Gilbert v. U.S. Taekwondo, Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-cv-00981-CMA-MEH |
| Parties | HEIDI GILBERT, AMBER MEANS, MANDY MELOON, GABRIELA JOSLIN, and KAY POE, Plaintiffs, v. USA TAEKWONDO, INC., and STEVEN LOPEZ, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiffs assert twelve claims1 against the remaining Defendants in this matter, U.S.A. Taekwondo, Inc. ("USAT") and Steven Lopez. See Third Amended Complaint, ECF 293 ("TAC"). Defendant Steven Lopez has filed an Answer to the TAC, ECF 297, but USAT filed the present Motion to Dismiss, ECF 294 ("Motion"), seeking to dismiss all claims against USAT. As set forth below, I respectfully recommend that USAT's Motion be granted in part and denied in part.
The factual background of this dispute has been thoroughly recited in both my previous Recommendation, ECF 218, and in the Honorable Christine M. Arguello's Order, ECF 266. Those recitations are incorporated herein by reference. As such, only those facts necessary to address the current Motion will be reiterated here.
Plaintiffs in this lawsuit are female taekwondo athletes who sought to compete for Team USA. Plaintiffs allege that during the time they participated and competed in the USAT system, they were sexually abused, assaulted, and raped by the Steven and Jean Lopez. Defendant Steven Lopez is a three-time Olympic taekwondo medalist for the United States. Defendant USAT is the national governing body for the sport of taekwondo, recognized and regulated by the United States Olympic Committee pursuant to 36 U.S.C. § 220505(c)(4).
This lawsuit commenced with the filing of the Complaint on April 25, 2018. Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, ECF 6, as a matter of course on May 4, 2018. USAT filed a motion to dismiss, ECF 50, on July 31, 2018. By agreement of all the parties at the time, on August 24, 2018, Plaintiffs amended their complaint again with the filing of their Second Amended Complaint, ECF 68 ("SAC"). The SAC asserted twenty-one causes of action which can be broadly categorized into (1) federal Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA") claims, (2) a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") claim, and (3) claims arising under state common law for negligence. USAT filed a second motion to dismiss, ECF 109, on September 24, 2018, and briefing was completed on November 15, 2018. I issued a Recommendation, ECF 218, on March 6, 2019, which was adopted in part and rejected in part in an Order, ECF 266 ("Order"), by Judge Arguello on September 27, 2019. Judge Arguello dismissed one federal claim (against an entity no longer in this case), the RICO claim, and all ofthe claims arising under state common law. However, the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice so as to allow the Plaintiffs to refile those claims.
With the SAC having been dismissed without prejudice, Plaintiffs proceeded to file the operative TAC, ECF 293. The TAC contains 874 numbered allegations against both Steven Lopez and USAT. Of the twelve claims in the TAC, only eight are alleged against USAT. Of these eight claims, four involve allegations of USAT's violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1589(b), 1590(a), 1590(b), 1591(d), 1595(a), and 2255 of the TVPRA (Claims 2, 3, 5, and 8) and four concern state law negligence claims (Claims 9, 10, 11, and 12). USAT filed the current Motion, ECF 294, in response to the TAC, seeking to have all claims against it dismissed. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the Motion, ECF 296, and USAT filed a reply in support of its Motion, ECF 298. It is important to note from the outset that the allegations contained in the TAC with regard to the federal TVPRA claims are substantively unchanged from the SAC. The substantive changes made from the SAC to the TAC concern the state law negligence claims.
As alleged in the SAC and TAC, the heart of this matter concerns Plaintiffs' allegations that Steven Lopez (and his brother Jean Lopez) perpetrated coerced sexual conduct and sexual assault. Plaintiffs allege that USAT knew (or should have known) about the Lopez brothers' conduct, and yet continued to support the brothers to the detriment of other taekwondo competitors, like Plaintiffs, who allegedly suffered abuse. In particular, the TAC alleges that USAT financially benefited from ignoring the Lopez brothers' conduct so that the Lopez brothers could continue to travel and compete, all while committing abuses on other U.S. taekwondo competitors.
A recitation of all of the allegations from the 179-page TAC would not be in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, especially since they have been recited twice now and themajority of the allegations remain unchanged. Where any fact becomes relevant to the resolution of the Motion, I will discuss it at the appropriate time. However, in all instances, Plaintiffs' factual allegations are taken as true for analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. For the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 2008). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility, in the context of a motion to dismiss, means that the plaintiff pled facts which allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Twombly requires a two-prong analysis. First, a court must identify "the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth," that is, those allegations which are legal conclusions, bare assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at 680. Second, the Court must consider the factual allegations "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 681. If the allegations state a plausible claim for relief, such claim survives the motion to dismiss. Id. at 679.
Plausibility refers "'to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs 'have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)). "The nature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on context." Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2011). Thus, while the Rule 12(b)(6) standard does not require that a plaintiff establish a prima facie case in a complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action may help to determine whether the plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim. Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192. However, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint must provide "more than labels and conclusions" or merely "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," so that "courts 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint has made an allegation, "but it has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
As mentioned above, Plaintiffs' TAC asserts eight claims against USAT. These claims fall into two broad categories: (I) federal TVPRA claims and (II) state law negligence claims. USAT argues each claim should be dismissed. See Motion, ECF 294. For the reasons set forth herein, I respectfully recommend the federal claims be allowed to proceed, but the state law negligence claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Four of Plaintiffs' claims against USAT are alleged violations of federal sex trafficking laws. When USAT challenged the SAC, it argued that the federal claims failed based on the statute of limitations. Now, USAT raises additional challenges to the federal claims. USAT argues thatPlaintiffs' TAC fails for five main reasons: there is no "aiding and abetting" under Section 1595; Plaintiffs have not adequately pled a "knowing benefit" sufficient to sustain a claim under Section 1595(a); Plaintiffs have failed to allege timely and specific acts of transportation necessary for a Section 1590(a) claim; Plaintiffs have not alleged obstruction of a governmental investigation as required for a claim under Section 1590(b); and because Plaintiffs will not be pursuing a Section 1595(a) claim against Steven Lopez, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a proper "venture" by which to hold USAT liable. I address each of these arguments below.
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs and USAT dispute whether USAT is even able to raise new 12(b)(6) arguments in relation to the federal claims at this juncture. Plaintiffs argue that Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2) prohibits successive motions under Rule 12, that USAT should have raised these arguments in its motion to dismiss the SAC which contained nearly identical allegations with regard to the federal claims, and in not doing so, USAT has waived the right to make the arguments now....
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