Giddins v. State
Decision Date | 12 May 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 84 September Term, 2005.,84 September Term, 2005. |
Citation | 899 A.2d 139,393 Md. 1 |
Parties | Damont Isaiah GIDDINS v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Philip J. Sweitzer (Winston Law & Mediation, Westminster; Ronald I. Kurland of Ronald I. Kurland, P.A., Baltimore), all on brief, for Petitioner.
Brian S. Kleinbord, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of MD, on brief). Baltimore, for Respondent
Argued before BELL, C.J., WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned) JJ.
Petitioner, Damont Isaiah Giddins, seeks review of the Court of Special Appeals's judgment affirming the denial of his "Motion to Bar Retrial Following Mistrial (Double Jeopardy)" after the Circuit Court for Worcester County had granted Mr. Giddins's motion for mistrial during direct examination of the State's first witness. We granted certiorari in this case to answer the following questions:
1. Whether the trial court entered an order that was a "favorable termination," tantamount to an acquittal of Petitioner, when it granted a mistrial and discharged the jury, and thereafter the trial judge—in response to the Prosecutor's specific assertion on the record that the Petitioner—exclaimed on the record from the bench that the Prosecutor had committed "misconduct" and that the State was barred from prosecuting Petitioner a second time?
2. Whether the State's Attorney's avowal or motion to retry the Petitioner on the record, after the trial judge dismissed the jury and terminated original jeopardy, was sufficient to ripen the issue of double jeopardy for a determination?
3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by drafting a sua sponte letter to revise its judgment, reinstitute the prosecution, reschedule the matter and effectively order another judge to sit in review of itself, after it ruled that Petitioner could not be retried?
Giddins v. State, 389 Md. 398, 885 A.2d 823 (2005). We shall hold that the trial court's granting of Mr. Giddins's motion for a mistrial did not constitute an acquittal, thereby foreclosing retrial under principles of double jeopardy, because the judge was not ruling on the evidence.
On July 6, 2004, Damont Isaiah Giddins was on trial in the Circuit Court for Worcester County for two counts of possessing a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute in violation of Maryland Code (2002), Section 5-602 of the Criminal Law Article,1 and two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of Maryland Code (2002), Section 5-601 of the Criminal Law Article.2 During the State's opening argument, the following exchange transpired among the State, the Court, and Mr. Kurland, counsel for Mr. Giddins:
As far as the contents of the warrant, we're going to have to depend upon—I'll do it myself if you want me to. I'll bring the officers in and tell them myself.
Mr. Kurland subsequently made a motion in limine to prevent the State from further mentioning the search and seizure warrant and the investigation, which the court denied. The State then continued its opening statement:
THE STATE: We'll start again.
In June of 2003, Detective Heiser began an investigation of drug distribution in Worcester County of the Defendant.
After a several-week investigation, the officers applied for and received a search warrant to search the Defendant and his store.
They're certainly entitled to say why they were there and why they searched. He's not going to go into—I will not allow the particulars of some—because I've never had seen the search warrant. I assume maybe there was a controlled buy or something like that. I don't know. Or somebody had been there and seen drugs in the past. None of that is going to be allowed. But if it is, ask for a mistrial. I'll consider it.
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