Giles v. University of Toledo

Decision Date14 March 2007
Docket NumberNo. 3:04 CV 7643.,3:04 CV 7643.
Citation478 F.Supp.2d 942
PartiesSammie GILES, Jr., Ph.D., Plaintiff, v. The UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

Dennis D. Grant, Bailey Cavalieri, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.

Theodore M. Rowen, Cheryl F. Wolff, Spengler Nathanson, Toledo, OH, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ZOUHARY, District Judge.

This is an employment discrimination case in which Plaintiff alleges violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, Ohio Rev.Code § 4112 and Ohio common law. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 59),1 and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 76). Defendants' Motion is granted and Plaintiff's Motion is denied.

FACTS

Plaintiff, an African-American professor, was employed at the University of Toledo's College of Engineering from 1987 until March 2006. Plaintiff was granted tenure in Academic Year (AY) 1991-92. Defendant University of Toledo (University) is a state-supported university in Ohio. Individual Defendants are as follows: Daniel Johnson, University's former President; Alan Goodridge, former Provost; James Sciarini, current Vice President for Human Resources; and Ganapathy Naganathan, Dean of the College of Engineering.

In 1998, Plaintiff applied for an open position as the College of Engineering's Electrical Engineering Chair, but was denied the opportunity to interview because he was not a full professor. Plaintiff applied for the position of Department Head of the Electrical Engineering Department at Tuskegee University in Alabama (Tuskegee) in 2000, was offered the position and accepted. He requested an unpaid leave of absence from the University for "at least two calendar years — three years would be optimum" from Ron Fournier, Dean of the College of Engineering at the time (Def.Ex.A). Plaintiff requested this leave commence January 1, 2001, and asked for up to three years because Tuskegee was undergoing a review by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology, which is normally a three-year process (Giles Aff. ¶ 9). Fournier supported Plaintiffs request and forwarded it to the Provost (Fournier Aff. ¶ 8).

Dr. Earl Murry, the University's Vice Provost for Faculty Development, discussed the request with Plaintiff and Fournier (Murry Aff. ¶ 13). Murry believed Plaintiff's experience at Tuskegee "would assist both Dr. Giles in his professional development and, ultimately, the University of Toledo in making some progress under its Affirmative Action Plan" (Murry Aff. ¶ 13). Murry advised Plaintiff his leave was approved for up to three years, but that "he should submit annual paperwork so the University could do necessary budgeting of his now available salary" (Murry Aff. ¶ 15).

Murry's November 2000 confirmation letter to Plaintiff only approved one year, and advised that if a second year was necessary, Plaintiff should make "another request at that time and the matter will be decided administratively with respect to other considerations affecting the University" (Giles Dep. Ex. B). To explain the discrepancy between his written approval of one year and verbal approval of up to three years, Murry cited his difficulties at the time with the University's Faculty Senate (Murry Aff. ¶ 16). Murry feared a three-year approval would be seen by the faculty as racial favortism (Murry Aff. ¶ 15).

In December 2000, Murry confirmed with Plaintiffs attorney that his leave had been approved, effective January 1, 2001. In September 2001, Plaintiff submitted the paperwork for a second year of leave (Giles Dep. Ex. TTT). Plaintiff was again approved, effective January 1, 2002 (Giles Dep. Exs. D, E). In July 2002, Plaintiff submitted paperwork for a third year of leave.. Defendants Naganathan, Goodridge and Sciarini jointly denied Plaintiffs request in September 2002 because, pursuant to Section 14.3.1 of the 2000-03 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the University and the University of Toledo Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (UT-AAUP) (Giles Dep. Exs. P, Q), leaves of absence were limited to two years. Naganathan was aware of Murry's earlier oral approval of a three-year leave of absence, but this did not change the University's determination that the CBA prohibited the additional year (Murry Aff. ¶ 22; Giles Dep. Ex. P). Plaintiff was then informed of his teaching assignments for the semester beginning January 2003 (Giles Dep. Ex. WWW).

In October 2002, Tuskegee advised Plaintiff that Tuskegee was granting him tenure, and in December Plaintiff informed the University that he would not be returning (Giles Dep. 115). A few days later, Plaintiff gave Naganathan a letter offering three methods of separation from the University: retirement; an additional year of leave; or resignation (Giles Dep. 117-20; Giles Dep. Ex. LL1-4). Plaintiff stated, "I leave the matter in the hands of The University of Toledo" and "I would most prefer the new leave-of-absence route, and I absolutely least prefer the resignation route. A combination of leave of absence and retirement would also be acceptable to me" (Giles Dep. Ex. LL1).

The University believed it could not give three years of leave under the CBA and Plaintiff was not yet eligible for retirement under the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (Giles Dep. 145). Therefore, the University accepted Plaintiffs resignation by e-mail on December 25, 2002. However, on December 26, President Johnson received a letter (dated December 24) from Plaintiff withdrawing his resignation and requesting sick leave for the spring semester 2003 (Giles Dep. 148-49, 157-60). The University accepted the retraction and Plaintiff remained a University faculty member (Giles Aff. ¶ 19).

Naganathan's denial of a third year of leave and attempted acceptance of Plaintiffs resignation allegedly caused Plaintiff emotional distress (Giles Aff. ¶ 20). His emotional distress, his desire to avoid retaliatory conduct by Naganathan, and an ill family member prompted Plaintiff to take leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (Giles Aff. ¶ 20). The University granted Plaintiff FMLA leave until May 2003 (Giles Dep. Ex. TT), although Plaintiff continued to work at Tuskegee during this leave (Giles Dep. 153).

In June 2003, Kevin West, who had been Murry's intern and was now handling some of Murry's duties while he was on administrative leave, sent Plaintiff a letter advising him that his FMLA leave ended in May 2003, unless he provided documentation of re-evaluation. Without a reevaluation, Plaintiff would be required to return to the University in August 2003 and, if he did not return, he would face termination (Giles Dep. Ex. TT). In July 2003, Plaintiff notified the University that he would not return to teach (Giles Dep. Ex. UU). Because Plaintiff did not return, the University notified Plaintiff, in October 2003, that it was beginning corrective action procedures according to the terms of the CBA.

In November 2003, Plaintiff and University officials held a conference call to discuss his faculty position (West Dep. Exs. 6A, 6B, 7). Plaintiff was unable to provide a reasonable date for his return (West Dep. 64-65). Later that month, Plaintiff e-mailed West and Naganathan indicating he "would like to retire from the Ohio system a little later," because his daughter just started medical school and he "would like to return to UT within the next four (4) years." He also inquired about a possible liaison position from the University to Florida A & M University and Tuskegee (Giles Dep. Ex. WW).

West responded that Plaintiffs continued refusal to return to the University constituted insubordination and job abandonment and notified him that the University scheduled a pre-disciplinary hearing to address these charges on December 22, 2003 (Giles Dep. Ex. XX). Plaintiff was unable to make the December hearing because he wanted to hire an attorney, and the University agreed to work with Plaintiff to reschedule the hearing for early January (Giles Dep. Ex. ZZ). When West did not hear from Plaintiff by early January, West rescheduled the hearing for January 20. Plaintiff did not respond or attend (Giles Dep. Ex. AAA). West then sent Plaintiff a deadline of February 4 to coordinate a new hearing date, but Plaintiff still did not respond; West again rescheduled the hearing, this time for April 2 (Giles Dep. Ex. CCC). Finally, on March 30, West heard from Plaintiff's attorney who requested a delay until May and also requested a large number of documents from the University (Giles Dep. Ex. DDD).

The University provided Plaintiff with the requested documents, numbering thousands of pages, and the hearing continued to be delayed. All the while, Plaintiff continued to teach at Tuskegee. In mid-2005, a year and a half after disciplinary proceedings began and two years after Plaintiff was supposed to return to his position, Plaintiff offered to return to the University to teach (Giles Aff. ¶ 26). However, Plaintiff had been suspended "pending conclusion of the disciplinary process" (Id.; Naganathan Dep. 148-49).

The pre-disciplinary hearing was finally held on October 20, 2005. Provost Goodridge presided over the hearing, despite Plaintiffs objections and, requests for recusal (Giles Aff. ¶ 24). Goodridge recommended Plaintiffs dismissal, finding Plaintiff was insubordinate and abandoned his job (Id. at ¶¶ 23-24; West Aff. Ex. A). After reviewing Goodridge's recommendation and the record, President Johnson issued a notice of dismissal on March 17, 2006 (West Aff. Ex. B).

During the long delay for the pre-disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff twice filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), but the EEOC was "[u]...

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    ...93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), governs claims of retaliation based on circumstantial evidence. See also Giles v. Univ. of Toledo, 478 F.Supp.2d 942, 953 (N.D. Ohio 2007). Therefore, if Ms. Peterson presents a prima facie case of workers' compensation retaliation, the burden shifts to......

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