Giles v. Carlin

• Decision Date: 13 August 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 84CV3398DT.
• Citation: 641 F. Supp. 629
• Parties: Phillip H. GILES, Plaintiff, v. Paul N. CARLIN, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

641 F. Supp. 629

Phillip H. GILES, Plaintiff, v. Paul N. CARLIN, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service, Defendant.

Civ. No. 84CV3398DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

August 13, 1986.

Morley Witus, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.

Patricia G. Blake, Asst. U.S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PHILIP PRATT, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Phillip H. Giles brought this action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 42, United States Code § 2000e-16, et seq., claiming that he was terminated from his job because of unlawful discriminatory employment practices by the defendant United States Postal Service. Before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Defendant's motion will be construed as one for summary judgment since all relevant affidavits, exhibits and documents will be considered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Wright v. Holbrook, 794 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir., 1986).

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The rules do not require that the movant support its motion with affidavit testimony. Rule 56(a) states that a party may move for summary judgment "with or without supporting affidavits." The Supreme Court has recently held that "we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Id. (emphasis in original).

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment is required by Rule 56(e) to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," and it is well settled that he "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), citing First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be a genuine issue of material fact. Emphasis in original.

Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

However, the trial court ought proceed with caution in granting summary judgment, and may deny summary judgment where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2514. The authority of the court to take a case away from the jury is limited, with all doubts to be resolved in the non-movant's favor.

Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.

Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

I. FACTS

On January 28, 1982, the plaintiff, a black Postal Service employee, was allegedly observed by U.S. Postal Inspectors to be stealing jewelry from the U.S. Mails. On February 8, 1982, he was was fired from his job as a distribution clerk at the Detroit Bulk Mail Center effective February 18, 1982. In addition to his firing, the plaintiff was formally charged with the violation of a federal criminal statute prohibiting theft from the United States Mail, 18 U.S.C. § 1709. Plaintiff, represented by an attorney, agreed to one year of court supervision in lieu of a plea and trial on April 29, 1982.

Subsequently, plaintiff sought to challenge the factual basis of his discharge by filing a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement. The grievance was heard by an arbitrator on July 8, 1982. In October or November, 1982, while awaiting a decision on his grievance, the plaintiff learned that he was a potential victim of race discrimination. Specifically, he discovered that a similarly situated white co-worker was merely suspended, rather than fired, for "basically the same misconduct" that plaintiff had been charged with.

Shortly after learning of the Postal Service's allegedly discriminatory disciplinary practices, plaintiff claims to have contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor, Mrs. Johnetta Lamb.¹ When the plaintiff told her that he was already seeking reinstatement through grievance arbitration, Lamb allegedly suggested that the plaintiff await the outcome of the pending arbitration prior to filing an EEOC complaint.² The arbitrator's decision affirming plaintiff's dismissal was rendered on February 11, 1983.

On March 3, 1983, plaintiff again contacted his EEO counselor and initiated an administrative complaint claiming that he had been discharged because of his race. Plaintiff's formal administrative complaint was filed on March 24, 1983. On June 23, 1983, the Postal Service issued a decision rejecting plaintiff's administrative complaint as untimely. The ground for rejection was that plaintiff had failed to initiate an administrative grievance within 30 days of the alleged discriminatory action as required by the applicable EEO regulation. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i). Furthermore, the Postal Service, citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), held that plaintiff's appeal of his firing through the grievance-arbitration provisions of the labor agreement did not toll the running of the thirty (30) day period for purposes of his discrimination complaint.

Plaintiff then appealed the rejection of his administrative complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Office of Review and Appeals. On June 18, 1984, the EEOC issued its decision affirming the Postal Service's rejection of plaintiff's administrative complaint as untimely. A timely appeal to this Court followed.

On appeal, plaintiff concedes the untimeliness of his administrative complaint. Nevertheless, he asserts that his untimely filing should be excused for two reasons. First, plaintiff contends that his late filing should be excused because he was not aware of nor informed of the appropriate limitations period set forth in the EEO regulations. Second, plaintiff argues that he did not learn of the factual basis for his complaint until October or November, 1982, and that thereafter, the EEO counselor suggested that he await the outcome of his then-pending grievance arbitration before lodging an administrative complaint. Since the plaintiff filed his complaint within 30 days of the arbitrator's decision, he claims that it was timely and that the Government is equitably estopped from relying on a technical application of the 30-day filing requirement. The Government responds that the thirty (30) day filing requirement of 29 C.F.R.(a)(1)(i) is jurisdictional in nature and not subject to waiver or equitable tolling.

II. NATURE OF PROCEDURAL DEADLINES UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, et seq., provides employees with a remedy for illegal discriminatory hiring practices committed by federal employers. Section 2000e-16(a) prohibits discrimination in federal employee personnel actions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.³ Section 2000e-16(c) permits an employee to file suit in the district court for violations of § 2000e-16(a). Before an aggrieved claimant may pursue his claim in the courts, however, administrative remedies made available by his own agency must be exhausted. Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976); Johnson v. Orr, 747 F.2d 1352, 1357 (10th Cir.1984); Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143, 1144 (7th Cir.1984); Woodard v. Lehman, 717 F.2d 909, 914 (4th Cir.1983).⁴

As an integral part of the enforcement scheme, Congress directed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to formulate administrative regulations demarcating procedural channels for aggrieved claimants. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b). Regulations thereafter promulgated set forth specific time constraints on the filing of administrative complaints.⁵ The agency may accept a discrimination complaint only if:

The complainant brought to the attention of the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor the matter causing him to believe he had been discriminated against within 30 calendar days of the date of that matter, or, if a personnel action, within 30 calendar days of its effective date.

The complainant or his representative submitted his written complaint to an appropriate official within 15 calendar days of the date of his final interview with the Equal Opportunity Counselor.

29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i) & (ii) (1985).

Plaintiff does not contest the fact that he failed to bring his discrimination complaint to the EEO counselor within 30 days of the allegedly unlawful discriminatory action taken against...