Giffin v. Crane
Decision Date | 01 September 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 30,30 |
Citation | 351 Md. 133,716 A.2d 1029 |
Parties | James M. GIFFIN v. Donna L. (Valtri) CRANE. , |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Cynthia E. Young, Annapolis (Jo B. Fogel, Rockville), all on brief for petitioner.
Joseph M. Quirk (John G. Nalls (argued), Rowan, Quirk & Nalls, Rockville; Kelly A. Koermer, Towson; Kevin G. Hessler, Rockville) all on brief for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW and RAKER, JJ., and JOHN F. McAULIFFE and ROBERT L. KARWACKI, Judges (retired), Specially Assigned.
James M. Giffin, the petitioner, and Donna L. (Valtri) Crane, the respondent, the parents of two daughters, Emily Stoughton, born December 22nd, 1982, and Sarah Ellen, born June 26th, 1988, separated in May, 1992, after more than 12 years of marriage. At separation, the petitioner and the parties' two daughters remained in the marital home, while the respondent lived nearby and maintained regular visitation with the children. A year later, the respondent moved to Louisville, Kentucky.
Both parties sought to obtain a divorce. The petitioner filed his complaint for an absolute divorce first, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging voluntary separation in excess of one year, or, in the alternative, separation for more than two years. The respondent countered by filing her complaint for divorce on the grounds of voluntary separation in excess of one year. The petitioner and the respondent both asked for custody of the two children, child support, and attorney's fees. The custody and visitation issues were resolved by the parties when they entered into, and placed on the record, a written agreement, "intended to resolve all issues between the parties as to the custody of their children, but to leave to the court decision on the issue of child support and attorney's fees." 1 In addition to maintaining the status quo with respect to the petitioner's being the children's custodian--the petitioner had sole physical custody of both minor children--the agreement provided for joint legal custody. The agreement also contained detailed and comprehensive provisions concerning the respondent's visitation with the children.
The agreement contemplated the possibility of annual reviews of the residential status of the children, to be conducted, at the requesting party's expense, by a mental health professional as to whom the parties agreed. With respect to such reviews, § 1.4 of the agreement thus provided:
The respondent, having indicated in the agreement her desire that Dr. Mary Donahue conduct such a review, Dr. Donahue proceeded to do so. As a result of her investigation, Dr. Donahue recommended that physical custody of the children be changed from the petitioner to the respondent. 2 By the time Dr. Donahue had completed her investigation and communicated her recommendation, the court had resolved all the outstanding issues, ordering the respondent to pay child support, declining to award the petitioner attorney's fees, and granting the petitioner a divorce. 3 When the petitioner refused to accept Dr. Donahue's recommendation and relinquish custody of the children, the respondent filed a petition for modification of custody and child support.
A hearing was held on the respondent's motion, during which the court, over a span of six days, received testimony from more than twenty witnesses and viewed a number of exhibits, including private investigators' reports and a videotape. At that hearing, the interests of the children were represented by an attorney appointed by the court. 4 The court granted the respondent's Petition for Modification of Residential Custody, thus modifying the custody agreement by transferring custody of the children from their father to their mother. The court explained its decision as follows:
The petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of Special Appeals. He argued in that court that the trial court erred by considering the sex of the parents as a factor in its determination of custody. In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court held, inter alia, that "[t]he consideration of gender was a valid consideration in determining residential custody in this case."
In response, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. In this Court, the petitioner argues, citing Maryland statutory...
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