Gile v. United Airlines, Inc.
| Citation | 95 F.3d 492 |
| Decision Date | 21 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-3432,95-3432 |
| Parties | , 5 A.D. Cases 1466, 8 NDLR P 322 Cheryl A. GILE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Stephen G. Katz (argued), Katz & Buhai, Barrington, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Roger L. Taylor, Elli Leibenstein (argued), Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.
Cheryl Gile sued United Airlines, Inc., alleging that United discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act when it failed to reassign her to a position on the day or afternoon shift after her disability made her unable to work on the night shift. In discovery, Gile requested documents pertaining to all United job vacancies in the Chicago metropolitan area. The district court limited her request to vacancies for the same position in the department where she had worked and to positions to which she had previously requested transfer. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of United on the ground that United could not possibly have reasonably accommodated Gile because Gile could not show that there was a suitable vacant position to which United could have transferred her. Gile appeals the discovery order and the grant of summary judgment. Because we find that the district judge imposed an overly narrow restriction on the scope of Gile's document request, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further discovery.
In March 1984, United hired Gile as a data-entry operator in its Air Freight Department at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago. Over the years, United transferred Gile several times between the day and night data-entry shifts. In January 1989, she was transferred to the night shift for the last time.
Gile experienced multiple problems while assigned to the night shift, including daytime insomnia, fatigue, and falling asleep in her car on her way to and from work. Gile's problems progressed until some point in 1992 when they blossomed into depression. She began seeing a licensed social worker in May 1992, and the social worker diagnosed Gile as suffering from a "depressive reaction in anxiety state exacerbated with sleep disorder." 1 The social worker told Gile that her assignment to the night shift was aggravating her mental condition.
Gile informed United of her disability for the first time on August 28, 1992. The next day Gile requested and received a medical leave of absence. On September 29, 1992, the social worker faxed a letter to United explaining her opinion that Gile's depression was related to working the night shift and requesting that United consider changing Gile's shift. While on medical leave, Gile was examined by United's in-house flight surgeon, Dr. McGuffin. Gile told Dr. McGuffin during her second visit that she wanted to return to work, but that she could not work the night shift. In addition, she said, Gile was subsequently placed on an unpaid authorized leave. She returned to work at United as a data-entry operator on the afternoon shift in April 1994, and she remains employed with United.
On March 18, 1994, Gile filed a complaint against United alleging that United discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., when it failed to reasonably accommodate her after she informed United of her depression and her inability to work the night shift. As part of her discovery, Gile served United with a request for the production of documents under FED. R. CIV. P. 34. Among other things, Gile requested:
7. Any and all vacancy notices, newspaper advertisements, and similar documents used to advertise and/or post vacant positions within the Defendant's Metropolitan Chicago area facilities since September 1, 1992.
8. Any and all position descriptions or other documents which set forth the duties, functions, and responsibilities of any vacant positions which were open and/or filled by the Defendant in its Chicago Metropolitan area facilities since September 1, 1992.
United objected to these two requests and responded by producing documents relating only to vacancies in dataentry positions in the Cargo Services Department (of which there were none on the day or afternoon shifts), as well as documents relating to vacancies in three positions to which Gile had previously requested transfer.
Gile filed a motion to compel production of the requested documents under FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). Gile did not attempt to narrow the breadth of her document request. Instead, she argued that all of the documents she requested were potentially relevant because the issue as to whether United could have accommodated her disability by transferring her to a vacant position would likely arise during the lawsuit. She explained, "The Plaintiff will be precluded from rebutting any contentions made by the Defendant that no vacancy existed for which Plaintiff could be transferred as a reasonable accommodation if Defendant is allowed to withhold the aforementioned information."
United responded that it was not required to produce all of the documents requested because they exceeded the scope of information discoverable under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). United argued that it was only required to produce documents specifically relating to data-entry positions in the Cargo Services Department and that it voluntarily provided the information regarding the positions to which Gile had previously requested transfer. United argued that Gile was not entitled to discovery regarding any other positions because she may not have been qualified for those positions, she may not have accepted an offer to transfer to one of those positions, and some of those positions were on the night shift. In passing, United noted that Gile's request was amazingly broad, so much so that it even included information regarding United's position of chief executive officer. At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to compel, the district court stated: "I'm not compelling anything beyond what they voluntarily produced essentially for the reasons they stated in their response."
United subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no genuine issue concerning whether United could have accommodated Gile's disability because no vacancies existed to which United could have transferred her. Gile responded that United could have either (1) bumped another employee from the day shift to accommodate her, (2) placed her on the day shift without bumping another employee, or (3) assigned her to a different, day-shift position. Gile also argued that United had previously accommodated other disabled employees by bumping nondisabled employees.
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue as to the fact that United could not reasonably have accommodated Gile's disability. The district court found that "bumping" another employee is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. The district court also recognized that although an employer may reasonably accommodate an employee by transferring the employee to a vacant position, Gile had offered no proof that there was a vacant position to which she could have been transferred. Finally, the district court disregarded Gile's arguments regarding prior accommodations of other employees because her evidence was in the form of inadmissible hearsay.
Gile appeals both the denial of her motion to compel discovery and the grant of United's motion for summary judgment.
A district court is in the best position to decide the proper scope of discovery and to settle any discovery disputes. For that reason, we review a district court's discovery determinations for an abuse of discretion. Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir.1995); Jurcev v. Central Community Hosp., 7 F.3d 618, 627 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1830, 128 L.Ed.2d 459 (1994). We will not find that a district court abused its discretion unless one or more of the following circumstances is present: (1) the record contains no evidence upon which the court could have rationally based its decision; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the decision is based on clearly erroneous factual findings; or (4) the decision clearly appears arbitrary. Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 998 F.2d 975, 977 (Fed.Cir.1993). In addition to according substantial deference to the district court's discovery decisions, we will not reverse a decision to limit discovery "absent a clear showing that the denial of discovery resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant." Searls, 64 F.3d at 1068.
Rule 34 provides that a party may request, among other things, the production of documents that "constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)" and are in the custody or control of another party. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). Rule 26(b) prescribes the scope of matters upon which a party may seek discovery: FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
The party from whom the documents are requested must provide the documents or state a specific objection. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b). Where the party from whom the documents are requested objects to the request, the party seeking the request may move for an order to compel...
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