Gilbert v. TrueAccord Corp.
| Decision Date | 23 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 21-cv-485 |
| Citation | 608 F.Supp.3d 656 |
| Parties | Tamika GILBERT, Plaintiff, v. TRUEACCORD CORP., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Paul Camarena, North & Sedgwick L.L.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Nicole Marie Strickler, Luke Chamberlain, Messer Strickler Burnette, Ltd., Barrington, IL, for Defendant.
After she received dunning emails, plaintiff Tamika Gilbert ("Gilbert") filed against defendant TrueAccord Corp. ("TrueAccord") a complaint alleging that the dunning emails violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grants defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.1
At some point, plaintiff incurred a debt (to Capital One Bank (USA) N.A.) that was, at another point, purchased by Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC. Plaintiff had used her Capital One credit account to purchase food and clothes. In January 2021, defendant, who regularly attempts to collect (directly or indirectly) debts asserted to be owed another, began attempting to collect on the debt.
On January 10, 2021, defendant emailed plaintiff. The email stated, among other things, that it was "an attempt to collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for that purpose." The email listed the creditor as Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC, stated that the amount owed was $2,528.70 and stated that the debt had originally been owed to Capital One. The email also stated:
The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC cannot sue you for it. Please note that making a payment on a time-barred debt has the potential to restart the statute of limitations for suit on the debt. However, it is the policy of Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC (a) never to file suit on a debt after the original statute of limitations has expired and (b) never to sell such a debt. The foregoing is a statement of our current practices. Should we ever change our practice not to sell time-barred debts we will require any purchaser to agree to follow our practice of not filing suit on such debts. Because of the age of your debt, Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC cannot report it to any credit reporting agency.
(January 10, 2021 email/Docket 28 at 13).
On January 19, 2021, defendant sent to plaintiff an email about a different debt, which was apparently owned by Orion Portfolio Services II, LLC. On January 21, 2021, plaintiff's attorney forwarded the January 19 email back to defendant, stating, (January 21, 2021 email/Docket 28 at 15).
Three days later, on January 24, 2021, defendant sent another email to plaintiff. This one stated, in relevant part:
(January 24, 2021 email/Docket 28 at 14). Later that evening, plaintiff's attorney forwarded the January 24, 2021 email back to defendant, stating:
(Second Atty. Email/Docket 26-2 at 8).
In plaintiff's complaint, she alleged she had been injured in two respects: (1) she had refrained from making purchases; and (2) the communications from defendant had wasted her time. Plaintiff testified at her deposition about her alleged injuries. She was asked the following questions and gave the following answers:
(Plf. Dep. at 30-31/Docket 37-3 at 2). Plaintiff also testified:
(Plf. Dep. at 38/Docket 33 at 11).
(Plf. Dep. 48-49/Docket 33 at 12-13).
Plaintiff also testified at her deposition that she thought TrueAccord might sue her. Specifically, plaintiff was asked the following question and gave the following answer:
(Plf. Dep. at 54/Docket 33 at 10).
In connection with the motions for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted an affidavit stating, among other things:
(Docket 33 at 14).2
Plaintiff filed suit, asserting two claims. In Count I, plaintiff asserted a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, which prohibits false, deceptive or misleading claims. Plaintiff alleged defendant "violated Section 1692e by urging Ms. Gilbert to pay Defendant True Accord for a debt without disclosing that Defendant TrueAccord could not sue or report that debt." (Complt. ¶ 13). In Count II, plaintiff asserted a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(6), alleging defendant continued "to communicate with Ms. Gilbert even after the Defendant knew she was represented by counsel." (Complt. ¶ 16). The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Hutchison v. Fitzgerald Equip. Co., Inc. , 910 F.3d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "A genuine issue of material fact arises only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists to permit a jury to return a verdict for that party." Brummett v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. , 414 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2005).
Defendant argues that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her claims. Issues of standing are jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Wadsworth v. Kross, Lieberman & Stone, Inc. , 12 F.4th 665, 667 (7th Cir. 2021).
The Constitution limits this Court's jurisdiction to "[c]ases"...
To continue reading
Request your trial