Gifford v. People
| Decision Date | 29 November 1893 |
| Citation | 148 Ill. 173,35 N.E. 754 |
| Parties | GIFFORD v. PEOPLE. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to criminal court of Cook county; R. W. Clifford, Judge.
Indictment of Eli Gifford for rape. Defendant was convicted, and he brings error. Reversed.
John T. Donahoe, for plaintiff in error.
M. T. Moloney, Atty. Gen., for the People.
Eli Gifford was indicted for the crime of rape upon the person of his daughter, 11 years old, and was convicted by a jury, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for a term of 25 years. The case is most revolting in its details, and, if the defendant is guilty, the punishment inflicted is richly merited. As, in the view we take, the case must be again submitted to a jury, we refrain from a discussion of the evidence, further than to say that the case made by the people depends almost entirely upon the testimony of the child, which is flatly and circumstantially contradicted by the defendant. The jury were required to say whether they would believe the prosecutrix or the defendant. The girl was slightly corroborated by the testimony of her brother George, and possibly by that of Dr. Borland, while, on the other hand, she was contradicted by the defendant, and by various facts and circumstances tending to discredit her statements. The defendant showed that his general reputation among his neighbers for chastity was good, and introduced evidence tending to account for the physical conditions found by Dr. Borland upon his examination of the prosecutrix, and also the testimony of a number of witnesses tending to impeach her character for truth and veracity. Where the testimony is conflicting, and the case close upon its facts, we have so frequently held that the jury should be correctly instructed, and nothing be permitted to reach them that might improperly influence their verdict, that the citation of cases is unnecessary. Here the testimony is conflicting, and the case is conceded by the attorney general to be very close in its facts; and, while the evidence may warrant a conviction,yet it does not so clearly preponderate in favor of the prosecution as that we can say that the errors that have intervened were not prejudicial.
After evidence had been introduced tending to show the general bad character of the prosecutrix for truth and veracity, the state's attorney called in rebuttal, among others, Jessie Meyers and Mrs. Raesel. Mrs. Raesel was asked, among other things, if she knew the prosecutrix, and how long she had known her, and announced that she did, and had lived near her six months, and saw her often during that time. She was then asked the following question: ‘I will ask you if you know what her reputation among the people where she lived at that time was, for truth and veracity?’ and answered, ‘Well, it was as good as any child's could be.’ Question: ‘Did you ever hear anything said against the girl's character, in your life?’ Answer: ‘No, sir.’ The defendant moved the court to strike out this testimony, and exclude it from the jury. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant excepted. Practically, the same examination occurred in respect to the witness Jessie Meyers, and the like ruling made, overruling the defendant's objection and motion to exclude. The finding of the jury upon the issue of guilt or innocence depended upon the credit given to the testimony of the prosecutrix; and it can scarcely be doubted that the evidence of these witnesses, testifying to their personal knowledge, although they had known the prosecutrix but a few months, would tend to give her credit with the jury. It will be observed, also, that the general reputation of the witness was not asked for. The proper inquiry, in all such cases, is whether the witness knows the general reputation of the person sought to be impeached or sustained, among his or her neighbors, for truth and veracity, which question the witness must answer in the affirmative before he or she can be asked what that reputation is. Foulk v. Eckert, 61 Ill. 318;Frye v. Bank, 11 Ill. 367;Cook v. Hunt, 24 Ill. 535;Crabtree v. Hagenbaugh, 25 Ill. 234;Dimick v. Downs, 82 Ill. 570;Bank v. Keeler, 109 Ill. 385;Gifford v. People, 87 Ill. 210. It is too...
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