Giles v. Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. And/Or Wilson Cnty. Sch.
| Decision Date | 28 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 1:17-cv-896,1:17-cv-896 |
| Parties | JILL R. GILES, Plaintiff, v. WILSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and/or WILSON COUNTY SCHOOLS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 41), and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 44). Plaintiff and Defendant each filed a response in opposition (Doc. Nos. 49, 52) and both replied. (Doc. Nos. 57, 58). For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Declaration of Angela Kincaid (Doc. No. 60) and Defendant's Motion to Strike and Notice of Objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Filing New Authority and Alternative Motion for Leave to Respond (Doc. No. 64). The Court DENIES both motions as moot.
Defendant employed Plaintiff as the Principal of W.A. Wright Elementary School from August 2004 to September 2015. (Doc. No. 53 ¶ 1). In 2012, Plaintiff was diagnosed with diverticulitis. (Id. ¶ 2). A "flare up" of Plaintiff's diverticulitis caused Plaintiff to experience severe stomach cramps, diarrhea, nausea, and the need for multiple trips to the restroom. (Id. ¶ 3). Often times, Plaintiff's symptoms occurred in the morning. (Id. ¶ 5). If Plaintiff felt like she was going to be late for work based on how she felt in the morning, she would send a text or an email to her staff at school, and if Plaintiff was going to arrive at work later than 10:45am she would enter an absence for half a day. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10). At the end of the 2014-15 school year, Plaintiff experienced numerous episodes due to her diverticulitis and requested FMLA leave from March 30, 2015 to May 1, 2015; Defendant's approved Plaintiff's request. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13). Exclusive of her FMLA leave, Plaintiff reported being tardy to work twenty-one times during the 2014-15 school year. (Id. ¶ 14). During the 2015-16 school year, Plaintiff continued to need days off from work or to arrive late on certain days due to her medical condition. (Doc. No. 50 ¶ 15)
Due to Plaintiff's illness, the school was without a principal at its disposal, and Plaintiff worried that her attendance issues was not best for the school. (Doc. No. 53 ¶ 20). On September 29, 2015, Mary Ann Sparks ("Ms. Sparks"), the schools Supervisor/Deputy Director of Human Resources for Wilson County Schools, and Dr. Donna Wright ("Dr. Wright"), Director of Schools for Wilson County Schools, received an email from Plaintiff requesting to work extra over fall break or on holidays to make up missed work time. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19, 21). During an October 1, 2015 meeting, Plaintiff, Ms. Sparks, and Dr. Wright discussed Plaintiff's medical condition and absences from school. (Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiff again requested she be allowed to make up absences on weekends and holidays. (Id.). Dr. Wright and Ms. Sparks informed Plaintiff that Wilson County Schools could not offer the accommodation and instead suggested that Plaintiff switch from the Principal position to the Assistant Principal position. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24). Dr. Wight, Ms. Sparks, and Plaintiff agreed to provide Plaintiff an accommodation by switching her position to Assistant Principal and modifying her regular daily work schedule to 8:30am to 4:00pm. (Id. ¶ 26). The transfer to Assistant Principal was intended to allow Plaintiff to work fewer days, 210 days peryear instead of 260 days per year, and allow her rest for her condition. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28). The change in hours also allowed Plaintiff additional flexibility in her schedule because she informed Dr. Wright and Ms. Sparks that her condition made it difficult for her in the mornings. (Id. ¶ 29).
On October 5, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred to the role of Assistant Principal of W.A. Wright Elementary School, but was paid at the rate of a Principal. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36). Plaintiff was to report a half day absence any time she was more than one (1) hour late to school. (Id. ¶ 38). After assuming the Assistant Principal role, from October 5, 2015 to May 12, 2016 Plaintiff was at least one hour late approximately thirty-three days and twenty-seven of those absences were related to Plaintiff's condition. (Id. ¶ 42). On October 22, 2015, Plaintiff requested from Defendant her years of experience and retirement date; before October 22, 2015, Plaintiff and Ms. Sparks never discussed retirement. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41). On April 21, 2016, Plaintiff, Ms. Sparks, and Dr. Wright attended an informal dinner meeting. (Id. ¶ 47). On April 22, 2016, Ms. Sparks emailed Plaintiff information about her eligibility for retirement and information regarding disability retirement, and also suggested she schedule a meeting with the Tennessee Consolidation Retirement System ("TCRS"); Plaintiff thanked Ms. Sparks for the information. (Id. ¶¶ 51). Plaintiff met with a representative of the TCRS on May 6, 2016, and was informed she was not eligible for disability retirement; Plaintiff informed Ms. Sparks that she would not be able to retire with full benefits until she had worked thirty years. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53). At the conclusion of the 2015-2016 school year, Plaintiff needed 1.5 years of employment to reach the thirty years of employment that would make her eligible for full retirement benefits. (Id. ¶ 48).
At the end of the 2015-16 school year, a second full-time homebound teacher position was created for Plaintiff by combining multiple part-time positions. (Id. ¶ 76). Homebound teachers work 200 days per year. (Id. ¶ 74). On May 25, 2016, Plaintiff, Dr. Wright, and Ms. Sparks had ameeting where Plaintiff was informed she was being transferred to a homebound teaching position for the 2016-17 school year. (Id. ¶ 77). After Ms. Sparks and Dr. Wright informed Plaintiff she would be transferred to the homebound teaching position, Plaintiff did not request details regarding the duties of a homebound teacher and she gave no response or alternate suggestion. (Id. ¶ 79). Plaintiff was not told she would have to retire if she did not accept the homebound teaching position and retirement was not discussed at the May 25, 2016 meeting. (Id. ¶¶ 79-80). On May 27, 2016, Plaintiff notified Wilson County Schools she was retiring at the end of the 2015-16 school year and declined the homebound teaching position. (Id. ¶ 87).
On September 19, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Defendant for unlawful employment practices under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Tennessee Disability Act ("TDA"), Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA")1. (Doc. No. 18). Plaintiff asserts Defendant interfered with Plaintiff's rights to continued medical leave, benefits and protections of the FMLA and retaliated against her for requesting and exercising her medical leave under the FMLA. (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff also asserts Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability in violation of the ADA and TDA; failed to reasonable accommodate her disability beyond May 2016; failed to engage in the ADA-mandated good faith interactive process; and retaliated against her for having requested a reasonable accommodation and exercised medical leave. (Id. ¶ 28). Plaintiff requests back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, liquidated damages, and punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 2-6).
Defendant argues summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff cannot establish she was a qualified employee under the ADA or that she requested a reasonable accommodation. (Doc. No. 41). Defendant further argues Plaintiff's FMLA claims should be dismissed because she was provided all requested FMLA benefits and there is no causal connection between the exercise of her FMLA rights and her job change. (Id.). Plaintiff argues summary judgment should be granted in her favor because as a matter of law Defendants violated her rights under the FMLA and the ADA by revoking her reasonable accommodation because of her disability. (Doc. No. 44).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may satisfy this burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an element of the non-moving party's claim or by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts in the light most favorable for the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 242 (6th Cir. 2015); Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court does not weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Rather, the Court determines whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of material fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere scintilla ofevidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient to survive summary judgment; instead, there must be evidence of which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003).
Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot prove constructive discharge, because Defendant transferred Plaintiff to...
To continue reading
Request your trial