibson himself moved to have the record sealed. Whatever the reason for the seal, the record of the federal proceedings is limited to an oral stipulation the parties made during the hearing on the second motion to dismiss. That stipulation, which was included in the trial court's order, states as follows:

In the United States District Court For The Eastern District of Tennessee, the plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to a single count of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. After the trial Court's acceptance of the plaintiff's plea and the imposition of sentence, a "Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct [a] Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody" was filed. The Federal Court placed that file under "SEAL" and it remains sealed to this day.

The § 2255 motion allegedly [sic] breach of plaintiff's Plea Agreement by the United States, that his plea of guilty was involuntary, that the defendants encountered an actual conflict of interest in representing Mr. Gibson but nevertheless contained [sic] multiple representation of him and his six (6) co-defendants and that the defendants, Cunningham and Trant, were ineffective in representing the defendant in connection with the foregoing. The trial court denied the plaintiff's request for relief and dismissed his action after an evidentiary hearing. The case was appealed to the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal which affirmed the trial court. No application for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court was filed and the time limitation for doing so has long expired.

Gibson appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. The Court of Appeals, after surveying the case law from other jurisdictions, reasoned as follows:

[T]he anomaly of allowing this suit to go forward is obvious. The voluntary plea of guilty to a criminal charge was the proximate cause of any injury or loss suffered as a result of the conviction, and the appellant must obtain post-conviction relief as a condition precedent to the maintenance of this action. The majority rule is clear: a guilty person is not entitled to civil damages for being found guilty notwithstanding his/her lawyers' negligence. We agree with the argument of the appellees that the allowance of this action would shock the public conscience, engender disrespect for the judicial system and generally discredit the concept of justice.

Gibson filed an application in this Court seeking review of the Court of Appeals' judgment. We granted permission to appeal and now affirm that court's decision. Specifically, we hold that a plaintiff must obtain post-conviction relief in order to maintain a legal malpractice claim against his defense lawyers. Because Gibson cannot meet this standard, the courts below correctly ruled that Trant and Cunningham are entitled to summary judgment.

Analysis

Appellate review of this question of law is de novo, without a presumption of correctness of the Court of Appeals' judgment. See Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999); Owens v. Truckstops of America, 915 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tenn. 1996).

Although the issue before us first came to the trial court on Trant's and Cunningham's motion to dismiss, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), the parties and the court considered matters outside the pleadings, namely, the stipulation quoted above. Therefore, the Court of Appeals properly treated the motion as one for summary judgment. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03 ("If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded...