Gilkey v. State, 88,208
Decision Date | 03 January 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 88,208,88,208 |
Citation | 31 Kan.App.2d 77,60 P.3d 351 |
Parties | WILLIAM A. GILKEY, Appellant, v. STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Michael P. Whalen, of Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, for appellant.
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Nola Foulston, district attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, for appellee.
Before GERNON. P.J., KNUDSON, J., and LARSON, S.J.
William A. Gilkey appeals from the trial court's summary denial of his motion filed under K.S.A. 60-1507. On appeal, Gilkey contends the trial court did not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Supreme Court Rule 183(j) (2001 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 210). Alternatively, Gilkey contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his motion without an evidentiary hearing.
We affirm the trial court. The court's findings and conclusions are sufficient for meaningful appellate review. The court did not err in concluding Gilkey's motion presented no issues of fact or law upon which relief should be granted.
The underlying facts of the criminal case are reported in Gilkey's direct appeal. State v. Gilkey, No. 81,002, unpublished opinion filed August 4, 2000.
Gilkey first contends the trial court's lack of specific findings and its conclusions are not adequate under Supreme Court Rule 183(j) and require a remand to the trial court for compliance. The State objects to our consideration of this issue, arguing Gilkey's failure to raise this issue before the trial court precludes appellate review.
Hill v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 263 Kan. 703, 706, 952 P.2d 1286 (1998).
Supreme Court Rule 183(j) requires that "[t]he court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented." (2001 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 211.)
The State's objection is persuasive. However, we may still consider a remand if the lack of specific findings precludes meaningful appellate review. See State v. Moncla, 269 Kan. 61, 65, 4 P.3d 618 (2000); Stewart v. State, 30 Kan. App. 2d 380, 42 P.3d 205 (2002). As pointedly noted in Moncla:
(Emphasis added.) 269 Kan. at 65.
Ordinarily, denial of a 60-1507 motion without an evidentiary hearing is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Lujan v. State, 270 Kan. 163, 169, 14 P.3d 424 (2000). We believe that highly deferential standard is in part based upon an assumption that the trial judge considering the 60-1507 motion is the same trial judge who presided at the underlying criminal proceeding. In Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 659-60, 694 P.2d 468 (1985), the court stated:
In this instance, Judge Paul Clark was also the presiding judge in Gilkey's criminal case. Thus, we will give great deference to his factual findings. This circumstance is not unimportant in ascertaining whether the trial court should be presumed to have found all facts necessary to support dismissal of Gilkey's petition. See Hill, 263 Kan. at 706. We are less inclined to indulge in such a presumption when the trial judge was not also the presiding judge in the criminal case. See Gilkey v. State, 31 Kan. App. 2d 84, 60 P.3d 347 (2002) (No. 88,234), a decision this date in an unrelated 60-1507 by the same petitioner. We do not suggest some seismic shift in our standard of review, but rather acknowledge the superior vantage point of the judge who presided in the criminal case.
At the preliminary hearing to consider Gilkey's motion, the parties presented the following argument:
Brown's argument was then followed by the argument of Debra Peterson.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Pabst v. State
...upon the wisdom and determination of the trial judge who saw all of the [criminal case] first hand as [it] happened.'" Gilkey v. State, 31 Kan.App.2d 77, 78, 60 P.3d 351, rev. denied 275 Kan. 963 (2003) (quoting Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 659-60, 694 P.2d 468 Pabst takes exception ......
-
Laymon v. State
...under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Estes v. State, 221 Kan. 412, 414, 559 P.2d 392 (1977); see also Gilkey v. State, 31 Kan.App.2d 77, 78, 60 P.3d 351, rev. denied 275 Kan. 963 (2003). And Supreme Court Rule 183(h) (2004 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 221) states that the "sentencing cou......
-
McCormick v. Kline
...1. Kansas law assumes that the trial judge will rule on a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to § 60-1507. Gilkey v. State, 31 Kan.App.2d 77, 60 P.3d 351, 353 (2003). 2. When Kerley was decided, the statutory provision was numbered 21-4608(3). Section 21-4608(c) is identical to § 21......
-
Bellamy v. State
... ... in affirming the denial of petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on evidence from a hearing on the 1507 motion); Gilkey v. State, 31 Kan.App.2d 77, 78, 82, 60 ... 172 P.3d 15 ... P.3d 351, rev. denied 275 Kan. 963 (2003) (applying an abuse of discretion standard in ... ...