Giguere v. Yellow Cab Co.

• Decision Date: 18 November 1937
• Docket Number: No. 7769.,7769.
• Citation: 195 A. 214
• Parties: GIGUERE v. YELLOW CAB CO.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

195 A. 214

GIGUERE

v. YELLOW CAB CO.

No. 7769.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 18, 1937.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Patrick P. Curran, Judge.

Action by Marie Giguere against the Yellow Cab Company. Verdict for the plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled, and cause remitted for entry of judgment on the verdict.

Walter I. Sundlun and Baker & Spicer, all of Providence, for plaintiff. Sherwood & Clifford and Raymond E. Jordan, all of Providence, for defendant.

BAKER, Justice.

This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence in which a jury in the superior court returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $900. The defendant's motion for a new trial, based on the usual grounds, was denied by the trial justice. The case is before this court on defendant's exception to this ruling, and on its exceptions to an order of the superior court consolidating this case, for the purpose of trial only, with another action of trespass on the case for negligence concerning the same accident, brought by this plaintiff against a different defendant.

The accident in question happened about 6 p. m. on January 7, 1934, at the intersection of College and North Main streets in the city of Providence. College street, as it enters and crosses North Main Street from the east, has a steep downgrade to the intersection. Both streets are main thoroughfares and each is about 40 feet wide between curbs. The evidence shows that from a position on College street 60 feet up from the point where that street enters North Main street, the driver of an automobile proceeding westerly in the center of College street has an unobstructed view northerly on North Main street for approximately 100 feet. At the time of the accident the street lights were on and it was dark and rainy, but no unusual road conditions existed.

From the evidence, it appears that at the time in question the plaintiff was a passenger for hire in a taxicab operated by the defendant company. The taxicab was going downgrade on College street from the east toward the intersection of College and North Main streets. An automobile owned by one Lapointe, and driven by his agent, was proceeding in a southerly direction on North Main street toward this same intersection. The taxi-cab and the automobile collided near the center of the intersection, the automobile striking the right rear portion of the taxi-cab. The plaintiff claims that she was thrown about in the taxicab and was injured as a result of the collision between the two vehicles. The plaintiff thereupon brought in the superior court two separate actions of trespass on the case for negligence, one against the defendant in the instant case, and the other against Lapointe. On motion of the plaintiff, which was opposed by the present defendant but not by Lapointe, a justice of that court ordered the two cases "consolidated for trial," and the defendant's exception to this ruling was noted. When the cases were reached for trial, the defendant herein moved before the justice, who was about to hear the cases, that the order of consolidation be dissolved and that the two cases be tried separately. This motion was denied and an exception noted by the defendant herein. The action of the superior court in connection with these motions is the subject of two of the present defendant's exceptions, both of which raise the same point.

The practice of consolidating cases for trial, or trying cases together, is not new in this state, although the question of when such consolidation is proper has not been directly decided by this court. The consolidation of cases for trial only does not operate as a merger of the different cases into one, but merely permits them to be tried together before the same justice or jury to avoid unnecessary delay and expense in the administration of justice. The causes of action remain distinct throughout such a trial, and every legal right is preserved to the respective parties as fully as if the cases had been tried separately. The distinction between such a consolidation of cases for trial only, and a complete and actual consolidation or merger of separate causes of action into only one cause, or the English consolidation practice in use in some jurisdictions in this country, is not always clearly kept in mind or adhered to in some of the decided cases, thereby causing apparent confusion in the law relating to this question.

Our review of the authorities on this point convinces us that, independent of statute, by which the matter is regulated in some jurisdictions, the trial court has inherent power to order that several cases pending before it be tried together where they are of the same nature, arise from the same act or transaction, involve the same or like issues, depend substantially upon the same evidence, even though it may vary in its details in fixing responsibility, and where such a trial will not prejudice the substantial rights of any party. Whether two or more cases should be tried together is a question which must necessarily be left to the sound discretion of the trial court, after application of the foregoing principles, and its action in this connection will not be revised or interfered with unless its discretion was clearly abused. 64 C.J. 35. On the issue of consolidation for trial, the following cases present situations somewhat similar to the one existing in the instant case: Burke v. Hodge, 211 Mass. 156, 97 N.E. 920, Ann. Cas.1913B, 381; Sullivan v. Boston Elec. Light Co., 181 Mass. 294, 63 N.E. 904; Keep v. Indianapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. (C.C.) 10 F. 454. See, also, Azinger v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 262 Pa. 242,...