Giddens v. Bolling

• Decision Date: 12 February 1891
• Citation: 9 So. 274,92 Ala. 586
• Parties: GIDDENS v. BOLLING.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

9 So. 274

92 Ala. 586

GIDDENS v. BOLLING.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 12, 1891^[1]

This was an action of unlawful detainer, brought by the appellee against the appellant, and was commenced before a justice of the peace. Upon the trial, as shown by the bill of exceptions, the plaintiff introduced in evidence the rental note given him by the defendant on March 26, 1889, which was in the following language: "On the 1st day of October next, I promise to pay R. E. Bolling or order eight hundred dollars rent for the R. E. Bolling Brier Hill Plantation in Pike county, Alabama, for the year 1889." This note was signed by J. C. Giddens, and duly attested by one G. P Waller. The defendant objected, and excepted to the introduction of this note in evidence. The plaintiff also introduced in evidence, against the objection and exception of the defendant, the written demand made upon the defendant by the plaintiff on the 2d of January, 1890, which was in words as follows: "Montgomery, Ala., January 2nd, 1890. Mr. J. C. Giddens, Brier Hill, Ala.-Dear Sir: I desire the possession of my Brier Hill place, rented to you last year 1889. You will please deliver the possession of said rented premises, including the house occupied by you as a residence and the out-houses, and adjoining lands, to my agent, Mr. G W. Huey, who hands you this request or demand. [Signed] Yours, respectfully, R. E. BOLLING." Defendant moved to exclude this written demand, which motion the court overruled, and the defendant duly excepted. The plaintiff testified that the Brier Hill place mentioned in the said demand included the plantation, store-house, and dwelling-house, and other houses in the village of Brier Hill, as described in the complaint; that the plantation adjoins the property which was in the village, and which consisted of the said store-house, dwelling-house occupied by one Mills, and other houses. All other facts are sufficiently shown in the opinion. In addition to the evidence as testified to by the defendant, he further testified that prior to the commencement of this suit he had rented out the said plantation to various parties for the year 1890, and had also rented store-house and dwelling-house in Brier Hill to one Mills, and that said Mills was occupying the same. The plaintiff, in rebuttal of the defendant's testimony, testified that the rental contract was entered into and the note executed in good faith, and with no intention to defraud creditors. Upon the introduction of the evidence, the court, at the request of the plaintiff, gave the affirmative charge in favor of the plaintiff, and also charged the jury that, "if they believed the evidence, they will find the annual value of the rent of the property sued for." The defendant separately excepted to each of these charges as given, and also reserved an exception to the court's refusal to give the following written charges, requested by him: "In considering the value of the rent, the jury must not estimate the value of the store-houses or other houses occupied by Mills under the contract for rent prior to the commencement of this suit." There was judgment for the plaintiff, and on this appeal, prosecuted by the defendant, he assigns the various rulings of the court as error.

Gardner & Wiley, for appellant.

E. P. Morrisette, for appellee.

COLEMAN J.

Appellee Bolling, sued the appellant in an action of unlawful detainer before a justice of the peace, and recovered a judgment for the land. The case was appealed to the circuit court. On the trial in the circuit court certain exceptions were reserved to the ruling of the court on the admission of testimony, to the charges given, and the refusal to charge as requested. The note given by defendant to plaintiff for the rent of the land, and also the notice to defendant to vacate the premises, appear in the statement of the facts of the case. There are three assignments of error: the first, for refusing to exclude evidence on motion of defendant; second, in the charges given; and, third, for refusing to charge as requested. The first motion was to exclude as evidence the written demand to vacate the premises. No reason is assigned to sustain the motion, and we presume none could be. The objection, also, is too general. The next motion was to exclude the "foregoing evidence," without further specifying the objectionable evidence, or assigning any reason for the motion. Such an exception is general, and may be overruled. Hayes v. Woods, 72 Ala. 92; 3 Brick. Dig. p 443, §§ 567-570. It cannot be maintained that a part of the "foregoing evidence," if not all of it, was not legal evidence, and the exception included all the evidence which had been introduced, including the note given for the rent, and the written demand to vacate. Warren v. Wagner, 75 Ala. 188; Fonnville v. State, 8 South. Rep. 688, (present term.) Plaintiff introduced one Huey, who further testified that $600 a year was a fair rental value pending the appeal. The objection was taken to this evidence as a whole. The defendant having executed a supersedeas bond on his appeal from the justice's court, it was competent to prove on the trial in the circuit court the value of the rent pending the appeal. Code,§ 8411. A general objection to evidence, a part of which is legal, may be overruled. Authorities, supra. It was competent to prove by parol the lands known as the "Brier Hill Plantation," so designated in the rent-note, and in the written notice to vacate as the "Brier Hill Place," etc. Vann v. Lunsford, 8 South. Rep. 719, (present term;) Guilmartin v. Wood, 76 Ala. 204; Chambers v. Ringstaff, 69 Ala. 140. The defendant, among other things, testified "that he had never rented any property from the said R. E. Bolling; that the note was to go...