Gilchrist v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 111,111
• Citation: 667 A.2d 876,340 Md. 606
• Parties: Gary GILCHRIST v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 606

340 Md. 606

667 A.2d 876

Gary GILCHRIST v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 111, Sept. Term, 1993.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 28, 1995.

Nancy M. Cohen, Assistant Public Defender, (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for Petitioner

David R. Durfee, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, both on brief), Baltimore, for Respondent.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

The principal issue in this criminal case is whether the holding by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), applies to peremptory challenges aimed at excluding white prospective jurors from the venire based on their race.

I.

Gary Gilchrist was charged with distribution of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On August 3, 1992, he was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

Jury selection at Gilchrist's trial was done in accordance with the following procedure. The trial judge conducted voir dire of the prospective jurors. After the roll of prospective jurors was called, voir dire commenced, the attorneys made their challenges for cause to the trial judge, and the stricken jurors were dismissed. The clerk then called off the names and numbers of the remaining prospective jurors one at a time, proceeding down the jury list from the top. Both sides exercised their peremptory challenges to each prospective juror immediately after his or her name was called. If a prospective juror was not challenged, that person was seated in the jury box until twelve jurors were seated. Once twelve jurors were seated in the box, the court then offered the parties a second opportunity to exercise peremptory challenges against the jurors who were already seated. If any jurors were then struck by the parties' attorneys, the process would begin again with the clerk calling off the name of the next prospective juror on the list. Jury selection continued in this fashion until twelve unchallenged jurors were ultimately seated.

Prior to the jury box becoming filled the first time, the State and the defense had each exercised one peremptory challenge. Once twelve jurors were seated, the defendant's attorney then exercised a peremptory challenge against one of the seated jurors, resulting in that juror's dismissal. The "ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY: I don't know the name of the case, but it is the case that came down after [Batson ] which indicates that there are--there is no right to any racially motivated strikes. And every strike so far exercised by the defense counsel has been of white jurors.

                clerk then called off the next prospective juror on the list.  This process continued, with the box continually filling and the defense exercising peremptories, directed either at a seated juror or at the next prospective juror on the jury list, until defense counsel had exercised seven peremptory challenges.  All of the prospective jurors struck by the defense counsel to this point had been white.  After the seventh prospective juror was challenged by defense counsel, the State raised an objection, arguing that the defense was attempting to remove all white prospective jurors from the jury in violation of the principles set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, supra.   The prosecuting attorney stated
                

"Some of those jurors have not answered questions so it cannot be based on the fact that they gave answers that would indicate--

"THE COURT: Which juror are you questioning or do you want to go through a reason for each one of them?

"ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY: For each one.

"THE COURT: All right. That's seven jurors you've struck. They were all white. Let's go through them one by one and give me the reasons you struck them."

The court found the defendant's reasons for striking three of the jurors to be acceptable. ¹ With respect to the remaining jurors, the following colloquy ensued:

Juror 3

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I personally, by looking at her--I see jurors in the box and I look at the way they relate to each other.

"THE COURT: Well, how did she look?

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: [S]he reminded me of my Catholic School teacher that I didn't particularly like.... Her look ... at the other people who were in the [jury] box.

"THE COURT: That's not a satisfactory explanation."

Juror 5

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, he was young. I didn't think particularly he would be a strong juror for my case by looking at him.

"THE COURT: And why was that?

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Because I look at the way he fits into the persons that are on the panel. And what I'm trying to accomplish from the look of him, from the way he sat--

"THE COURT: Well, how did he look from the way he was sitting that made you feel he was not good, other than the fact he was white and young?

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, he--number one, most of the jurors would look at my client and look over at the table. He was just like sitting there not relating to anything in the room.

"THE COURT: Because he wasn't relating to your client?

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Not relating to anything or anyone in the room. Frankly, I don't think [he] even wanted to be here.

"THE COURT: I don't think that's a satisfactory explanation either."

Juror 137

"THE COURT: Why?

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Oh why? He was--I don't have anything written on here.

"THE COURT: Let the record reflect he was a young white male in a navy blazer and khaki slacks.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: I believe he was--I remember him, Judge, and ... we say he was unacceptable.

"THE COURT: And [why] was that?

* * * * * *

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: His clothing, his manner.

"THE COURT: What was wrong with his clothing and his manner?

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, his manner and his clothing suggest to me ... that he wouldn't be able to relate to my client because in this particular case there are--there is the police officer's word against my client's word. My client may very well testify. And because of those things--

"THE COURT: Well, how do his clothing have anything to do with it? I don't make the connection.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: The clothing, Judge, means when you go to Brooks Brothers and buy a suit, and maybe not the suit--

"THE COURT: The people who go to Brooks Brothers are more likely to believe police than defendants; is that what you're saying?

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Not necessarily so. But given the little information I have about them, I must make judgments about these individuals.

"THE COURT: Well, what--well, all right. That's right. So what information did you have ... that required you to strike him?

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: ... [H]e's a student. We don't know what he's studying--

"THE COURT: Well, we could have asked him.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, some courts don't let you bring them up and ask them.

"THE COURT: But you didn't ask.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: He seems rather studious.

"THE COURT: Well, so what if he's studious? He's 21 years old.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right. He has 16 years of education.

"THE COURT: Right.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: That means he's done his college.

"THE COURT: Right.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: ... But for those reasons, Judge,--

"THE COURT: That's an unacceptable reason.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Those are my reasons.

"THE COURT: I mean, that's no reason at all. You're just citing his biography and saying those are reasons.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have nothing else. Is the Court saying I can't strike him at all because--

"THE COURT: The Court is saying you have to, when you have struck seven jurors, potential jurors, ... and they are all white and they all have different profiles, you're going to have to come up with a satisfactory explanation that persuades me that your reason for striking him was not racial. I mean, that's what the case law is saying.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: I know, Judge. But I haven't said anything to you now that would suggest that the reasons were racial. Nothing.

"THE COURT: Well, I'm not quite sure.... When you say that someone comes in a navy blazer and khaki slacks, and because he's a student and because of his address that's a reason for striking him--

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: I said I don't know anything about his address because I don't know the address. But, Judge, that could have been a black man. Are we saying that black men don't wear blazers and khaki pants?

"THE COURT: All right. That's--I don't buy that as a satisfactory explanation.

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Very well."

With regard to the final juror struck, Juror Number 155, defense counsel was unable to recall her reasons for exercising "She [defense counsel] did give satisfactory reasons for [the two jurors] who are victims.

                the peremptory challenge.  The court found that "that's not a satisfactory reason at all."   In summation, the court said
                

"On the other hand, the other people she's struck, all of them are white, none of them have particular profiles. She hasn't seemed to come up with adequate answers."

The court excused the entire jury pool, including those members of the jury already chosen, and started jury selection anew with an entirely different pool of potential jurors. A second jury was chosen, and defense counsel answered affirmatively when the court asked if it was acceptable. The defendant was convicted of both charges by the second jury, and the court sentenced him to serve five years imprisonment for each conviction, the terms to run concurrently.

Gilchrist took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed. Gilchrist v. State, 97 Md.App. 55, 627 A.2d 44 (1993). His principal argument was that the Batson holding was inapplicable to peremptory challenges against white potential jurors. The defendant argued, alternatively, that even if Batson were applicable, the trial court erred in determining that the prosecution had made a prima facie showing of discrimination. The State both disagreed with the defendant's contentions and, alternatively, argued that...