Gikas v. Zolin, S030724

• Citation: 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500,6 Cal.4th 841,863 P.2d 745
• Decision Date: 23 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. S030724,S030724
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 863 P.2d 745 Nicholas GIKAS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Frank S. ZOLIN, as Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent.

Page 500

25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500

6 Cal.4th 841, 863 P.2d 745

Nicholas GIKAS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Frank S. ZOLIN, as Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent.

No. S030724.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Dec. 23, 1993.

Michael D. McGlinn, San Diego, for plaintiff and appellant.

Paul H. Neuharth, Jr., San Diego, and Ed Kuwatch, Willits, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Henry G. Ullerich, Asst. Atty. Gen., Melvin R. Segal, Martin H. Milas and Mary Horst, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendant and respondent.

ARABIAN, Justice.

Alarmed by the death and destruction that drunk drivers cruelly perpetrate upon our highways, the Legislature has empowered the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to promptly suspend the driver's licenses of those who drive while intoxicated. We are asked to decide whether a determination in a criminal prosecution that a defendant had been illegally arrested for driving under the influence precludes relitigation of the same question in the DMV's administrative proceeding to suspend the license. We conclude it does not.

I. FACTS

In the early morning hours of July 20, 1990, California Highway Patrol Officer Kenneth Jolly arrested appellant, Nicholas Gikas, for driving while under the influence of alcohol. A blood test showed that appellant's blood-alcohol level was 0.10 percent. Officer Jolly served appellant with an "administrative per se order of suspension," giving appellant a 45-day driving license, but notifying him that his license would be suspended after that time because of the results of the blood test.

Appellant moved to suppress evidence in the criminal proceeding. Officer Jolly and a defense investigator testified at the hearing. The municipal court ruled that the original stop and detention were unreasonable, and granted the motion. The People, represented by the San Diego City Attorney, indicated they were unable to proceed, and the criminal case was dismissed. The People did not appeal.

Thereafter, the DMV conducted an administrative hearing to consider suspending appellant's driver's license because of the July 20, 1990, blood test. Relying on the municipal court's grant of the suppression motion and the subsequent dismissal of the criminal charges, appellant argued that the DMV was collaterally estopped from relitigating the legality of his arrest. The DMV rejected the claim, and suspended appellant's driver's license for four months. It later denied relief on administrative review.

Appellant filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court. The court denied the petition, finding that the DMV "is not collaterally estopped from determining that plaintiff's stop and detention was lawful." The Court of Appeal stayed the suspension pending appeal and, by a two-to-one vote, with Justice Huffman dissenting, reversed. It found that the "DMV is collaterally estopped from relitigating the cited issues [essentially the lawfulness of the arrest] which were necessarily resolved by the municipal court decision to grant the suppression motion." Because of this holding, the court did not decide appellant's alternate contention, that the dismissal of the criminal charges was an "acquitt[al]" that also precluded the administrative proceeding under Vehicle Code section 13353.2, subdivision (e).

We granted the DMV's petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

It is a criminal offense to drive while under the influence of alcohol or a drug, or to drive with 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in the blood. (Veh.Code, § 23152, subds. (a) and (b); see also Veh.Code, § 23153 [similar but also involving bodily injury].) ¹ In addition to criminal sanctions, the Legislature has established administrative procedures whereby the DMV may suspend a person's driver's license for driving under the influence or with a specified blood-alcohol level.

The DMV has long been authorized to suspend drivers' licenses of persons convicted of specified alcohol related driving offenses, or of persons who refused to submit to a chemical test to determine their blood-alcohol level. (E.g., §§ 13352, 13353.) At issue here is legislation enacted in 1989, operative July 1, 1990, designed to allow suspension of drivers' licenses before conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.10 percent or more, later reduced to 0.08 percent. (Stats.1989, ch. 1460, p. 6501; Stats.1990, ch. 431.) "Similar laws providing for administrative license suspension or revocation, sometimes called 'administrative per se' laws, have been enacted and are in effect in at least 23 states, and are reported to be an effective deterrent to driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. [Citation.]" (Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 449, 452, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 392; see also, generally, id. at pp. 452-453, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 392 and Claxton v. Zolin (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 553, 558-559, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 319.)

Under this legislation, when a person is arrested for driving under the influence and is determined to have a prohibited blood-alcohol level, the arresting officer or the DMV serves the person with a "notice of the order of suspension." (§§ 13353.2, subds. (b) & (c), 23158.5, subds. (a) & (b).) The notice informs the person that his or her driver's license will be suspended 45 days from the date of service, states the reason and statutory grounds for the suspension, and explains the person's right to seek an administrative hearing. (§§ 13353.2, subd. (c), 13353.3, subd. (a).) If the arresting officer serves the notice, the officer also confiscates the person's driver's license, and issues a 45-day temporary license. (§ 23158.5, subd. (b).) The period of suspension is four months for a person with no prior record. (§ 13353.3, subd. (b)(1).)

The DMV automatically reviews the suspension order to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether: (1) the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe the person was driving in violation of section 23152 or section 23153; (2) the person was placed under arrest; and (3) the person was driving with 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in the blood. (§ 13557.) The determination is based upon the officer's report and any evidence accompanying the report. (§ 13557, subd. (a).) The person may request a hearing with the DMV limited to these issues, at which additional evidence may be presented. Upon a timely request, the hearing must be held before the effective date of the order of suspension. (§ 13558.) The person may seek judicial review of an adverse decision. (§ 13559.) None of these review proceedings have a "collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent criminal prosecution" or "preclude litigation of those same facts in the criminal proceeding." (§§ 13557, subd. (f), 13558, subd. (g), 13559, subd. (b).)

The express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension procedure are: (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive blood-alcohol levels; (2) to guard against erroneous deprivation by providing a prompt administrative review of the suspension; and (3) to place no restriction on the ability of a prosecutor to pursue related criminal actions. (Stats.1989, ch. 1460, § 1, pp. 6501-6502; Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 599, 603, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353.)

The legislative history reveals that "[t]he need for the administrative per se statutes arose from the fact that '[t]he legal process leading to imposition of a suspension sometimes [took] years from the time of arrest.' [Citation.] 'Many drivers with high chemical test results fail[ed] to have sanctions taken against their driving privilege because of reduction in charges as the result of "plea-bargaining" or pre-trial diversion programs.' [Citation.] In enacting the administrative per se law, the Legislature intended to establish 'an expedited driver's license suspension system' [citation] that would 'reduce court delays. The suspension will be swift and certain and will be more effective as a deterrent....' [Citation.]" (Bell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 304, 312, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 830.)

"[T]he Legislature, in enacting these statutes, contemplated two processes--one involving court proceedings and criminal in nature, the other involving administrative proceedings and civil in nature; and that these processes are, for the most part, intended to operate independently of each other and to provide for different dispositions." (Robertson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 938, 947, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 319.) However, as relevant here, one important requirement is common to both. For the incriminating evidence to be admissible in the criminal proceeding, or for the DMV to suspend the driver's license, the underlying arrest must have been lawful. (§ 13557, subd. (b)(2)(A); Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 607, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353; see also Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 760, 280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404; Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 108, 111, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 855; and Music v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 841, 847, 270 Cal.Rptr. 692 [interpreting similar statutory language in § 13353, involving the "implied consent" law].)

In the criminal proceeding of this case, the court concluded that the arrest was unlawful. The precise question confronting us is whether that determination precludes relitigation of the issue in the administrative proceeding.

Especially pertinent to this inquiry is § 13353.2. Subdivision (a) of that section provides: "The [DMV] shall immediately suspend the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle if the person was driving a motor vehicle when the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of...