Gilbert v. Moose

• Decision Date: 01 October 1883
• Citation: Gilbert v. Moose, 104 Pa. 74 (Pa. 1883)
• Parties: Gilbert <I>versus</I> Moose's Administrators.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

104 Pa. 74

Gilbert versus Moose's Administrators.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 31, 1883.

October 1, 1883.

May 31st 1883.

Before GORDON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT, GREEN and CLARK, JJ. MERCUR, C. J., and PAXSON, J., absent

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Adams county: Of May Term 1883, No. 10.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Wills (Edw. J. Cox, with him), for plaintiff in error. —Moose originated the contract with the association, but the contract itself was between the company and Jacobs, the beneficiary. The administrators of Moose can show no contract relation with the company, and none with Gilbert. If it was a wager, Moose was the author of it, and his administrators can now no more disaffirm it than he could have done. The association raised no objection. If there was any illegality in the contract, the administrators of Moose cannot invoke the aid of the court in their behalf, after it has been fully executed. They are obliged to bring in the illegality of the transaction in making their demand, and in such case the courts will not lend their aid: Swan v. Scott, 11 S. & R. 155; Speise v. McCoy, 6 W. & S. 485. They made no claim on the association, and gave no notice not to pay Gilbert.

But Moose had an insurable interest in his own life, and could make whomsoever he wished his beneficiary; and he in turn could dispose of it as he pleased: American L. & H. Insurance Co. v. Robertshaw, 2 Casey 189; Folmer's Appeal, 6 Norris 133; Cunningham v. Smith's Adm'r, 20 Smith 450.

R. G. McCreary, for defendants in error.—Moose did have insurable interest in his own life, and his contract with the company was valid. Jacobs had none beyond the amount of his advance to pay Moose's membership fee, and he could transfer no greater interest to Gilbert: May on Insurance, § 110; Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 566.

Sound policy forbids all gambling or purely speculative insurance: May on Insurance, §§ 101, 105, 106, 398; Warnock Adm. v. Davis, 14 Otto 775. An assignee, without insurable interest, who receives the proceeds of the policy, holds the same as trustee for the representatives of the insured, less advances made by him on the policy: Warnock v. Davis, supra; Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wallace 643.

Mr. Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court, October 1st 1883.

Jacob Moose, in his lifetime (August 17th 1880), made application to the Southern Pennsylvania Relief Association, of Hanover, York county, for an insurance on his life, and upon this application a policy, or certificate of membership, as it is called, in the sum of $2,000, was issued for the benefit of one Peter Jacobs, an alleged grand-son of the assured. It turns out, however, that Jacobs was in no way related to Moose, being but the son of a son's wife; hence, having no assurable interest in the life on which the policy was issued. On the 31st of August following the date of the certificate, Jacobs, for the consideration of $28, assigned to John G. Gilbert, the defendant, by whom all subsequent assessments, made by the company, were paid. On the 3d of April 1881, Jacob Moose died, and the defendant received from the company on the policy some $356. It was for this sum of money, or the balance of it, after deducting the assessments and other expenses paid by Gilbert, that this suit was brought. The court below, after hearing the evidence, directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiffs, and reserved the following point: "Whether or not, the assignment being made upon the consideration of the payment of $28, the assignee having no interest in the life of the assured, and having taken the assignment for the purpose of speculation only, is entitled to retain the money received on the policy as against the personal representatives of the deceased, beyond the amount of the consideration, fees and assessments paid to the association." Afterwards, on argument, the court entered judgment on the verdict for the plaintiffs. We are thus at once brought face to face with the question, really the only one in the case, can one having no interest in the life assured, and for the purpose of speculation only, acquire, by assignment or otherwise, such title to the policy as the law will enforce?

It was held by this court as early as 1803, in the case of Pritchet v. The Insurance Co., 3 Yeates 458, that every species of gaming contracts of insurance, wherein the insured has no interest in the subject matter of the policy, or one only colorable, is, in this Commonwealth, without the sanction of either law or usage; that such contracts are mischievous and dangerous to the interests of trade, commerce and society, and are to be reprobated rather than encouraged by our courts. The very same view of this subject is adopted in Edgell v. McLaughlin, 6 Wharton 176, and it was there said that no kind of wager had ever been recoverable in the courts of Pennsylvania. So also, in the case of Adams v. The Insurance Co., 1 Rawle 97, it was asserted that, in this state, a gaming policy cannot be enforced. We need not stop to consider at length the principles on which these decisions rest, for they must be obvious to every sound moralist. The gambler is, as a rule, reckless and dangerous, and seldom hesitates at the means necessary to secure his bet. We have within our own knowledge a case in which a wagering policy on a life resulted in murder.

So far, however, as the policy itself is, in this case, concerned, we must take it as valid; nothing to the contrary appears from the evidence, and its validity seems not to have been questioned in the court below. The sole inquiry then is, to whom do the proceeds belong? Was the court right in holding that they could not go to Jacobs, the beneficiary named in the certificate, or to the defendant, his assignee, because of their want of interest in the assured life? If so, judgment was properly entered for the plaintiffs, for, in that case, the beneficial interest in the risk remained in Jacob Moose and the representatives of his estate. We do not overlook the fact that the status of Jacobs is the point of this case, for if he was the proper and lawful beneficiary, then, even were Gilbert without right, the plaintiffs could not recover, for the proceeds of the policy would belong to Jacobs, and, on the other hand, if his claim was not good he had nothing to assign to the defendant. But as a beneficiary merely, having no interest in the life, it seems to us very clear that he could lawfully have no interest in the policy. For if we admit the contrary; if we admit that one man...