Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2004
• Docket Number: Docket No. 122457. Calendar No. 11.
• Citation: 470 Mich. 749,685 N.W.2d 391
• Parties: Linda M. GILBERT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

685 N.W.2d 391

470 Mich. 749

Linda M. GILBERT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 122457. Calendar No. 11.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued December 10, 2003.

Decided July 22, 2004.

Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Johnson (by Geoffrey N. Fieger, Tammy J. Reiss, and Mark C. Smiley), Southfield, Bendure & Thomas, of counsel (by Mark R. Bendure), Detroit, for the plaintiff.

Kienbaum, Opperwall, Hardy & Pelton, P.L.C. (by Thomas G. Kienbaum, Elizabeth Hardy, and Noel D. Massie), Birmingham, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher L.L.P., of counsel (by Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Eugene Scalia, Paul DeCamp, and Joanie L. Roeschlein), Washington, D.C., and Patricia J. Boyle, of counsel, Birmingham, for the defendant.

Robert S. LaBrant, Lansing, for amici curiae the Michigan Chamber of Commerce.

National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc. (by Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Ellen Dunham Bryant), and Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker L.L.P. (by Paul Grossman, Zachary D. Fasman, and Neal D. Mollen), Washington, D.C., for amici curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.

Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (by Mary Massaron Ross), Detroit, for amici curiae the Michigan Municipal League Liability & Property Pool.

Opinion

YOUNG, J.

In this appeal, defendant seeks reversal or remittitur of the largest recorded compensatory award for a single-plaintiff sexual harassment suit in the history of the United States. The $21 million verdict awarded, according to plaintiff, barely compensates her for the lasting effects of the sexual harassment she endured as an employee of defendant, DaimlerChrysler, by whom she is still employed and earning almost $100,000 a year. She contended during her trial that defendant's failure to deal adequately with sexual harassment in her plant led to a permanent change in her "brain chemistry" and a relapse into substance abuse and depression, and that these conditions will soon lead to her untimely and excruciating death.

The foundation for this theory of recovery was laid by the expert opinion testimony of a social worker who had a longstanding relationship with plaintiff's counsel. This witness not only lacked any training, education, or experience in medicine, but also testified falsely about his credentials. Nevertheless, plaintiff asked the jury to treat this witness's testimony as a "prognosis," and to compensate plaintiff for the loss of her health and, eventually, her life. Plaintiff's counsel evoked images of physical abuse and torture, compared his client to survivors of the Holocaust, and argued that defendant DaimlerChrysler thought of itself as "God Almighty," exempt from the legal norms that govern others. Thus, in defendant's view, the verdict was the product of inflammatory rhetoric, unscientific "expert" testimony, fraud on the court, and attorney misconduct.

We granted leave to appeal in order to determine whether the verdict was a legitimate estimate of plaintiff's losses, as plaintiff contends, or whether it was, as defendant argues, an unjust, excessive award procured through systematic misconduct by plaintiff's trial counsel and supported by dubious evidence. The majority and the dissent agree on one fundamental fact: the verdict rendered in this case is excessive and cannot be affirmed.¹ A careful review of the record reveals that plaintiff's trial counsel engaged in a sustained and deliberate effort to divert the jury's attention from the facts and the law. In their stead, counsel interposed misleading argument, prejudice-baiting rhetoric, and pleas for punitive damages. This rhetoric had its intended result: the jury's verdict unmistakably reflects passion rather than reason and prejudice rather than impartiality.

We conclude that the trial court lacked any justification for denying defendant's postverdict motion for a new trial under MCR 2.611. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. We reverse, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

It is undisputed that plaintiff, Linda Gilbert, has long waged a losing battle with substance abuse. Her personal struggles were thoroughly documented in medical records that plaintiff introduced at trial in order to establish damages. According to those records, Ms. Gilbert began drinking at fourteen and began using cocaine at twenty years of age. Most of her adult life has since been marked by excessive drinking. At one point during her employment with defendant, she reported to her substance abuse counselors that she was consuming a pint to one-fifth gallon of alcohol a day. Her cocaine use also continued during her employment with defendant, as documented by records from St. John Hospital and Sacred Heart Rehabilitation Center.

Ms. Gilbert sought professional assistance on a number of occasions and has been treated on both an inpatient and outpatient basis for substance abuse. On the basis of the testimony at trial, however, it appears that none of these treatments has been entirely successful. Indeed, the foundation of plaintiff's claim for $140 million in damages was the assertion that plaintiff's substance abuse would continue until it resulted in her death.

Plaintiff's work life contrasts markedly with her personal difficulties. In the mid-eighties, plaintiff began an apprenticeship to train for a career as a millwright. By 1990, plaintiff had become a journeyman millwright and was hired two years later by the Chrysler Corporation.² Plaintiff was the first female millwright to work at Chrysler's Jefferson North Assembly Plant in Detroit. To our knowledge, plaintiff continues to work for defendant and, according to her attorney, earns "nearly $100,000 per year" with overtime pay.

Plaintiff initiated the present sexual harassment action against defendant on March 25, 1994, complaining that a hostile work environment existed in defendant's Jefferson North plant. At that time, plaintiff had reported two specific instances of harassment through defendant's formal discrimination reporting procedure. The first incident took place on May 22, 1993, a little over a year after plaintiff began working for defendant. Plaintiff reported that she found a lewd cartoon taped to her toolbox. It depicted a woman in a bar engaged in an "arm-wrestling" match with a man's penis. Plaintiff's name was written above the woman in the cartoon, and the name of a coworker was written on the man whose penis was being wrestled.³ After receiving plaintiff's oral report of this cartoon, plaintiff's supervisor and area coordinator apologized to plaintiff, stated that defendant "did not condone such action" and that they would address the problem by speaking with employees in the area and distributing copies of defendant's written policy against sexual harassment. Defendant's internal memo notes that an employee in Chrysler's human resources department and several other employees spoke with the workers in plaintiff's area and distributed the company's sexual harassment guidelines following plaintiff's report.

The second reported incident took place on June 5, 1993, when plaintiff found a Polaroid photograph of a penis on her toolbox. She informed her supervisor about the picture. Defendant's internal memo concerning the complaint indicates that its supervisory employees apologized to plaintiff and reassured her that "[Chrysler did] not approve of such action, and that [Chrysler was] doing everything possible to prevent such harassment."

On the basis of these two incidents, plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against defendant alleging breach of contract, violations of the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and negligence in addressing plaintiff's concerns about sexual harassment in the workplace.⁴

After filing her lawsuit, plaintiff formally reported to management several other incidents of harassment that occurred while the suit was pending. Plaintiff reported that, on October 10, 1994, she found a vulgar cartoon entitled "Highway Signs You Should Know" taped to her locker;⁵ she also reported that she had found an article by "Dr. Ruth" taped to her locker one week earlier.⁶ In response, Maya Baker, a human resources facilitator for defendant, personally patrolled plaintiff's work area on occasion and also asked union leaders to share with union members that the responsible party could be terminated. Next, plaintiff reported that on March 12, 1995, she found a lewd and misogynistic "poem" on a bulletin board in a work area adjacent to hers.⁷ Defendant investigated these latter two incidents and, being unable to determine the responsible party, removed the bulletin board.

Finally, on September 2, 1997, plaintiff formally reported that a coworker made references to his "big meat" in front of her. In response to plaintiff's complaint about her coworker's apparent reference to his genitals, defendant reprimanded the responsible employee.

These are the only sexual harassment incidents that plaintiff made known to defendant through the formal procedures established by defendant for such matters. However, plaintiff contends that defendant had actual notice of other incidents because of her description of those incidents during her deposition testimony given after the commencement of this suit and that defendant had "constructive notice" of other incidents.⁸

Before trial, defendant moved to exclude "evidence regarding incidents that were never reported." After hearing argument on this motion, the court denied defendant's request and admitted testimony and evidence on these unreported incidents.

At trial, plaintiff offered the testimony of social worker Carol Katz and of certified social worker and substance abuse counselor Steven Hnat. Mr. Hnat had counseled plaintiff regarding her substance abuse problems before the initiation of her lawsuit against DaimlerChrysler. He therefore...