Gilchrist v. State

• Decision Date: 18 December 1967
• Docket Number: No. 109,109
• Citation: 236 A.2d 299,2 Md.App. 635
• Parties: David L. GILCHRIST v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 635

2 Md.App. 635

236 A.2d 299

David L. GILCHRIST v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 109.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 18, 1967.

Howard L. Stern, Oxon Hill, for appellant.

Richard C. Ridgway, Asst. Atty. Gen., Rockville, Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., and James E. Kenkel, State's Atty., and Deputy State's Atty., for Prince George's County, respectively, Upper Marlboro, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.

MORTON, Judge.

The Appellant, David L. Gilchrist, after entering a plea of not guilty was convicted of armed robbery by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Judge Roscoe H. Parker presiding. He received an indeterminate sentence, not to exceed twelve (12) years, in the Maryland Correctional Institution for Males. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for a New Trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, which Motion, after a hearing thereon, was denied.

It appears from the record that in the early morning of October 26, 1966, a Seven-Eleven Store located on St. Barnabas Road in Oxon Hill, Prince George's County, was robbed by two individuals carrying pistols. Although Gilchrist was identified by an employee of the store and by a customer as one of the individuals participating in the robbery, he vigorously denies his participation therein, asserting that he was at home and in bed at the time of the robbery.

In this appeal, he contends that the trial judge erred in denying his Motion for a New Trial; and that it was prejudicial error to permit a witness to relate the substance of a conversation which he allegedly had with the Appellant some seven (7) months prior to the date of the crime.

With respect to the latter contention, the record indicates that John Brugman, a witness for the State, was permitted, over objection, to testify as follows concerning a conversation with the Appellant:

'We were talking about our financial problems and he (Gilchrist) told me that it would be very easy to solve them by robbing a McDonald's or the Hot Shoppes. The Hot Shoppes is a few blocks down the street. And I told him I wasn't interested. He told me it would be easy and we could get away with it and I said 'no I wouldn't be interested".

The trial judge admitted this testimony into evidence because, in his opinion, it showed a disposition on the part of the Appellant to commit the crime of robbery.

It is true that evidence of a plan, design or scheme which has been put into execution is relevant to the issue of guilt or innocence and, therefore, is admissible if it tends, by reasonable inference, to establish the commission of the crime charged. Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Vol. 1, § 179, p. 354; Underhill, Criminal Evidence, Vol. 1, § 212, p. 502. However, evidence which simply indicates a disposition on the part of the accused to commit a crime is ordinarily excluded as irrelevant and untrustworthy since it tends to deflect the mind of the trier of facts from the single issue of guilt or innocence of the particular crime under consideration. For example, convictions of prior crimes are ordinarily excluded, ¹ because 'the jury may be mislead into a conviction for an offense for which the defendant is not indicted or that he may be prejudiced by accumulation of offenses which he is not prepared to defend.' Wharton, supra, Vol. 1, p. 170. See also Wentz v. State, 159 Md. 161, at 165, 150 A. 278; Young v. State, 152 Md. 89, 136 A. 46.

Judge Delaplaine in Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410, stated the rule as follows (p. 414, 20 A.2d 146, p. 148):

'To come within the exception to the rule that evidence of previous offenses is irrelevant, there must appear between the previous offense and that with which the defendant is charged some real connection other than...