Gilbert v. McNulta

• Decision Date: 16 March 1899
• Docket Number: 25,013.
• Citation: 96 F. 83
• Parties: GILBERT et al. v. Mcnulta.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

96 F. 83

GILBERT et al. v. Mcnulta.

No. 25,013.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Illinois.

March 16, 1899

James S. Harlan and S. S. Gregory, for plaintiffs.

J. A Baldwin, Henry R. Baldwin, and J. D. Hood, for defendants.

SEAMAN District Judge.

The sole question raised by the plea is whether the receiver of a national bank appointed under the act of congress is suable in this court upon his contract made on behalf of the estate in the course of its administration. It is established by authority that the receiver in such case is 'not the officer of any court, but the agent and officer of the United States,' in the performance of his duties. Ex parte Chetwood, 165 U.S. 443, 458, 17 Sup.Ct. 385. But it is equally well settled that officers of the United States are not granted immunity from suits in all cases, even in respect of matters in which their possession or acts are exclusively for the United States (U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 Sup.Ct. 240; Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 17 Sup.Ct. 770), and that courts of law may determine as to the rights of parties dealing with such officers, although they may not interfere with the discharge of official duties (Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347; Litchfield v Register, 9 Wall. 575). In the case at bar the act provides for the comptroller to have the charge of winding up the affairs of the insolvent bank for the benefit of creditors and stockholders, and the receiver is appointed by him as a trustee or agent to that end. While the funds which come to the hands of the receiver are paid over 'to the treasurer of the United States, subject to the order of the comptroller,' they are in no sense public funds, but belong to the stockholders after all liabilities are discharged. The argument against jurisdiction rests mainly upon the proposition that there is no express statutory authority for its exercise, and therefore there can be no cognizance in a federal court under its well-settled limitations. I am of the opinion that the proposition is not well founded, as the administration of the affairs of the insolvent bank arises exclusively under the act of congress (Rev. St. Secs. 5234-5238); and by another act, of August 13 1888, jurisdiction is conferred upon the circuit courts 'of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity when the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2,000, and arising under the constitution or laws of the United States. ' See Hallan v. Tillinghast, 75 F. 849; Smithson v. Hubbell, 81 F. 593; Snohomish Co. v. Puget Sound Nat Bank, Id. 518. The case is distinguished from Bausman v. Dixon (decided by the supreme court Feb. 20, 1899) 19 S.Ct. 316, and from Capital Nat. Bank of Lincoln v First Nat. Bank of Cadiz, 172 U.S. 425, 19 Sup.Ct. 202, there cited. No ground of public policy appears to oppose action by the courts to determine the rights of claimants against the funds which are in course of administration under the act, aside from the fact that the machinery of the government is employed therein. On the other hand, the claimant is without remedy; is, in effect, denied due process of law, if his suit cannot be entertained. The inhibition must be clear to oust jurisdiction in such case, and this statute expressly provides for action by the court when application is made under sections 5234 and 5...