Gilbert v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co.

• Decision Date: 07 June 1898
• Citation: 30 S.E. 673,104 Ga. 412
• Parties: GILBERT v. GEORGIA RAILROAD & BANKING CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

30 S.E. 673

104 Ga. 412

GILBERT v. GEORGIA RAILROAD & BANKING CO.

Supreme Court of Georgia

June 7, 1898

Syllabus by the Court.

1. When, in an act amending a section of the Code, there is stated in the first part of the act certain amendments to be made, and in the latter part of the act it is declared that the section as amended shall read in a certain way (setting it forth), none of the amendments referred to in the first part of the act become operative, save those alone which are contained in the recital in the latter part of the act as to how the section shall read as amended.

2. The act of the general assembly of this state, approved December 20, 1892, amending section 3406 of the Code of 1882 (Acts 1892, p. 59), providing where railroad companies shall be sued, is not in conflict with that provision of the constitution which declares that civil cases shall be tried in the county where the defendant resides.

3. Nor is such act unconstitutional because it does not distinctly describe the law to be amended.

4. A suit against a railroad company filed in the county where the principal office of the corporation was located, by a plaintiff resident in that county, setting up a cause of action which originated in another county, was properly dismissed on demurrer, when there was no allegation that the corporation had no agent in the county where the cause of action originated.

Error from city court of Richmond county; W. E. Eve, Judge.

Action by Ella V. Gilbert against the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

E. T Brown and E. B. Baxter, for plaintiff in error.

Jos. B. & Bryan Cumming, for defendant in error.

COBB J.

Ella V Gilbert brought suit in the superior court of Richmond county against the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company for damages on account of personal injuries to her son caused by his being run over by a car of the defendant. The petition alleged that the plaintiff was a resident of Richmond county, that the principal office of the defendant company was in the same county, and that the injuries occurred in the county of Columbia; but there was no allegation that the defendant did not have an agent in the latter county. The defendant demurred to the petition, on the ground that it appeared therefrom that the court had no jurisdiction of the cause of action, and that the suit should have been brought in the superior court of Columbia county. The demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff excepted.

1. In 1892 the general assembly passed the following act:

"An act to be entitled 'An act to amend section 3406 of the Code so as to define where certain actions shall be brought against railroad companies.'

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Georgia, that section 3406 of the Code be, and the same is, hereby amended, by striking from the second line of said section the words 'liable to be,' and also by striking from said line the word 'any' and inserting in lieu thereof the word 'the,' and to add to the end of said section these words: 'Any judgment rendered in any other county than the one in which the cause originated shall be utterly void; provided, that said suits may be brought in the county where the principal office of said railroad company is located, if the plaintiff should reside in said county,' so that said section, when amended, shall read as follows: 'All railroad companies shall be sued in the county in which the cause of action originated by any one whose person or property has been injured by such railroad company, its officers, agents or employees, for the purpose of recovering damages for such injuries; and also on all contracts made or to be performed in the county where suit is brought; any judgment rendered in any other county than the one in which the cause so originated shall be utterly void. But if the cause of action arises in a county where the railroad company liable to suit has no agent then suit may be brought in the county of the residence of such company."'

"Sec. 2. [Repeals conflicting laws.]"

Acts 1892, p. 59.

In the Code of 1895 appears only that part of the act of 1892 which follows the expression "when amended, shall read as follows." Civ. Code, § 2334. It clearly appears from this that, in the opinion of the codifiers, no part of the law took effect except that part which declared that the section should read in a certain way after it was amended and that the proviso in the first part of the act never became the law. Under the view we take of the case, it is not necessary for us to determine whether the codifiers had authority to leave out of the Code any part of this act if the same should have been properly carried therein, as we think the proviso left out never became effective. While, in amending statutes, it is proper to embrace in the first part of the amending act, as declaratory of the intention of the general assembly, what is to be the character of the amendment, still this part of the statute, which is merely declaratory of the legislative intention, is not to be looked to as the final determination of the general assembly. When a statute or a section of the Code to be amended is recited in the statute in its amended shape, and it is in express terms declared therein that, when amended, the old law shall read in a certain way, this declaration by the general assembly, being the last...