Giddings v. SRT-Mountain Vista, LLC
Decision Date | 04 February 2019 |
Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-35643,A-1-CA-35643 |
Citation | 458 P.3d 596 |
Parties | Tanya GIDDINGS, Bernalillo County Assessor, Petitioner-Petitioner, v. SRT-MOUNTAIN VISTA, LLC, Robert Fox, and Linda Fox, Respondents-Respondents. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Robles, Rael & Anaya, P.C., Charles H. Rennick, Marcus J. Rael, Jr., Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.
Sutin, Thayer & Browne, P.C., Frank C. Salazar, Larry Curtis Vernon, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent SRT-Mountain Vista, LLC.
Vance, Chavez & Associates, LLC, Claud Eugene Vance, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondents Linda Fox and Robert Fox.
{1} On motion of the Bernalillo County Assessor (Assessor), the district court certified this appeal to resolve three issues arising from two consolidated district court cases. First, we conclude the district court has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Bernalillo County Valuation Protests Board (Board) based upon the Assessor's petitions for writs of certiorari. Second, we determine the Assessor to be an aggrieved party, entitling her to review of the Board's decision under Rule 1-075(B) NMRA. Third, we hold that residential property transfers between individuals or their trusts, and their wholly-owned limited liability companies constitute a "change of ownership" as defined by NMSA 1978, Section 7-36-21.2(E) (2010).
{2} The consolidated district court cases from which the Assessor appeals arose from separate and unrelated decisions by the Board regarding the properties of two taxpayers. As such, we set forth the relevant factual and procedural backgrounds of each case leading up to consolidation in the district court.
{3} SRT-Mountain Vista, LLC (SRT) is a New Mexico limited liability company wholly owned by The Philip J. Salley Revocable Trust (Trust) and managed by Philip J. Salley. Prior to April 24, 2013, the SRT subject property was owned by the Trust. On that date, Salley, as trustee of the Trust, executed a special warranty deed granting the subject property to SRT for purposes of refinancing the property.
{4} Following the transfer from the Trust to SRT, the Assessor valued the subject property at its "current and correct" taxable value for the 2014 tax year, without applying any limitations on increased value provided for in Section 7-36-21.2(A). SRT protested the Assessor's valuation to the Board, arguing there was no "change of ownership" as defined in Section 7-36-21.2(E), and that the subject property therefore qualified for the limitation on property value accorded by Section 7-36-21.2(A). The Board found "[t]he 2013 warranty deed clearly and indisputably transferred fee ownership from the Trust to the LLC[,]" but that the transfer did not constitute a "change [of] ownership" for purposes of Section 7-36-21.2(E) because "the property had the same ultimate owner owning the property."
{5} Robert and Linda Fox created Fox Trust, a revocable inter vivos trust, to serve as the sole owner of various LLCs. Prior to 2013, these LLCs owned the Fox subject properties. On January 23, 2013, and February 5, 2013, the LLCs granted the subject properties to Richard and Linda Fox as joint tenants for purposes of refinancing. After refinancing the properties, Robert and Linda Fox granted the properties back to the various LLCs that previously owned them.
{6} Following these conveyances, the Assessor valued the subject properties at their "current and correct" taxable values for the 2014 tax year, without regard to the valuation limitation set forth in Section 7-36-21.2(A). Robert and Linda Fox protested the Assessor's valuation to the Board, arguing that notwithstanding the transfers, there was no "change of ownership" under Section 7-36-21.2(E). The Board found "[t]he 2013 warranty deeds clearly and indisputably transferred fee ownership from the LLCs to [Robert and Linda Fox] and back to the LLCs/Trusts[,]" but that the transfers did not constitute "changes of ownership" within the meaning of Section 7-36-21.2(E) "because in each case the property had the same ultimate owners owning the same proportion of each property."
{7} After the Board issued its decisions in both cases, the Assessor filed petitions for writs of certiorari in the district court, seeking reversal of the Board's decisions on the grounds that they were arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with the law. Additionally, the Assessor successfully moved to consolidate both cases.
{8} SRT and Robert and Linda Fox (collectively, Respondents) moved to dismiss the Assessor's petition, arguing the Assessor lacked the right to appeal the Board's decision under NMSA 1978, Section 7-38-28(A) (2015) ( ), and Addis v. Santa Fe County Valuation Protests Board , 1977-NMCA-122, ¶ 6, 91 N.M. 165, 571 P.2d 822 ( ). Anticipating the Assessor's intent to invoke the district court's power to issue writs of certiorari under Article VI, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution, Respondents further argued the Assessor had not made the prima facie showing of entitlement to relief required on direct appeal. Finally, Robert and Linda Fox argued the district court lacked original jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 13 to hear a property tax matter invoking a constitutional claim because the Assessor raised no such claim.
{9} Without ruling on the Assessor's petition or Respondents' motions to dismiss, the district court granted the Assessor's motion for certification to this Court to resolve the following issues: (1) whether the district court has jurisdiction to review the Assessor's petition under Article VI, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution ; (2) whether the Assessor may seek review under Rule 1-075 ; and (3) whether the transfers at issue constitute "changes of ownership" for purposes of Section 7-36-21.2(E). We accepted certification from the district court.
{10} The threshold issue raised by the parties is whether the district court has jurisdiction to review the Assessor's petition for writ of certiorari. The Assessor contends the district court has appellate jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution, a premise Respondents refute. The question of whether the district court has jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Smith v. City of Santa Fe , 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300.
{11} Article VI, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution grants appellate jurisdiction to the district court in "cases originating in inferior courts and tribunals in their respective districts..., and supervisory control over the same[,]" and confers upon the district court the "power to issue writs of ... certiorari ... in the exercise of their jurisdiction; provided that no such writs shall issue directed to judges or courts of equal or superior jurisdiction." Id.
{12} "A writ of certiorari lies when it is shown that an inferior court or tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has proceeded illegally , and no appeal or other mode of review is allowed or provided." Zamora v. Vill. of Ruidoso Downs , 1995-NMSC-072, ¶ 17, 120 N.M. 778, 907 P.2d 182 ( ). Our Supreme Court "has long held that certiorari is the appropriate process to review the proceedings of bodies acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial character[.]" Id. ¶ 18 ( ); See Rule 1-075(A) (). County valuation protests boards are quasi-judicial bodies. See Addis , 1977-NMCA-122, ¶ 5, 91 N.M. 165, 571 P.2d 822 (). In the absence of a direct right to appeal from an adverse valuation protests board determination, or other mode of review on behalf of a county assessor, we agree with the Assessor that certiorari is the appropriate means of determining whether the Board exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded illegally in the underlying agency proceedings. See Rule 1-075(G)(2) ( ); Rainaldi v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. , 1993-NMSC-028, ¶ 8, 115 N.M. 650, 857 P.2d 761 ( ).
{13} It need be emphasized that, pursuant to Section 7-38-28(A), "[a] property owner may appeal an order made by a ... county valuation protests board by filing an appeal pursuant to the provisions of [NMSA 1978,] Section 39-3-1.1" (1999) (emphasis added); see § 39-3-1.1(A) . Indeed, interpreting a prior version of Section 7-38-28, we squarely held that "[t]he county assessor may not appeal the order of the [valuation protests board]; only the property owner may appeal." Addis , 1977-NMCA-122, ¶ 6, 91 N.M. 165, 571 P.2d 822 ; see NMSA 1953, § 72-31-28(A) (1973) (). We vie...
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