Gilbert v. Big Bros. Big Sisters of Am., Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14–CV–3806–B
• Citation: 262 F.Supp.3d 402
• Parties: Kelley GILBERT, Plaintiff, v. BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

262 F.Supp.3d 402

Kelley GILBERT, Plaintiff,

v.BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14–CV–3806–B

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

Signed June 16, 2017

Michael E. Coles, The Coles Firm PC, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Matthew W. Ray, Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP, Dallas, TX, Hannah L. Sorcic, Reed Smith LLC, Chicago, IL, Joel S. Barras, Valerie Eifert, Reed Smith LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Peter J. Stuhldreher, Reed Smith LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JANE J. BOYLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, Inc.'s (BBBSA) Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 61.¹ For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS BBBSA's Motion.

I.BACKGROUND²

This is a race-based employment discrimination case. In 2014, Defendant employer BBBSA faced a "near-devastating financial situation." Doc. 62, Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 2 [hereinafter Def.'s Br.]. In March of that year, Pam Iorio joined BBBSA as CEO. Doc. 1, Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 11; Doc. 62, Def.'s Br. 2. Following her arrival, there was at least one major reduction in the workforce (RIF). Doc. 1, Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 13; Doc. 62, Def.'s Br. 9. The total amount of employees let go and how many of those employees were minorities is disputed by the parties. Compare Doc. 1, Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 13–16 (asserting that of 45 total employees working, BBBSA terminated 14 minority employees and 7 Caucasian employees) with Doc. 62, Def.'s Br. 21 (asserting that of 64 total employees working, BBBSA terminated 14 minority employees and 17 Caucasian employees).

After Iorio was appointed CEO, she fired the former general counsel and allegedly made the decision to replace the position with pro bono counsel. Doc. 62, Def.'s Br. 2. To fill the position until she found pro bono counsel, BBBSA asserts, Iorio installed Plaintiff Kelley Gilbert as the Interim General Counsel, a title Gilbert does not dispute. Id. ; Doc. 1, Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 18. Prior to filling the role of Interim General Counsel, Gilbert was the Assistant General Counsel & Associate Vice President of Government Relations. Doc. 1, Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 9, 18; Doc. 62, Def.'s Br. 10–11.

By June 2014, Iorio retained two national law firms to provide pro bono legal services. Doc. 62, Def.'s Br. 11. As a result, Gilbert's position of Interim General Counsel was eliminated and her employment was terminated. Id. In her Complaint, Gilbert states that she knew Iorio sought General Counsel in the Dallas area. Doc. 1, Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 18. Gilbert notes that Iorio fired her without ever inquiring about Gilbert's willingness to relocate to Dallas, Texas or providing Gilbert an opportunity to apply for the General Counsel position. Id. ¶¶ 18–19.

After her employment was terminated, Gilbert brought a race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. ¶ 23. Gilbert reasons that BBBSA's termination of her employment was a result of discrimination based on her race. Id. In her Complaint, Gilbert asserts that after Iorio's arrival, Iorio allegedly decided to shift the focus of BBBSA away from serving ethnic minorities and therefore, BBBSA "purged its workforce of ethnic minorities." Id. ¶ 24. Gilbert appears to have abandoned this particular theory, though, in responding to BBBSA's Motion for Summary Judgment. In her Response, Gilbert's discrimination theory is based solely on the number of minorities terminated during the RIF. See Doc. 65, Pl.'s Resp. 6–7.

BBBSA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 61) seeking to dismiss Gilbert's sole claim—a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Gilbert has responded to BBBSA's Motion, and BBBSA has replied. See Doc. 65, Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. [hereinafter Pl.'s Resp.]; Doc. 68, Reply Br. in Further Supp. of Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. [hereinafter Def.'s Reply]. Thus, BBBSA's Motion is ripe for the Court's review.

II.LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute "is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party." Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp. , 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007). And a fact "is ‘material’ if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Id.

The summary judgment movant bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Latimer v. Smithkline & French Labs. , 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990). Usually, this requires the movant to identify "those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). But if the non-movant ultimately bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may satisfy its burden just by pointing to the absence of evidence supporting the non-movant's case. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

If the movant meets that burden, then it falls to the non-movant to "show with significant probative evidence that there exists a genuine issue of material fact." Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc. , 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Conkling v. Turner , 18 F.3d 1285, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994) ). And significant probative evidence is just that: significant. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). "[M]etaphysical doubt as to material facts," "conclusory allegations," "unsubstantiated assertions," or a mere "scintilla of evidence" will not do. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Rather, "the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial." Bluebonnet Hotel Ventures, L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 754 F.3d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).

To be sure, the court views evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant when determining whether a genuine issue exists. Munoz v. Orr , 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000). Yet it need not "sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment." Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. , 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc. , 953 F.2d 909, 915–16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) ). Simply put, the non-movant must "identify specific evidence in the record" and "articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports [its] claim." Id. If it cannot, then the court must grant summary judgment. Little , 37 F.3d at 1076.

B. The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework

As referenced, Gilbert asserted her race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. " Section 1981 is a federal law designed to ensure that all persons in the United States have the ‘same right[s]’ and, inter alia , ‘the full and equal benefit of all laws ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.’ " Finley v. Fla. Par. Juvenile Det. Ctr. , 574 Fed.Appx. 402, 404 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) ). "Claims of racial discrimination brought under § 1981 are governed by the same evidentiary framework applicable to claims of employment discrimination brought under Title VII." LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc. , 86 F.3d 444, 448 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996). On that basis, the Court will address Gilbert's claim using the Title VII evidentiary framework. See Jackson v. Watkins , 619 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff may establish his prima facie case of discrimination using circumstantial evidence.³ Wheeler v. BL Dev. Corp. , 415 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Laxton v. Gap Inc. , 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003) ). If a plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence, as Gilbert does, then the McDonnell Douglas framework applies. Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc. , 398 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2005) ; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)

To survive summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff, or a § 1981 plaintiff, must first establish a "prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence." LaPierre , 86 F.3d at 448 (citing McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817 ). " ‘Although the precise elements of this showing will vary depending on the circumstances, the plaintiff's burden at this stage of the case is not onerous.’ " Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc. , 701 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia , 372 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex. 2012) ).

Second, if the plaintiff shows a prima facie case, then "the ‘burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.’ " Reed , 701 F.3d at 439 (quoting Black v. Pan Am. Labs., L.L.C. , 646 F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2011) ). "The employer's burden is one of production, not persuasion, and does not involve a credibility assessment." Black , 646 F.3d at 259. Third, "[i]f the employer meets its burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to make an ultimate showing of intentional discrimination." Reed , 701 F.3d at 439.

To be sure, the three-step McDonnel Douglas framework shifts the "intermediate evidentiary burdens ... back and forth" between the plaintiff and defendant. Jackson v. Cal–Western Packaging Corp. , 602 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010). But at bottom, " ‘the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’ " Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ).

III.ANALYSIS

A. Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case of racial...