Gifford v. Wiggins

• Decision Date: 07 July 1892
• Citation: 52 N.W. 904,50 Minn. 401
• Parties: GIFFORD v WIGGINS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

50 Minn. 401

52 N.W. 904

GIFFORDvWIGGINS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 7, 1892.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. A person who in good faith and without malice merely makes complaint before a magistrate of the commission of a public offense in a matter over which the magistrate has a general jurisdiction, and the magistrate issues a warrant, upon which the person charged is arrested, the party laying the complaint is not liable for an assault and false imprisonment, although the particular case may be one in which the magistrate had no jurisdiction.

2. Rule applied to a case where the complaint was for the violation of a municipal ordinance which was in fact invalid.

Appeal from district court, Kandiyohi county; POWERS, Judge.

Action by George S. Gifford against John H. Wiggins for false imprisonment. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

C. H. Childs, for appellant.

Samuel Porter, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

The material allegations Of the complaint may be summarized as follows: The defendant made a complaint under oath to a justice of the peace in the village of Wilmar that plaintiff had violated the provisions of an ordinance of that village prohibiting peddling any goods, wares, merchandise, or other articles not manufactured or grown within the county of Kandiyohi without first having obtained a license therefor, and praying that the plaintiff might be arrested and dealt with according to law; that upon this complaint the justice issued a warrant, upon which the plaintiff was arrested and tried, and, upon the testimony of the defendant, adjudged guilty of a violation of the ordinance; that plaintiff was thereupon committed to jail, and there imprisoned until discharged on a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the ordinance in question was unconstitutional and void. There is no allegation that the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause; hence the facts stated do not constitute a cause of action for malicious prosecution. If the complaint states a cause of action at all, it must be for false imprisonment. It is not alleged that defendant participated or took part in plaintiff's arrest, or officiously interfered therewith by giving orders or directions to the officers or otherwise. It is true that in the complaint to the justice he prayed that the plaintiff might be arrested and dealt with according to law, but this is what is done, impliedly at least, in every case where a complaint is made to a magistrate or court charging any person with a violation of public law. The allegation that the plaintiff was convicted on the testimony of the defendant adds nothing to the complaint. By testifying as witness, certainly defendant did nothing that rendered him liable unless he testified falsely, which is not charged. It is alleged that the confinement of plaintiff was “on account and by reason of the procurement and direction of the defendant,” but, in the absence of any allegations of specific facts, this must be construed as having reference to the act of making the complaint upon which the warrant was issued. It is also alleged that this confinement was wrongfully, maliciously, and unlawfully procured by defendant, and that said confinement was without probable cause; but this has reference to and is qualified by what immediately follows, to wit, “In this, that said ordinance was and is wholly void and unconstitutional.” Hence, after stripping the complaint of all mere verbiage, we have a case where all...