Gilbert v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 21 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | A-32 September Term 2020,084860 |
| Parties | Brenda GILBERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenyatta K. STEWART, Esq., Hunt, Hamlin & Ridley, Defendants-Respondents, and James A. Addis, Esq., Defendant, and State of New Jersey Judiciary, Passaic County Vicinage Probation Department, and Monroe Gilbert, Defendants. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Michael Confusione argued the cause for appellant (Hegge & Confusione, attorneys; Michael Confusione, on the brief).
Juliana E. Blackburn, Newark, argued the cause for respondents (The Law Offices of Juliana E. Blackburn, attorneys; Juliana E. Blackburn, on the letter brief).
The Court considers whether, on the summary judgment record presented here, a rational jury could conclude that an attorney's alleged professional negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's asserted damages. Defendant Kenyatta Stewart is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of New Jersey.1 Plaintiff Brenda Gilbert is a Senior Probation Officer employed in the Passaic Vicinage (the Vicinage). Plaintiff alleges that she suffered a demotion and other negative employment consequences as a result of defendant's negligent representation of her in a municipal court matter.
In 2014, plaintiff was summoned to Woodland Park Municipal Court (WPMC) in connection with numerous traffic tickets. The tickets were largely acquired by plaintiff's ex-husband, who had sole possession of the family car, which was registered in plaintiff's name. Plaintiff's ex-husband retained defendant to represent him in the WPMC matter. When plaintiff, her ex-husband, and defendant convened for the court appearance, defendant advised plaintiff that she should plead guilty to the traffic offenses. Plaintiff took his advice and was sentenced to fines and community service. In the words of the municipal court judge, plaintiff "fell on the sword" for her ex-husband.
About a month after learning of the court summonses, plaintiff informed her employer of her involvement in the WPMC matter. The Vicinage subsequently launched an investigation into plaintiff's conduct and, in the course of that investigation, learned of a number of other municipal court violations that plaintiff had incurred over the years and failed to report to the Judiciary. The Vicinage then initiated disciplinary proceedings against plaintiff, which resulted in plaintiff receiving a demotion and fifty days of suspension without pay. During a later ethics proceeding against him, defendant admitted to violating the Rules of Professional Conduct by dually representing plaintiff and her ex-husband in the WPMC matter.
In 2016, plaintiff brought an attorney malpractice claim against defendant in the Law Division -- the origin of this appeal -- alleging that his negligence resulted in her disciplinary sanctions. Defendant moved for summary judgment in November 2018. The trial court found that defendant may have breached a duty of professional care owed to plaintiff but that the undisputed material facts did not support a finding that his breach of duty was the proximate cause of plaintiff's harm. The court determined that it was plaintiff's untimely and misleading reporting of her involvement in the WPMC matter, and what that reporting subsequently revealed to her employers, that proximately caused her damages. Finding that the record therefore did not support causation, a necessary element of plaintiff's malpractice claim, the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff's claims with prejudice. The Appellate Division affirmed.
We disagree with the conclusion of the Law Division and Appellate Division and find that a reasonable jury could determine that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's harm. The trial court and Appellate Division relied on testimony from plaintiff's human resources manager that plaintiff's demotion and suspension were the result of plaintiff's failure to report involvement in the municipal court matters and not the result of the convictions themselves. However, we find that reliance misplaced. That view does not consider facts that support plaintiff's claim that, had defendant not breached his duty by advising her to accept a guilty plea for offenses she did not commit, there would have been (1) no conviction to report, which would mean (2) no failure to report the conviction, which would mean (3) no inquiry leading to the discovery of prior failures to report, which, in turn, would mean (4) no imposition of disciplinary charges or the other adverse consequences plaintiff asserts as damages.
Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that defendant's breach of his professional duty was a substantial factor in -- and thus a proximate cause of -- plaintiff's harm. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff Brenda Gilbert has been employed by the State in the Passaic probation department since 1994. She began as a Probation Investigator and was promoted to Probation Officer, Senior Probation Officer, and, finally, Supervisor.
During her tenure with the Judiciary, beginning as early as September 2003, plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the workplace policies and procedures manual. The manual includes a "Policy and Procedure for Reporting Involvement in Criminal/Quasi-Criminal Matters." That policy provides, in relevant part, that:
The policy's stated purpose is to ensure that Judiciary employees fulfill their "obligation to maintain a high degree of integrity and to avoid any actual, potential or appearance of partiality or conflict of interest in the adjudication or handling of all cases." The policy notes that failure to adhere "may result in actions such as discipline, up to and including termination of employment, or removal from service."
Prior to the events giving rise to this appeal, plaintiff had reported matters in accordance with the policy on at least two occasions: in the 2010s, plaintiff informed her supervisor that her adult son and daughter were involved in separate child support matters.
In 2006, plaintiff divorced her husband, Monroe Gilbert. As a part of their separation agreement, Monroe2 acquired sole possession of the family's Ford Explorer, which at the time was titled and insured in plaintiff's name. Per the agreement, Monroe was to transfer both title and insurance to his name, but he never did.
Between 2006 and 2014, Monroe was issued many tickets while using the car, which was still registered in plaintiff's name. Though the tickets were mailed to plaintiff's address, she never learned of them because Monroe retained keys to her house and removed all mail related to the traffic tickets from her mailbox.
In April 2014, Monroe called plaintiff and informed her that he had to report to the WPMC regarding his outstanding traffic tickets. Woodland Park is within the Passaic Vicinage. Monroe told plaintiff that the court summonses were issued in her name due to his failure to transfer title on the car, and he asked her to accompany him to the court appearance. Plaintiff agreed, and on April 15, 2014, she met Monroe and his attorney, defendant Kenyatta Stewart, at WPMC.
On that date, the municipal court judge asked plaintiff whether she was aware of the violations against her; plaintiff responded that she was not, and the matter was adjourned to May 6, 2014. In the interim, plaintiff, defendant, and Monroe discussed the best way to resolve the outstanding summonses. Plaintiff did not retain defendant as her attorney or request that he represent her; nor did defendant bill plaintiff or enter into a fee agreement with her. Nevertheless, he indicated to plaintiff that the optimal resolution would be for her to plead guilty to the charges because Monroe was at greater risk of license suspension due to his poor driving record, whereas plaintiff would likely only be subjected to a fine. Plaintiff later testified that she reluctantly agreed to plead guilty and accept a fine because she wanted "to get this over with" and "move forward with [her] life."
The parties dispute the extent to which defendant advised plaintiff of certain risks associated with the plea agreement. Plaintiff contends that defendant never warned her that she might have to perform community service as a result of her guilty plea. She testified that she did not know community service would be part of the plea...
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