Gilbert v. Mullin
| Decision Date | 03 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-6085.,01-6085. |
| Parties | Lewis Eugene GILBERT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Mike MULLIN, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Gloyd L. McCoy, of Coyle, McCoy & Burton, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Nancy Elizabeth Connally, Assistant Attorney General (Jennifer B. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, and W.A. Drew
Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Lewis Eugene Gilbert, an Oklahoma state prisoner sentenced to death, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This court has granted Gilbert a certificate of appealability ("COA") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) with respect to three of his claims of legal error: (1) that his right to a fair trial was violated by a coerced verdict at the sentencing stage of the trial; (2) that he was improperly denied his request for a competency evaluation in state court; and (3) that there was insufficient factual support for the jury's finding of the existence of the "avoid arrest" and "continuing threat" aggravating circumstances. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Gilbert is not entitled to habeas relief on any of these claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § § 1291 and 2253, we affirm.
Gilbert and a co-defendant were convicted of the 1994 murder of Roxanne Ruddell, a security guard at Lake Stanley Draper in Oklahoma.1 Prior to this murder, Gilbert and his co-defendant had killed an elderly woman in Ohio, stolen her car, and driven it to Missouri. In Missouri they had killed an elderly couple, stolen their car, and driven it to Oklahoma. The two took the second stolen car to Lake Stanley Draper, where they saw Ruddell fishing alone. Intending to steal her pickup, they tied Ruddell's hands and made her walk a short distance to sit in the "vee" at the base of a tree. Gilbert then shot her three times in the head. Approximately three days later, Gilbert and his co-defendant were apprehended in New Mexico sleeping in a ditch. Ruddell's pickup was found nearly a mile away.
During the sentencing stage of the trial the prosecutor argued, and the jury found the existence of, two aggravating circumstances: that there was a probability that Gilbert would commit criminal acts of violence such that he constituted a "continuing threat to society," and that the murder was committed for the purpose of "avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." Gilbert v. State, 951 P.2d 98, 103, 122 (Okla.Crim.App.1997). The jury recommended that Gilbert be sentenced to death for Ruddell's murder, and the trial court sentenced him in accordance with this recommendation.
Gilbert appealed, raising thirteen propositions of error, but his convictions and death sentence were affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ("OCCA"). He subsequently filed an application for post-conviction relief before the OCCA, urging eight grounds and requesting an evidentiary hearing, but this application was denied. In September 1999, Gilbert filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, seeking relief on seven grounds. The petition was denied and this appeal followed.
Because Gilbert filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), the provisions of that act are applicable to his case. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27, 117 S.Ct 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Pursuant to AEDPA, we may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(2) "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id.
Gilbert contends that he was denied due process of law when the trial court, at the sentencing phase of his trial, coerced the jury into recommending a death sentence by delivering a supplemental jury instruction that was intended to urge the jurors to achieve a unanimous decision. Whether a jury has been improperly coerced by a judge is a mixed question of law and fact. Rodriguez v. Marshall, 125 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir.1997). Pursuant to AEDPA we may grant habeas relief on such a claim only if the state court unreasonably applied the law to the facts of the case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
Jury deliberations for the sentencing phase of Gilbert's trial began at 4:40 p.m. on a Thursday. At approximately 10:00 p.m., the trial court sua sponte called the jury to the courtroom "to inquire as to their progress." (7 Tr. at 1692.) The following exchange then took place between the court and the jury's foreperson:
. . .
THE COURT: I would like for you to go back and try a little longer. We won't leave you in there this long without inquiring further. But at this time I would ask you to go back and try again on the remaining charge.
(7 id. at 1693-94.)
At approximately 11:05 p.m., the trial court recalled the jury to the courtroom and the ensuing exchange took place:
. . .
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this case has taken approximately seven days of trial time counting the voir dire. You have deliberated, I believe, over six hours. You report to me that you are experiencing difficulty in arriving at a verdict. This is an important case and a serious matter to all concerned. You are the exclusive judges of the facts, the Court is the judge of the law.
Now, I most respectfully and earnestly request of you that you return to your jury room and resume your deliberations. Further open and frank discussion of the evidence and the law submitted to you in this case may aid you in arriving at a verdict. This does not mean that those favoring any particular position should surrender their honest convictions as to the weight or effect of any evidence solely because of the opinion of other jurors or because of the importance of arriving at a decision.
No juror should ever agree to a verdict that is contrary to the law and the Court's instructions nor find the fact or concur in a verdict which in good conscience he or she believes to be untrue. This does mean that you should give respectful consideration to each other's views and talk over any differences of opinion in the spirit of fairness and candor.
If at all possible, you should resolve any differences and come to a common conclusion that this case may be completed. Each juror should respect the opinion of his or her fellow jurors as he or she would have them respect his or hers in an earnest and diligent effort to arrive at a just verdict under the law and the evidence. You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as the case may require and take all the time necessary.
The giving of this instruction at this time in no way means that it is more important than any other instruction. On the contrary, you should consider this instruction together with and as part of the instructions which I have previously [given] you.
In stating the foregoing, I again repeat: You are the judges of the facts, the Court is the judge of the law. In making all statements made to you, I have not nor do I now express or intimate nor indicate in any way the conclusion to be reached by you in this case. Nor do I intend in any manner — or any way or manner...
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