Giles Toro v. University of Puerto Rico

Citation183 F.Supp.2d 457
Decision Date28 December 2001
Docket NumberNo. CIV.97-2934 DRD.,CIV.97-2934 DRD.
PartiesRichard K. GILES TORO, Plaintiff, v. The UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO, et al, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Harry R. Segarra-Arroyo, Evelyn Quinones, Ponce, PR, for plaintiff.

Gustavo A. Gelpi, Elfrick Mendez-Morales, Hato Rey, PR, for Angel Rodriguez-Trinidad, defendant.

Humberto Guzman-Rodriguez, Martinez Odell & Calabria, San Juan, PR, Diana M. Battle, Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, for Analytical Genetic Testing Services, Inc., defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is whether or not subject matter jurisdiction exists to entertain this case. The Court has issued an Order for Plaintiffs to Show Cause as to why the Court should retain subject matter jurisdiction and not dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Docket No. 75). In the Order, the Court invoked the Rooker-Feldman doctrine asserting that "the Court strongly believes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because this controversy was fully adjudicated by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's courts. . . . [T]he Court is strongly convinced . . . [the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel] apply to this case barring Plaintiffs from re-litigating issues that were adversely decided by the state Superior Court." Id. Analytical Genetic Testing Center ("Analytical") also requested a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (Docket No. 92). Plaintiff objected to Analytical's motion asserting that his claim was for a violation of his constitutionally protected right to due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and furthermore, he was not trying to relitigate or have a State court decision re-evaluated. (Docket No. 100).

I FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is undisputed and is taken from Plaintiff's Complaint (Docket No. 1) and a judgment rendered by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico (Docket No. 59, English translation). This case derives from a paternity and child filiation suit brought before the Superior Court of Puerto Rico by Mrs. Luz Neyda Pagan ("Pagan"), representing her minor daughter, Richanell Kerty Giles, for the purpose of determining whether Dr. Giles Toro was the child's biological father. At Pagan's request, the Superior Court ordered Pagan, her daughter and Dr. Giles Toro to submit to DNA tests. The Court ordered the test to be performed by the University of Puerto Rico ("UPR") Histocompatability Laboratory pursuant to Art. V, sec. 1 of Regulation No. 83 of the Puerto Rico Department of Health. The Court rejected Dr. Giles Toro's initial objection to both the type and cost of the test. Consequently, all parties had their blood drawn at the UPR facilities. The UPR Histocompatibility Laboratory then contracted the testing to Analytical Genetic Testing Center, Inc. ("Analytical") in Denver, Colorado.

Thereafter, Analytical remitted the results to Dr. Angel Rodriguez Trinidad ("Dr.Rodriguez"), in his capacity as Director of the UPR Histocompatibility Laboratory. Dr. Rodriguez then reported the test results to the Court and indicated that the administering laboratory was Analytical. Along with the test results Dr. Rodriguez submitted a memorandum to the Court stating that ". . . testing of the alleged father indicates that he is approximately 9,000 times as likely to be the biological father as an unrelated Puerto Rican male." (Emphasis ours).

Once the test results were submitted to the Court, Dr.Giles Toro requested that they be suppressed, alleging that the results would cause him grave prejudice; the Court refused said request. Nonetheless, Dr. Giles Toro appealed in certiorari on October 21, 1996, before the Circuit Court of Appeals. In an Opinion entered on November 6, 1996, the Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari and left as scheduled the hearing set for November 13, 1996. On November 12, 1996, a day before the hearing, Dr. Giles Toro once again filed a petition for certiorari and a Motion in Aid of Jurisdiction before the Circuit Court of Appeals. Again these requests were denied.

At Superior Court trial, Dr. Giles Toro contracted an expert witness to testify that he was infertile. The Superior Court, however, refused to grant the expert's testimony any credibility.1 Dr. Rodriguez who had been subpoenaed by the Court to bring with him the complete record of the case, and/or the chemist who had performed the blood testing, failed to comply with the Court's order. Despite his position as Director of the UPR's Histocompatibility Laboratory, Dr. Rodriguez took the stand and testified as an expert witness on Dr. Giles Toro's behalf. Dr. Rodriguez refuted the test's credibility because only two personal characteristics were analyzed, whereas it should have been four. Furthermore, Dr. Rodriguez testified that he lacked evidence that the blood sample from Dr. Giles Toro was compared to the samples of other Puerto Rican males, thereby contradicting the memorandum he personally submitted to the Court. Dr. Rodriguez further discredited his testimony by admitting that he was receiving compensation for his testimony; in fact, he received a check from Dr. Giles Toro while in the very courtroom. Throughout his testimony, the local Court judge seriously questioned Dr. Rodriguez' ethical conduct, as he was undermining his own government run work product. Despite the Court's admonishments and warnings that he was in violation of the Government's Code of Ethics, Dr. Rodriguez continued his subverting testimony. Consequently, the Superior Court disqualified Dr. Rodriguez for being in violation of the Government's Code of Ethics and also stated for the record that his testimony lacked credibility.

Despite Dr. Rodriguez' testimony the Court admitted Analytical's test results into evidence. The DNA test results showed 99.989% of paternity probability, furthermore, excluded 99.942% of Puerto Rican males. Additionally, all parties involved, Pagan, Dr. Giles Toro and Richanell Pagan all have O+ blood type. The Court determined paternity due to "the circumstances of the relations between parties, their genetic characteristics, . . ., the D.N.A. test and the blood type testing." Finally, the Superior Court held that "[b]y virtue of the above stated facts and conclusions of law, the Court GRANTS the filiation complaint and in consequence determines that Richanell Kerty Pagan is the daughter of Richard K. Giles Toro. . . ."

II

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE provide that a defendant may, in response to an initial pleading, file a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, respectively. It is well-settled, however, that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond any doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which may support a claim entitling him or her to relief. Ronald C. Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir.1995); see also Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1991); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The Court must accept as true the well pleaded factual averments contained in the complaint, while at the same time drawing all reasonable inferences from the allegations in favor of the plaintiff. See Doyle v Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190 (1st Cir. 1996); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1st Cir.1994); Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Beléndez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990); Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989). However, "[b]ecause only well pleaded facts are taken as true, we will not accept a complainant's unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law." Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993).

Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the facts alleged, taken as true, do not justify recovery. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp. 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988). Although all inferences must be made in Plaintiff's favor, the Court need not accept "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like." Aulson, supra, at 3.

Moreover, when considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) the Court must limit its focus to the allegations of the complaint. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Colon, 587 F.2d 70, 74 (1st Cir.1978). Specifically, the inquiry should be "whether a liberal reading of [the complaint] can reasonably admit of a claim...." Id.; see also Doyle, supra, at 190.

In Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75 (1st Cir.1999), the Court held that a dismissal for failure to state a claim can only be upheld if, after giving credence to all well pleaded facts and making all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the factual averments do not justify recovery on some theory asserted in the complaint. With this standard in mind, we move to the analysis of the pending dispositive motions.

III ANALYSIS

Plaintiff was ordered to show cause as to why this suit should not be dismissed pursuant to the doctrines of Rooker-Feldman, res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. The "records and judicial proceedings" of any state, territory, or possession of the United States "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court" within the United States. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738. This provision applies to the judgments from Puerto Rico's local courts. Baez-Cruz v. Municipality of Comerio, 140 F.3d 24, 28 n. 1 (1st Cir.1998). Thus, this Court must provide a Puerto...

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