Gilkeson v. Koskowski

Decision Date05 June 2012
Docket NumberNo. 9:10-cv-00558-JKS,9:10-cv-00558-JKS
PartiesJAMES GILKESON, Petitioner, v. RAYMOND KOSKOWSKI, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

JAMES GILKESON, Petitioner,
v.
RAYMOND KOSKOWSKI, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondent.

No. 9:10-cv-00558-JKS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: June 5, 2012


ORDER

[Re: Motion at Docket No. 63]

This Court entered judgment denying James Gilkeson's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 21, 2010.1 At Docket No. 63, Gilkeson, a state prisoner appearing pro se, filed a Motion for Relief From Judgment.2 In his motion, Gilkeson requests this Court: (1) reopen this case and grant a mandatory evidentiary hearing; and (2) grant de novo review for the first, fourth, and fifth grounds raised in his Petition.

In addition to unsuccessfully appealing from the judgment,3 this is Gilkeson's second motion for post-conviction relief. On May 3, 2011, Gilkeson filed a Motion for Reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60,4 which this Court, treating it as a timely motion to

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alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, denied on June 7, 2011.5Gilkeson did not appeal from that Order.

In his current motion Gilkeson seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which authorizes this Court to relieve him from a judgment for "any other reason that justifies relief."6 In his motion, Gilkeson challenges the "integrity of the first habeas corpus proceeding" and requests this Court reopen this case. Gilkeson points to three errors that he alleges undermined the integrity of the proceedings: (1) refusal to reach the merits of his first ground for relief (sufficiency of the evidence) by falsely claiming that the state appellate court decision rests on state law alone; (2) refusal of this Court to consider Gilkeson's affidavit filed in the state-appellate court as being of equal weight to the victim's testimony; and (3) failure to grant Gilkeson a mandatory evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute between the victim's testimony at trial and Gilkeson's post-trial affidavit, which Gilkeson contends would establish his actual innocence.

First, Rule 60(b)(6) may not be used as a substitute for appeal.7 Each of the issues Gilkeson attempts to raise in his current motion are clearly of record and could have been raised on appeal. In his Notice of Appeal Gilkeson appealed from every portion of this Court's decision.8

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Second, Gilkeson is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court made clear in Pinholster that "review under [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits."9 "Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings."10 "If the state-court decision 'identifies the correct governing legal principle' in effect at the time, a federal court must assess whether the decision 'unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'"11 As the Supreme Court noted, "[i]t would be strange to ask federal courts to analyze whether a state court's adjudication resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state court."12Although under Pinholster an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas proceeding is not absolutely precluded, Pinholster also made clear that the discretion to grant a request for an evidentiary hearing is cabined by § 2254(e)(2),13 which provides:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—

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(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

Gilkeson's request in this case does not meet that standard. Nor, based upon the record before this Court, can it be said that the state courts precluded him from developing the factual basis for his claim.14

Distilled to its essence, Gilkeson simply requests this Court to weigh the testimony in his affidavit, which was not presented to the jury, against the testimony of the victim, which was presented to the jury. Gilkeson misperceives the role of a federal court in a habeas proceeding challenging a state-court conviction. This Court is precluded from either re-weighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of witnesses. As articulated by the Supreme Court in Jackson, the constitutional standard for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."15 In making this determination, this Court may not usurp the role of the finder of fact by considering how it would have resolved any conflicts in the evidence, made the inferences, or considered the evidence at trial.16 Under Jackson, the role of this...

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